Discuillo v. Stone & WebsterDiscuillo v. Stone & Webster
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Lead Opinion
Opinion
BORDEN, J.The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the limitation period within which the plaintiff was required to file his workers’ compensation claim began to run before he actually was aware that the heart attack he had suffered was work-related.1 The plaintiff, Peter Discuillo, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the decision of the compensation review board (board). The board had determined that the workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) improperly had concluded that the plaintiffs notice of claim was timely filed. We conclude that the plaintiffs notice of claim was not timely filed and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The relevant facts, as found by the commissioner, are set forth in the Appellate Court opinion. “Prior to November 12, 1982, the plaintiff was employed by the
“On November 12,1982, the plaintiff sustained a heart attack after working the entire day on scaffolding using a heavy grinding machine. The plaintiff has not worked since that date. The plaintiff did not relate the heart attack to job stress until September, 1984, when he read in a newspaper about a similar case. On September 27, 1984, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim that identified his injury as the November 12, 1982 heart attack while in the defendant’s employ. On October 22, 1984, the defendant filed a notice contesting the claim on the grounds that (1) the heart attack did not arise out of the employment and (2) the claim was barred by the (General Statutes [Rev. to 1981]) § 31-2943 time limitations.
“The board reversed the commissioner’s decision and concluded that the plaintiffs claim is barred by § 31-294. The board held that a heart attack is an accidental injury and not an injury that is the direct result of repetitive trauma and that notice of claim for a heart attack must be filed within one year of the attack to be timely.” Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 43 Conn. App. 224, 225-26, 682 A.2d 145 (1996).
The Appellate Court, relying on its interpretation of our decision in Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993), affirmed the decision of the board. The Appellate Court concluded that, even if a heart attack was an injury that was the result of a repetitive trauma, as opposed to an accidental injury, the one year filing limitation of § 31-294 automatically applied to the former type of claim as well as to the latter. Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 43 Conn. App. 226. The Appellate Court further concluded that,
The plaintiffs principal claim is that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the limitation period on his claim effectively began to run on the last day of his employment, rather than on the date that he became aware that his injury was work-related.4 The defendant responds that the Appellate Court correctly held that repetitive trauma claims always must be filed within one year of the claimant’s last day of exposure to the relevant stress, and that the claimant’s date of awareness of the nature of his injury is irrelevant. We conclude that, even if the plaintiffs heart attack is properly classified as a repetitive trauma injury, rather than an accidental injury, the limitation period in this case began to run on the date of the plaintiffs heart attack, which was also his last day of work and therefore the last day on which he was exposed to the relevant work-related traumas. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The workers’ compensation scheme explicitly provides for three categories of compensable injury: (1) accidental injury; (2) repetitive trauma injury; and (3) occupational disease. See
The plaintiff argues that, given this statutory silence, the “humanitarian purpose” of the workers’ compensation system is best effectuated by judicial creation of
The fundamental problem with the plaintiffs position is that it ignores the fact that the workers’ compensation system in Connecticut is derived exclusively from statute. We have previously observed that the workers’ compensation commission, like any administrative body, “must act strictly within its statutory authority .... It cannot modify, abridge, or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which it acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it that power.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, supra, 237 Conn. 4, citing Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 428, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). A commissioner may exercise jurisdiction to hear a claim only “under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.” Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44 (1963); see also Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 60, 566 A.2d 670 (1989). “[I]t is settled law that the commissioner’s jurisdiction is confined by the [Workers’ Compensation Act] and limited by its provisions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. United Aircraft Corp., 159 Conn. 302, 305, 268 A.2d 660 (1970).
We therefore conclude that, for a commissioner to have jurisdiction over a claim, that claim must fit within the existing jurisdictional provisions of § 31-294. In other words, for purposes of jurisdiction, every cognizable claim must be considered as stemming from either an “accident” or an “occupational disease” as those terms are used in § 31-294.7 We acknowledge, however, that
In this regard, we first note that the plaintiffs heart attack does not closely resemble an “occupational disease.” The term “occupational disease” is specifically defined in
In the present case, the workplace circumstances that allegedly caused the plaintiffs heart attack cannot be said to be “peculiar to” his occupation as a painter. The physical stresses he describes — having to lift, carry, and use heavy pieces of equipment — are present in many jobs involving manual labor. Likewise, the mental stress created by close supervision and productivity pressure is common throughout the working world. Neither type of stress is “distinctively associated with” the plaintiffs particular occupation as a painter. Thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs heart attack resulted from an occupational disease because his job and experiences as a painter were no more likely to cause his heart attack “than would other kinds of employment carried on under the same conditions.” Madeo v. I. Dibner & Bro., Inc., 121 Conn. 664, 667, 186 A. 616 (1936); see Crochiere v. Board of Education, supra, 227 Conn. 353 (music teacher could not claim mental injury as occupational disease where injury based upon false charges of sexual misconduct by student, because such allegations “could arise in numerous occupational settings”); Hansen v. Gordon, supra, 221 Conn. 37 (hepatitis was occupational disease where dental hygienist was “at a particular risk of contracting [hepatitis] because of [her] contact with blood and other secretions”); cf. Zaleta v. Fairfield, 38 Conn. App. 1, 7-8, 658 A.2d 166, cert. denied, 234 Conn. 917, 661 A.2d 98 (1995) (hyper
In conjunction with our conclusion that the plaintiffs heart attack, even if stemming from repetitive trauma, does not resemble an occupational disease, we also conclude that the plaintiffs particular claim does resemble an accidental injury.
Furthermore, § 31-294 does not contain any provision for tolling the filing period for a claim of accidental
Neither § 31-294 nor any antecedent statute, however, has ever contained any language so tolling the running of the limitation period for a claim based on accidental injury. Indeed, our precedent explicitly holds that, given the absence of such language, the limitation period for a claim based on accidental injury is not tolled simply because the claimant is unaware that he or she has suffered a compensable injury. In Gavigan v. Visiting Nurses Assn., 125 Conn. 290, 4 A.2d 923 (1939), the plaintiff suffered a fall at work in 1933, but she did not visit a doctor until 1938, when she experienced severe back pain. Id., 291. The plaintiff was then informed that her fall five years earlier had fractured her coccyx. The plaintiff presented a compensation claim shortly thereafter. Id. This court held that the commissioner properly refused to consider the plaintiffs claim. Id., 293. The applicable jurisdictional statute at the time provided, as it does now; see footnote 3 of this opinion; that claims of accidental injury had to be filed “within
Because the legislature has not acted to change the Gavigan rule in the fifty years since that case was decided, we presume that the legislature acquiesces in our interpretation. See Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 693-94, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996). Accordingly, our conclusion that the plaintiffs injury in the present case is accidental for purposes of § 31-294 compels the conclusion that the limitation period on his claim began to run on the date of his heart attack, even though he was unaware that his injury was work-related.
In the present case, the plaintiff never returned to work after his heart attack. Consequently, the date of his heart attack is also his last date of exposure to the relevant stresses. Because the plaintiff did not file his claim within one year of that date, we conclude that the commissioner in this case improperly exercised jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion NORCOTT, PALMER and PETERS, Js., concurred.
Notes
We granted the plaintiffs petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “When does the statute of limitations begin to run in a workers’ compensation case in which the plaintiff suffers a work-related heart attack but does not learn that the heart attack is work related until two years thereafter?” Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 239 Conn. 953, 688 A.2d 325 (1996).
The defendants in this ease are Stone and Webster, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and the second injury fund. For purposes of this appeal, we will refer to Stone and Webster as the defendant.
At the time of the plaintiffs injury,
All references herein to
See footnote 1 of this opinion for the certified question. Subsequent to certification, the plaintiff, pursuant to
At the time of the plaintiff’s injury,
All references herein to
See footnote 3 of this opinion for the text of
There is no legislative history that illuminates the reason, if any, that the drafters of No. 191 of the 1947 Public Acts did not create an explicit limitation period for the bringing of a repetitive trauma claim. Likewise, there is no indication of what those drafters intended the limitation period for a claim of repetitive trauma to be. In light, however, of the principle that the legislature is presumed to have intended to create a consistent body of law; Cagiva North America, Inc. v. Schenk, 239 Conn. 1, 8, 680 A.2d 964 (1996); it is reasonable to infer that the legislature intended that the then new repetitive trauma claims be folded into one of the preexisting jurisdictional categories. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
Of course, one could theoretically argue that, because there is no explicit filing period for repetitive trauma claims in
At the time of the plaintiff siryury,
The preceding language is presently codified, with minor technical changes, at
We emphasize that our characterization of the plaintiffs injury is based upon the specific facts of this particular case. We therefore disagree with the Appellate Court to the extent that it suggested that repetitive trauma injuries must automatically be treated as accidental injuries for purposes of
We have adopted this general rule out of recognition that, in many cases involving repetitive trauma, the very nature of the injury will make it impossible to demarcate a specific date of injury. Thus, out of necessity, some other clear threshold had to be established as the start of the applicable limitation period. The last day of exposure to the relevant trauma is a logical choice, as the process of injury from a repetitive trauma is ongoing until that point. See, e.g., Pick v. Pratt & Whitney, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 164 (1988). We emphasize, however, that the fact that we properly may fill in the interstices of
We also note that, although the last day of a claimant’s exposure to a repetitive trauma often coincides with the last day of the claimant’s employment; Borent v. State, 10 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 219, 220 (1992); the former is the sole germane date for calculating the limitation period on a claim. As the Appellate Court in Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 43 Conn. App. 225, implicitly recognized, our dicta in Crochiere v. Board of Education, supra, 227 Conn. 354, to the effect that the final date of a claimant’s employment has independent significance, was an incorrect application of board precedent.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. This case raises a pivotal issue under Connecticut’s workers’ compensation law with respect to the limitation period within which an employee must file his or her claim for a work-related
There are three classes of compensable injuries under our workers’ compensation law: (1) accidental injury; (2) occupational disease; and (3) repetitive trauma injury.
The majority recognizes that the legislature clearly intended that repetitive trauma injury be recognized as a third category of compensable injury;
In this case, the majority imposes a one year limitation for the plaintiffs repetitive trauma claim because
In my view, a repetitive trauma injury has its own legislative identity and cannot be merged into the classification of an accidental injury or an occupational disease, as the majority attempts to do. I conclude, for the reasons set forth herein, that the notice for a repetitive trauma injury must be filed within one year from the date of the employee’s last exposure to the work-related repetitive trauma, or the last day worked, whichever is later, but that the limitation period is subject to a “discovery” rule. The discovery rule tolls the time by which notice of the injury must be filed until the employee discovers, or should have discovered through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she has been injured and that the injury is causally connected to his or her employment.
The following relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Prior to November 12, 1982, the plaintiff was employed as a painter by the named defendant, Stone and Webster (defendant).4 The plaintiffs job responsibilities required him to climb ladders and to work on scaffolding while carrying five gallon buckets of paint, heavy pneumatic grinding equipment and heavy rubber air hoses. He was required to carry this paint and equipment up the ladders in order to grind and paint beams
On November 12,1982, before the work day was over, the plaintiff began to experience chest pains as he was cleaning his equipment. When he walked to his car to drive home, the chest pains became worse and he sat in his car and waited for them to subside. The next morning he was taken to Lawrence Memorial Hospital in New London and was treated for a heart attack by Robert Linden, an internist. Linden’s discharge summary noted that the plaintiff had the risk factors for a heart attack because of smoking and a family history of heart disease. The doctor’s records did not indicate that the plaintiff suffered from stress on the job.
The plaintiff testified that he did not relate his heart attack to job stress until September, 1984, approximately two years after the heart attack, when he read a newspaper story depicting a person who had suffered a heart attack that resulted from job stress. Consequently, on September 27, 1984, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim that identified his November 12, 1982 heart attack as resulting from his employment with the defendant. The plaintiff was subsequently examined by Martin J. Frank, a board certified cardiologist, and he confirmed that physical and emotional stress on the job was a significant and precipitating factor causing the plaintiffs heart attack. The defendant filed with the
The commissioner hearing this case found that the heart attack suffered by the plaintiff was caused by physical and emotional job stress, as well as arteriosclerotic heart disease. The commissioner also concluded that the plaintiffs claim was not time barred under
I
Although the majority does not reach the issue, I first resolve that the injury in this case — the plaintiffs heart attack — was caused by work-related repetitive trauma. “Our standard of review of the [review] board’s determination is clear. [T]he [review board’s] hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a de novo hearing of the facts. Although the [review board] may take additional material evidence, this is proper only if it is shown to its satisfaction that good reasons exist as to why the evidence was not presented to the commissioner. Otherwise, it is obliged to hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts. . . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts rests on the commissioner, the
The commissioner’s finding in the present case that the plaintiffs injury was primarily the result of repetitive trauma is consistent with the evidence in the record. There was no evidence indicating that on the date of the heart attack the plaintiff was subjected to any unusual excitement or overexertion, or that he was involved in an “accident.” More importantly, the commissioner found that Frank, the plaintiffs cardiologist, “was of the opinion that the job stress [that the plaintiff] experienced was a significant factor in the cause of the [heart attack]” and “that [the plaintiff] had an ongoing cardiac disease prior to November 12, 1982, but that the stress of work probably was the precipitating factor causing [the plaintiffs heart attack].” The commissioner indicated that “[t]he doctor described the stress as both physical and emotional. He believed that the combination of long hours of holding a grinding machine while working on a scaffold coupled with the mental pressure of supervisors produced the stress that precipitated the [heart attack]. ” The commissioner credited this medical opinion, and discounted the opinion of Linden, the plaintiffs treating physician at the time of the heart attack. The commissioner’s finding that the work-related repetitive trauma was a significant and precipitating factor causing the plaintiffs heart attack must stand.
II
The majority concludes that “even if the plaintiffs heart attack is properly classified as a repetitive trauma
The majority’s conclusion that a repetitive trauma injury could be classified as an accidental injury for the purpose of determining when the employee must give notice is contrary to the statutory definition of an accidental injury. An accidental injury is clearly defined as an injury “definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred . . . .”
Although I do not agree with the majority’s analysis or its conclusion, I agree that there is a one year limitation period for repetitive trauma claims. We made that abundantly clear in Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 348, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993). But that one year period is measured, in the first instance, from “the last day of exposure to the work-related incidents of repetitive trauma, or the last day worked, whichever is later.” Id., 354.5 In Crochiere, however, we never discussed the discovery rule, which is deeply embedded in the limitation period for repetitive trauma claims, because the employee in that case made his claim within one year from the date that his employment terminated. See id.
As previously noted, the limitations period for repetitive trauma claims is subject to a discovery rule — that is, the one year period is tolled until the employee discovers, or should have discovered through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she has been injured and that the injury is causally connected to his or her employment. The review board has held so for a period spanning the last ten years. See, e.g., O’Leary v. New Britain, 3 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 108, 110 (1986); Boutin v. Industrial Components, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 23 (1987); Dorsett v. General Dynamics Corp., 8 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 77, 79, aff‘d, 23 Conn. App. 827, 584 A.2d 484 (1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 218 Conn. 901, 588 A.2d 1076 (1991); Edmounds v. Machlett Laboratories, 9 Conn.
In Boutin, a case involving an employee who suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome because of work-related repetitive trauma, the review board reversed the ruling of the commissioner below. The commissioner who conducted the hearing ruled that the employee’s claim was time barred because she had not sent a notice of claim to her employer within one year of the 1980 surgery on her arm, the time by which notice must be sent in accidental injury cases. In Boutin, the employee’s neurosurgeon, approximately one year after surgery on her right arm, “informed the claimant for the first time that the carpal tunnel condition in both arms was due to her work.” Boutin v. Industrial Components, supra, 4 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 20. The employee filed a claim within weeks after being informed of this connection to her work. Id. The then chairperson of the workers’ compensation commission, John Arcudi, wrote in Boutin that “[w]e would need to hold that [the] claimant’s remedy expired before she could know that she was injured in order to affirm the ruling below. Such a determination offends equity and logic.” Id., 21. Consequently, Arcudi articulated a logical rule: “[T]he limitation period [for repetitive trauma injuries] is not triggered until the employee knew or should have known that he has a disabling condition arising from the employment.” Id., 23. Boutin points out that this rule of law is consistent with the development of workers’ compensation law in Connecticut, and relies on this court’s reasoning in Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, Inc., 118 Conn. 666, 174 A. 172 (1934).6 Although
The discovery rule adopted by the review board should control based upon several tenets of statutory construction. “We accord great deference to the construction given to
I recognize that in September, 1996, a majority of the review board reversed its long-standing discovery rule for repetitive trauma claims by overruling Boutin. See Dorsey v. United Technologies Corp./Norden Systems, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 447, 450 (1996). In Dorsey, however, chairperson Jesse M. Frankl dissented with respect to the reversal of the rule set forth in Boutin.7 In his dissent, Frankl not only noted that the Boutin decision had been repeatedly followed by the review board, but he also noted that “[t]he doctrine
As indicated by the dissent in Dorsey, it is not that much of a leap to apply the legislative policy underlying
The previously long-standing rule applied in the Boutin decision, and as argued for in the dissent in Dorsey, is in line with the liberal thrust of the workers’ compensation law in this state. Indeed, in Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 231 Conn. 469, 483, 650 A.2d 1240 (1994), this court recently reaffirmed that the act is to be liberally construed — and that case included the four justices who comprise the majority on this panel. That is a construction that we have consistently applied over the years. See, e.g., Dubois v. General Dynamics Corp., 222 Conn. 62, 67, 607 A.2d 431 (1992) (“[w]e have also stated that [w]e are mindful of the principles underlying Connecticut practice in [workers’] compensation cases: that the legislation is remedial in nature . . . and that it should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose” [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); Massolini v. Driscoll, 114 Conn. 546, 553, 159 A. 480 (1932) (“[t]he [a]ct is to be construed with sufficient liberality to carry into effect the beneficent puipose contemplated in.that legislation, and not to defeat that purpose by narrow and technical definition”).
The logic of the majority, however, eludes me. The majority stresses that “the workers’ compensation system in Connecticut is derived exclusively from statute” and, therefore, the court is unable “to craft a limitation period for repetitive trauma claims . . . .” Having said this, the majority does exactly what it claims cannot be done by in fact crafting a limitation period. The problem with this crafted limitation period is that it is uncertain and it could expire before the employee has knowledge that he or she has in fact been injured by repetitive trauma. Finally, adopting the purest position of the majority, namely, that the act is exclusively statutory, would require that this court conclude that there is in fact no limitation period for repetitive trauma injuries because no time limitation is specifically provided for by statute.
It is axiomatic that the workers’ compensation law provides an employee with the exclusive remedy for his or her work-related injuries, but the majority’s result deprives the plaintiff of this remedy for his heart attack that was caused by work-related repetitive trauma. The majority rigidly applies a time limitation applicable to accidental injuries when the statute is silent with
Accordingly, I dissent.
“(11) ‘Occupational disease’ includes any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such and includes any disease due to or attributable to exposure to or contact with any radioactive material by an employee in the course of his employment. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
At the time of the plaintiffs injury,
The present version of the statute is codified at
In 1947, when the legislature amended the statute in effect at that time to include repetitive trauma injuries as a third class of compensable ir\jury, to be added to the already existing accidental injury and occupational disease claims; Public Acts 1947, No. 191; it apparently neglected to include a time limitation for repetitive trauma claims. See footnote 7 of the majority opinion. To this day, the legislature has not corrected this statutory gap.
In addition to the named defendant, there are other defendants in this case. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion. References herein to the defendant are to Stone and Webster.
The rule in Crochiere was based upon the precedent from several cases of the review board. Crochiere v. Board of Education, supra, 227 Conn. 353-54.
In Bremner, this court held, relying on the “ ‘first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease’ ” language in the statute in effect at that time, that the statutory limitation period for an occupational disease claim does not begin to run until the employee knew or should have known that the disease is work-related. Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, Inc., supra, 118 Conn. 669-72. Specifically, the court stated: “No doubt the legislature used the word manifestation with something of this significance, intending that the duty of giving notice, and the risk that an employee might forfeit compensation for an occupational disease, should arise only when a symptom of that disease should plainly appear, not when it was merely suspected or doubtful.” Id., 669-70. At the time of the Bremner decision, occupational disease claims had to be brought within one year “from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease . . . provided no claim . . . shall be made by an employee or his dependents . . . except while the employee is still in such employ or within three years after leaving such employ . . . .” General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 5245. The three year cap was later increased to five years. See General Statutes (1939 Sup.) § 1330e. That cap was eventually eliminated altogether. See footnote 9 and the accompanying text of this dissent.
Although Frankl wrote the decisión of the review board that dismissed the plaintiffs .claim in this case as untimely, the review board’s decision did not disavow the discovery rule for repetitive trauma claims, but, rather, it improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that all heart attacks are caused by an accidental injury and not by repetitive trauma. I do not dispute that under the facts of any given case a heart attack could be caused by an accidental injury, but it depends on the facts of the case and it is for the commissioner to make those findings of fact. The commissioner in this case determined that the plaintiffs heart attack was caused by repetitive trauma. See part I of this dissent.
The majority cites to Gavigan v. Visiting Nurses Assn., 125 Conn. 290, 292, 4 A.2d 923 (1939), for the proposition that “our precedent explicitly holds that, given the absence of [tolling] language [in
At that time, the limitation period for occupational disease claims was codified at