127 Wis. 651 | Wis. | 1906
Lead Opinion
The general question here presented is whether a nonresident and alien creditor may sue a nonresident and alien debtor in the courts of this state upon a cause
The plaintiff, however, is within neither of these principles. It is a nonresident, it has no property of any kind within the state, it has made no contract within the state or with any resident of the state. It has brought action against another nonresident alien, temporarily within the state, to redress a wrong committed without the state, and it asks the courts of this state not only to give it judgment for that wrong, but also to lend the aid of its process to impound property within the state and satisfy such judgment therefrom to the prejudice of one of the state’s own citizens who has a claim against the same debtor. It is true that the cause of action is transitory and the parties both within the jurisdic
This court bas held that a resident of another state may sue another nonresident upon a transitory cause of action arising outside of this state, in our courts, as a matter of strict right. Eingartner v. Illinois S. Co. 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664. This ruling was, however, based solely upon
“It is the duty as well as the right of every nation to administer justice to its own citizens; but there is no uniform and constant practice of nations as to taking cognizance of controversies between foreigners. It may be assumed or declined at the discretion of each state, guided by such motives as may influence its judicial policy.”
Mr. Webster, in his argument in the case of Bank of U. S. v. Primrose, defined the doctrine of comity as follows:
“It is, in general terms, that there are, between nations at peace with one another, rights, both national and individual, resulting from the comity or courtesy due from one friendly nation to another. Among these is the right to sue in their courts, respectively.” 6 Webster, Works, 117.
The principle is impliedly recognized in Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240. This was a libel for salvage upon a French vessel which had been damaged in a collision on the high seas and brought into an American port by a crew put
“These doubts [i. e. doubts as to the jurisdiction] seem rather founded on the idea that upon the principles of general policy this court ought not to take cognizance of a case arising entirely between foreigners, than from any positive incapacity to do so. On weighing the considerations drawn from public convenience, those in favor of the jurisdiction appear much to overbalance those against it, and it is the opinion of this court that whatever doubts may exist in a case where the jurisdiction is objected to, there ought to be none where the parties assent to it.”
It is very manifest that the case was entertained and decided not because the alien parties had a right to demand it, but because considerations of public convenience seemed in that case to require it. Had considerations of public policy, convenience, or the protection of the interests of our own citizens been upon the other side of the question, it seems evident that the court would have refused to exercise its jurisdiction. This is really the principle of comity. It is a question of discretion in the exercise of power, not a question of the existence of the power itself, for that is admitted.
In an early case in New York it was said that while our courts may take cognizance of torts committed on the high seas on board a foreign vessel where both parties are foreigners, still “it must, on principles of policy; often rest in the sound discretion of the court to afford jurisdiction or not according to the circumstances of the case. To say that it can be claimed in all cases, as matter of right, would introduce a principle which might oftentimes be attended with manifest disadvantage and serious injury to our citizens abroad as well as to foreigners here.” Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134. This doctrine was approved in Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cow. 543; Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31; Olzen v. Schierenberg, 3 Daly, 100; and the doctrine was also held in that
Holding, therefore, that the main action in the present case, with its equitable auxiliary proceedings to impoqnd nonleviable property, is to be maintained in the courts of this state (if at all) upon the ground of comity rather than upon the ground of right, we are to inquire what the general principles of comity are, and what circumstances in the present case are to be considered in deciding whether the courts of this state should extend their aid to the plaintiff. Comity is defined as: “Courtesy; a disposition to accommodate.” By the rules of comity between nations, the courts of one state will voluntarily enforce the laws of a friendly state or nation when, by such enforcement, they will not violate their own public policy or laws or injuriously affect the interests of their own state or of their own citizens. While this court has not had occasion to consider the application of the principles
In Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 60, 54 N. W. 395, the
“Our own citizens, in a proper case, would no doubt be protected against the effect of such extraterritorial act and*665 adjudication, if injurious to tbeir interests or in conflict with tbe laws and public policy of Wisconsin, and effect would not be given to it at tbe expense of injustice to our own citizens.”
Tbis was not a cbance remark, but a .careful statement of tbe principle of comity as applied to tbe case before tbe court, and was thoroughly supported by citations of and quotations from tbe authorities, which need not be repeated here. Tbis case has since been cited with approval in Hughes v. Hunner, 91 Wis. 116, 120, 64 N. W. 887; Parker v. Stoughton M. Co. 91 Wis. 174, 180, 64 N. W. 751; Wyman v. Kimberly-Clark Co. 93 Wis. 554, 559, 67 N. W. 932; Finney v. Guy, 106 Wis. 256, 82 N. W. 595; and by tbe present chief justice in bis concurring opinion in Eingartner v. Illinois S. Co. 94 Wis. 70, 84, 68 N. W. 669, where be also says:
“Actions like the- one at bar [which was an action by one nonresident against another for a tort committed in Illinois] are generally governed by tbe principles of interstate comity.”
In Finney v. Guy, supra, it is said in tbe opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall:
“Tbis court recognizes fully tbe importance of interstate comity and uniformly freely gives effect to it as regards tbe laws of sister states when it will not seriously violate tbe policy of our own laws or tbe rights of our own citizens. . . . A liberal course in tbe enforcement of the laws of other states in proper cases should be tbe rule, but the paramount duty of our judicial system is to safeguard our own state policy and prevent injustice to our own people within reasonable limits.” 106 Wis. 276, 277 (82 N. W. 602).
Upon these principles, then, we are to determine whether tbe plaintiff should be allowed by tbe courts of tbis state to take tbe moneys which it has impounded, and in determining tbis question a brief reference to tbe facts at tbis point will be helpful. Terlinden committed a tort (tbe nature of which does not appear) against tbe plaintiff in Germany in May, 1901, and fled to tbis country, bringing tbe money in question and depositing it in bank. It appears to have been
It may be admitted that there is nothing contrary to our laws or public policy in the prosecution of an action by a foreigner against another to recover damages for a tort committed abroad, provided that the legal business of citizens is not materially interfered with thereby. The policy of our laws is to give every man a certain and efficient remedy in the courts for the wrongs which he may suffer. It may be admitted, also, that by the mere prosecution of the action to judgment in the present case no interest of the public nor of any of our citizens was prejudiced. But the plaintiff was not content simply to prosecute his action to judgment. At the inception of his action he asked and obtained the help of the court to seize and hold property of the defendant within.
As to the equitable action in aid of the garnishment against the Marine National Bank, while the general principles of comity already discussed are equally applicable, there are some further considerations. In this case neither party obtained any lien on the fund by reason of the attempted garnishments, because it was represented only by a negotiable instrument which the bank had issued to Terlinden. Stats. 1898, sec. 2769, subd. 1. The equitable action was, therefore, brought by the plaintiff, to which Umbreit was made a party, in order to reach the indebtedness represented by the negotiable instrument and subject it to any judgment which might be obtained in the main action. At the time this action was brought Umbreit had brought his action against Ter-linden, obtained service by publication only, and had attempted to garnish the Marine National Bank, but had obtained no judgment. In the complaint in the equitable action the plaintiff alleged that Umbreit claimed a lien on the instrument by reason of his subsequent garnishment of the bank, but alleged that such garnishment was without validity and without jurisdiction, and therefore prayed that Um-
There is no bill of exceptions in the case, and hence tbe findings of fact are solely to 'be considered, and by them we are only informed that Umbreit obtained judgment by default upon substituted service of tbe summons, and tbe question has occurred to us (though not suggested in tbe briefs) whether such a judgment constitutes any proof that any sum was owing from Terlinden to Umbreit; in other words, is tbe judgment itself proof of personal liability, especially when tbe parties are litigating their rights before a court of equity ? Tbe validity and justice of tbe plaintiff’s judgment in tbe main action cannot be questioned, because it was rendered after personal service of tbe summons and is unappealed from, but the defendant Umbreit has no such judgment and is not found, as matter of fact, to have bad any claim against Terlinden, except bis judgment obtained by default on substituted service. When be comes into a court of equity and makes bis affirmative claim for priority of right in property which tbe plaintiff bad in form equitably impounded and upon which be ( Umbreit) bad no actual lien, must there not be a finding that be actually bad a just claim in order to justify tbe court in protecting bim? Is bis judgment any
The act of 1868, above named, as codified by subd. 1, sec. 2639, B. S. 18Y8, added a new class of cases in which service by publication was authorized, namely, cases where
We conclude that in the case of the creditors’ bill against
By the Court. — Tbe judgments in both actions are reversed, with costs. Tbe garnishment action is remanded with directions to render judgment for tbe defendant Umbreit tbat be recover tbe sum garnished, with costs. Tbe equitable action is remanded to take further proof, and for judgment in accordance with tbe opinion.-
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I briefly state tbe grounds of my dissent in tbis case. It seems to be well established tbat one alien may sue another alien in tbe state courts upon contract made abroad or for a tort committed in a foreign coun
“The right to proceed by process of attachment has been limited by the statutes of some of the states to a citizen of the state or to a citizen of some other of the United States. As a rule, however, at the present time this right is not ordinarily affected by the question of citizenship, and it is generally immaterial that the attaching creditor is a nonresident.” 4 Oyc. 406.
“Where the statutory grounds for the issuance of the writ of garnishment exist, the proceedings may be instituted against all persons, both individual and corporate, and irrespective of whether they are residents or nonresidents, unless,, of course, they enjoy some special immunity from suit. The statutes authorizing the issuance of writs of garnishment are,, as a rule, very broad in regard to the persons who may take-advantage of the process, and generally.provide for its issuance on the application of any person; and the word ‘person/ as so used, has been held to include all individuals, nonresidents as well as residents, corporations, and sovereignties.” 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 752.
“Since, as a general rule, the garnishing creditor acquires no greater right in the property or credits in the hands of the garnishee than that possessed by the defendant at the time of the service of the writ of garnishment, a prior valid sale or assignment oír lien or incumbrance thereon will take precedence over a subsequent garnishment. On the other hand, as*674 the garnishing creditor succeeds to all the rights and interests of the defendant at the service of the writ, the rights of the garnishing creditor are not affected by any alienation by the defendant or incumbrance created or arising subsequently to the service of the writ.” 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 867.
The same is true as to attachments. 4 Oyc. 632. Our statutes give the right of garnishment in broad terms, and ■extend to actions “to recover damages founded upon contract, express or implied,” and extend to cases where “the defendant fraudulently contracted the debt or incurred the obligation respecting which the action is brought” and. to cases where the “defendant is a foreign corporation” or a nonresident. Stats. 1898, secs. 2731, 2763. This court has repeatedly held that proceedings by garnishment or creditors’ bill to reach nonleviable assets are, in effect, an equitable levy from the time of service of process. La Crosse Nat Bank v. Wilson, 74 Wis. 391, 43 N. W. 153; Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 55 N. W. 919. It follows from what has been said .that the plaintiff was properly allowed to maintain this action against Terlinden for the tort committed by him in Germany in May, 1901, and, since personal service was had upon him in Milwaukee August 17, 1901, and the First National Rank of Milwaukee garnished on that day, the funds in the bank were subject to garnishment, and the plaintiff by such garnishment obtained an equitable lien upon the funds deposited in the bank August 14, 1901.
The fact that the plaintiff obtained judgment against Ter-linden February 19, 1904, for a large amount, and that judgment never having been appealed from, would seem to con- . clusively establish the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action against Terlinden. The plaintiff having the right to ■ maintain this action against Terlinden, then, unless there is ■■some law to the contrary, or the plaintiff is precluded by the bankruptcy proceedings in Germany, it would seem that he
In my opinion tbe judgment should be affirmed in this case and modified in tbe other, according to the rights of tbe parties under tbe creditors’ bill.
Rehearing
TJpon motion for rehearing in these cases our attention is called to art. I of tbe treaty concluded be
“There shall be between the territories of the high contracting parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce-and navigation. The inhabitants of their respective states shall mutually have liberty to enter the ports, places, and rivers of the territories ■of each party wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said territories, in order to attend to their affairs; and they shall enjoy, to that effect, the samé security and protection as natives of the country wherein they reside, on condition of their submittng to the laws and ordinances there prevailing.”
Attention is also called to a provision in the treaty of 1799 between the same parties as follows:
“Each party shall endeavor by all the means in their power to protect and defend all vessels and other effects belonging to the citizens or subjects of the other, which shall be within the extent of their jurisdiction by sea or by land
We have been unable to see that either of these treaty provisions has any bearing on the questions in controversy here.
By the Oourt. — Motion denied.
Rehearing
Tbe respondent moved for a rehearing.
Winlcler, Flanders, Smith, Bottum & Fawsett, attorneys, and F. G. Winlcler, of counsel, for tbe motion.
Joseph B. Doe, contra.
Tbe motion was denied April 17, 1906, and tbe following opinion was filed May 8, 1906: