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Director of Health Affairs Policy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission
977 A.2d 148
Conn.
2009
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*1 HEALTH AFFAIRS POLICY DIRECTOR OF OF CONNECT- PLANNING, UNIVERSITY HEALTH CENTER v. FREEDOM ICUT COMMISSION OF INFORMATION (SC 18286) Vertefeuille, McLachlan, Norcott, Palmer, Js. Zarella and officially 25, Argued August March 24 released *2 whom, on attorney, with Brown, principal Tracie C. principal attorney, Perpetua, Victor brief, were appellant for the counsel, Murphy, general Colleen (defendant). attorney general, Comerford, D. assistant

Jane attorney Blumenthal, brief, was Richard whom, on the appellee (plaintiff). for the general,

Opinion appeal in this dispositive issue McLACHLAN,J. The plaintiff, held whether certain records is the Univer- policy planning for of health affairs director exempt from Center,1 are sity of Connecticut Health (act), of information act under the freedom disclosure pursuant to General seq., Statutes 1-200 et § General pro- protects peer which (d), 19a-17b § Statutes into evidence discoveiy and introduction ceedings from defendant, the freedom of informa- in a civil action.2 The judg- from the appeals (commission), tion commission court; appeal plaintiffs sustaining ment of the trial appeal, proceedings underlying points this both the At various University policy planning and of Connecticut of health affairs director convenience, plaintiff. we refer to as the For Health Center were identified opinion. plaintiff as the in this both part: proceed (d) provides in relevant “The § Statutes General conducting peer review shall not be ings of a medical review committee any subject evidence in civil action for or to or introduction into provider arising against matters which are out of the a health care person committee, who was in and no evaluation and review such permitted required meeting at of such committee shall attendance testily . . . .” action as to the content of such such civil appeal,

from the final decision of the commission.3 On the commission that the trial court improperly claims requested exempt records were concluded pursuant disclosure 19a-17b. commission also improperly claims that the trial court concluded that requested exempt four of the records were from disclo- pursuant sure 60.13 of title 45 of the Code of (a) Federal Because we conclude that 19a- Regulations.4 inapplicable and, 17b is to commission proceedings, we therefore, inapplicable, that 45 C.F.R. 60.13 also reverse the of the trial court. judgment

The final decision of the commission sets forth the *3 procedure. complain- relevant facts and The following patient a ant, Russo, Zamstein, Louis J. former of Jacob a physician, requested writing records to pertaining plaintiffs the decision not to renew Zamstein’s clinical response, plaintiff produced In the minutes privileges. of of clinical affairs meetings four the subcommittee University of the of Connecticut Health Center board directors, produce but declined to the remainder requested records, plaintiff which the claimed comprised the file created the clinical credentialing affairs subcommittee and the credentials committee. a complainant complaint then filed with the com- pursuant mission disclosure of the records to seeking act. a the commis- Following hearing matter, on 3 appealed judgment The commission from the of the trial court to the Appellate Court, appeal pursuant and we transferred the to this court (c) § § General Statutes 51-199 and Practice Book 65-1. provides: (a) Regulations title 45 the Code of Federal Section 60.13 reported “Limitations on disclosure. Information to the Prac [National Data Bank considered confidential and shall not be disclosed is titioner] Department Services, except specified outside the of Health and Human 60.10, in § § and§ 60.11 60.14. Persons and entities which receive information directly Data Bank either or from another [National Practitioner] solely provided. party respect was must use it for which it prevent Nothing paragraph shall the disclosure of information this applicable party law which is authorized under to make such dis [s]tate closure.” public agency is a plaintiff that concluded

sion requested (A); 1-200 (1) meaning § within the meaning of Gen- within the are records records 1-212 the clinical (a);5 1-210 (a) Statutes §§ eral committee are the credentials subcommittee and affairs of 19a- meaning within the § committees medical review concern requested records and the (a) (4); 17b concluded, however, that also review.6 The commission only “civil actions” and applicable 19a-17b (d) dis- seeking before the commission not to Therefore, the commission to the act. pursuant closure an provide does not (d) concluded 1- mandatory pursuant §§ disclosure exemption to rejected also 1-212 The commission (a) (a). requested records— claim that four of the plaintiffs and IC- IC-2006-098-23 through labeled IC-2006-098-20 exempt pursuant from disclosure 2006-098-33—were claim, plaintiffs In (a). rejecting 45 C.F.R. 60.13 of 45 C.F.R. relied on the last sentence the commission in this provides: “Nothing paragraph 60.13 which (a), by party the disclosure of information prevent shall law to applicable which is authorized under [s]tate the act author- Reasoning disclosure.” make such *4 disclosure, make the the commis- plaintiff ized the to provide did not (a) concluded that 45 C.F.R. 60.13 § sion 5 “Except part: (a) provides in relevant as other General Statutes 1-210 statute, provided by records maintained wise federal law or state all kept by any public agency, are on whether or not such records or file by any required by any regulation, shall be records law or rule or every inspect promptly person right (1) have the to such records shall hours, (2) copy during regular office or business such records accordance 1-212, copy (g) (3) of such records with subsection of section or receive with section 1-212. . . .” in accordance provides part: “Any person (a) § 1-212 in relevant General Statutes request, plain applying writing receive, promptly upon or certified shall copy any public of record. . . .” finding requested based its records concern The commission by forty-two produced peer records review on its in camera review of the plaintiff upon the commission’s order. Accordingly, exemption to the act.7 the commission an. complainant plaintiff provide ordered the copies exception requested records, with the determined were records that the commission had three exempt (b) (10) under 1-210 because from disclosure requests legal for advice and those records constituted responses thereto. plaintiff appealed from the decision of the com

The appeal, court, the trial which sustained the mission to exemption (d) concluding constituted an that 19a-17b analysis, act. In its the trial to disclosure under the heavily public policy on reasons under court relied namely, peer privilege,8 encourage lying “to and criticism frank, discussion, uninhibited debate provider” peers during of a health care by encouraging proceedings, candor, that level of and, quality patient improve the care. Commissioner App. 577, 582, 17 Conn. Kadish, Health Services of 554 A.2d 1097 (O’Connell, dissenting), J., denied, cert. purpose, (1989). That 806, according court, would be undermined to the trial complainant. The the disclosure of the records to the provision (d) on the in 19a-17b court also focused “ not to dis review material ‘shall ” covery,’ allowing and concluded that of the act would have a such material context the complaint by pursuant medical invasion of pursuant commission: disclosure plaintiff plaintiff files and §to for the personal privacy”; (1) 1-210 the commission did not similar files the disclosure of which would constitute virtue of the records; (b) (2) § 1-210 challenge (2) on the the records (b) (1) complainant’s had not been ground that on (3) the records were not on the appeal were not ground that repeated, deprived they following rulings of the exempt were earlier jurisdiction they from disclosure “[pjersonnel exempt requests constituted over an A.2d 322 our case law uses § 19a-17b. “[p]reliminary 8Although (1999). See, § 19a-17b does not include the phrase “peer drafts or notes e.g., Babcock that term in Bridgeport Hospital, . . . ." referring to the exemptions review 790, 825, provided *5 privilege,” by process. Finally, on the effect chilling of the commission proceedings court concluded purposes for actions the act constitute civil pursuant to on the based its conclusion 19a-17b The court (d). of § act are instituted pursuant to the proceedings fact that is author complaint; the commission by the filing testimony; and hear hearings ized to conduct for “procedural various are proceedings governed in with an action court.” commonly associated malities that the four records court also concluded The trial pertain to information by the commission determined bank) data bank practitioner (data from the national trial court reasoned from disclosure. The exempt were provided was information from the data bank and that disclo solely purpose peer review, for the requirement complainant would violate the sure to the receive informa 60.13 that entities that (a) of 45 C.F.R. § solely respect it data bank must “use tion Accordingly, provided.” for which it was to the plaintiffs judgment sustaining the court rendered appeal. appeal This followed. provides 19a-17b a stat- plaintiff (d) claims act.

utory mandatory disclosure under the exemption to inappli- (d) The commission contends that § pursuant cable to the act because meaning civil within the act do not constitute actions We with the commission. (d). agree of 19a-17b provides part: in relevant “The (d) Section 19a-17b conducting of a medical review committee intro- subject shall not be or any for or against duction into evidence civil action which provider a health care out of the matters arising committee, are to evaluation and review such person meeting and no who was attendance at a testify permitted required such committee shall be pro- such civil action as to the content of such . . .” In ceedings interpret language . order to this *6 170 peer

mean that the review bars disclosure privilege pursuant act, we would have to conclude that legislature phrase subject the intended the “shall not be discovery any ... in action,” civil to include in its to disclosure ... in any meaning subject “shall not be action the commission." This presents two before closely questions: related in legislature, whether enacting (d), 19a-17b intended for the term “discov- ery” pursuant to include disclosure to the act, and phrase intended for the “in civil action” include actions before the commission. Both of these ques- are statutory tions of construction and therefore are review. Barton v. Bristol, plenary 84, 97, 291 Conn. 967 A.2d 482 “General Statutes l-2z directs us (2009). first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship If, to other statutes. after such examining text and considering relationship, such of meaning plain yield such text is and unambiguous and does not absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of of the statute shall meaning not be considered.” quotation marks (Internal omitted.) Id., 97-98. We inter- pret the words of the “according statute to their ordi- nary meaning unless their context dictates otherwise.” State Mattioli, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 573, 576, Conn. 556 A.2d 584 (1989). questions statutory We address each of these of inter pretation turn, in beginning question of “discovery” properly may whether be understood to include disclosure under the act, and our taking starting point, 1-2z directs, with the text of the statute. In enacting (d), defined scope its in terms rendering of a medical . . . subject committee “not introduction into evidence . . . .”9 The meaning Bridgeport Hospital, 790, 821-22, In Babcock v. explained (1999), privilege we does not shield all documents used Rather, applies only proceedings. privilege “the to those apeer review, documents that reflect the or that were created primarily being during for the utilized the course of review. employed “discovery” must be understood as it is statute, as one of the two circumstances within a play—in in which the comes into civil action “discovery” conjunc- best words, other understood *7 concept tion with the of “evidence.” these two Reading together, understanding terms most reasonable “discovery” pretrial their is that refers to the meaning procedures by parties attempt which gain access to by held opposing party,10 information and “introduc- by tion into evidence” refers to the means which the parties attempt they to use the information that have available to them at the of trial. time This understanding discoveiy dictionary is consistent with its definition as including pre-trial devices that can be by used “[t]he party one to obtain facts information about the case party from the other in order to party’s assist the preparation Dictionary for trial.” Black’s Law (6th Ed. discovery In other 1990). words, is a tool which a party may acquire information, party which the then may use at trial if the information is admissible as evidence.

In contrast, the concept of “disclosure” is related to policy overarching legislative which “[t]he [act]” open favors “the conduct of government public and free access to records.” government (Internal quotation marks Perkins v. omitted.) Freedom of Information apply indepen- . . . does not to those [T]he documents that were dently acquired.” quotation (Internal omitted.) Id., recorded or marks 822. words, privilege applies In other “to the substantive discourse that takes place meetings during at the actual which ‘matters which are committee,’ evaluation and review such are discussed and deliber- ated.” Id. practice discovery “any pro The rules of allow for civil action . . . appeal, appeal judicial authority bate or . . . administrative where the finds reasonably probable required it that evidence outside the record will be § . . . .” Practice Book 13-2. Some of the available tools of include interrogatories; production 13-6; requests; § see Practice Book see Practice 13-9; depositions; 13-26; subpoenas. Book see Practice Book See (subpoenas). General Statutes 52-143 158,

Commission, 166, (1993). 228 Conn. upon act does not confer We have that “the recognized government an absolute to all informa- right Commission, tion.” Wilson Freedom of Information Instead, 328, 435 A.2d 353 324, (1980). intention to balance the represents legislative act “a are agencies doing, to know what its public’s right confidentiality. private needs for the governmental act, however, is disclo- rule, . . . The under general that disclosure 328-29. The concrete form Id., sure.” provides in 1-210 which rele- (a), takes is set forth by any “Except provided as otherwise federal part: vant kept on statute, all records maintained law or state or not such records by any public file whether agency, by any by any regulation, law or rule or required are *8 every person shall have public shall be records and promptly inspect during the such records right (1) hours, copy office or business such records regular (2) 1-212, of section (g) in accordance with subsection in accordance with copy a of such records (3) receive Statutes 1-211 1-212. . . .” See also General section computer-stored public records). of (disclosure discovery act and Certainly, disclosure under the are designed share an essential characteristic—both possession of another obtain information that is We may and otherwise be unavailable to the seeker. discovery concluded, however, that the rules of have provisions operate “separately of the act and the v. Free- of each other. Police independently” Chief of 396, Commission, 377, dom Information of Police, In we addressed 746 A.2d 1264 (2000). Chief pro- Statutes 1-213 which “scope (b), of General in the . . . shall part: ‘Nothing vides in relevant [a]ct . in manner to: . . limit the (1) rights be deemed proceed- parties to administrative litigants, including . .’” discovery of this state . . under the laws of ings, police Id., case, plaintiff, In that the chief 379. department, claimed that certain police of the Hartford under requested exempt records were from disclosure records were the the act because the same Id., 380, federal action. discovery request pending plaintiffs concluding rejected argument, 383. We act, under the that “each determination—disclosure discovery solely rules—is made and disclosure under body responsibility: with that charged [com- act; or the court the court applying mission] discovery Id., expressly its rules.” 397. We applying interpre- of our acknowledged practical that “the effect tation is a member of the be able to might that secure under the act documents from an agency he is or intends to sue that he not be able suing might discovery in through to secure Id. We litigation.” noted, however, judicial discovery that “the act and rules are with different aims and limitations designed For that a reason, mind.” Id. fact member “[t]he adversary an public might agency also be of the . . . him strip rights does not itself of his under the supports act.” Id. Our decision in Police our Chief of “discovery” initial of the term in 19a-17b reading (d) discovery confined to in a court action in a being civil Our matter. conclusion Police that the Chief of provisions operate rules of and the of the act separately independently is irreconcilable with the *9 “discovery” may notion that the term in 19a-17b (d) § interpreted pursuant to include disclosure to the act. Moreover, phrase the “civil action” 19a-17b (d) § must be understood in relation to the other terms in “discovery” the statute. Our conclusion that as used in solely discovery 19a-17b refers in the context (d) § of a unlikely court action a civil matter makes it that phrase reasonably may the “civil action” be interpreted to include before the commission. proceedings Also, just as our understanding “discovery” is informed by conjunction phrase the use of that term in with the in 19a-17b so is our (d), into evidence” §

“introduction is, “civil action.” That phrase of the understanding the scope the defines (d) “subject being exempting any into evidence in civil introduction or the use of already noted, have . . . As we action evidence,” into “discovery” and “introduction the terms the signify the term “civil action” together within the apply that the privilege intended legislature in a civil matter. of a court action context by our case law supported both interpretation This statutory of civil action in definition interpreting the statutory Statutes, by 52 of the General title defining employed language both to civil actions other to extend scope privileges agencies. before administrative in 19a- is no definition of “civil action” there Although Statutes, of the General it is defined in title 52 17b, Specifically, General Stat- civil actions. governs which shall part in relevant provides utes 52-91 “[t]here on the pleading action. The first be one form of civil complaint shall be known as the part plaintiff of the constituting of the facts and shall contain a statement separate page and, of action on the cause be a relief, for the which shall complaint, a demand remedy sought.” or remedies Addition- statement of the procedures 52-45a sets forth the General Statutes ally, “Civil of a civil action: the commencement governing process consisting legal actions shall be commenced attachment, describing writ of of a summons returnable, it is the return the court to which parties, appearance of an place filing date and for day, the by the Office of the Chief required information accompanied by The writ shall be Court Administrator. may The writ run into complaint. plaintiffs by a commissioner and shall be judicial signed district or clerk of the court judge Court or a Superior *10 and 52- In 52-91 applying §§ which it is returnable.” consti- statutory proceeding 45a to determine whether whether the action, we have considered tutes a civil as by complaint, of a filing action was commenced by process of as it was commenced service well whether Education by rules of Board pleading. or controlled 544, 558, 888 Center, 276 Conn. v. Tavares Pediatric proceeding Island administrative (2006) (Rhode A.2d 65 Waterbury Waterbury not civil see also action); 407-408, 407 A.2d 1013 Union, 401, Police 176 Conn. modify or confirm, (1979) (statutory proceeding not award not civil action because vacate arbitration Chieppo v. Robert E. by filing complaint); initiated Inc., 652, 169 Conn. McMichael, 646, finding from and award of workers’ com- (1975) (appeal Slattery v. pensation action); commissioner not civil Woodin, 48, 50, (appeals 96 A. 178 from (1915) not civil probate actions). proceed- we have never that a

Moreover, concluded necessarily ing before an administrative is a agency question civil action. of whether such a Although under no proceeding could circumstances constitute today—and civil expressly action is not before us we do not decide that issue—we note that administrative appeals, which are heard in first instance Superior Court, only are deemed to be civil actions under some circumstances. See Practice Book 14-6 appeals (administrative purposes civil actions for practice, purposes rules of but not for of certain enu- merated statutes);11 see also Commissioner Health provides: purposes rules, Practice Book 14-6 “For of these administra appeals actions, tive are civil actions. Whenever these rules refer to civil actions, causes, cases, civil causes or shall reference include administra appeals except (a) appeals superior judgments tive that: court only appeals provided by in administrative shall be certification as General amended, chapter rules; (b) Statutes 51-197b 72 of these appeal purposes an administrative shall not be deemed an action for 52-591, §§ General Statutes 52-592 or 52-593.” *11 App. (inves- 580-81 Kadish, supra, Conn.

Services purely services was of health by commissioner tigation proceed- proceeding, not investigatory administrative of purposes action for and thus not civil court, ing 38-19a]). § at General Statutes codified [then before an proceeding then, underlying Certainly, court—may be than a agency—rather administrative legisla- evidence of such only action if the deemed a civil lacking is That evidence strong. tive intent present case. act are not commenced

Proceedings pursuant by appeal a notice of process, filing but by service pro which (1), 1-206 (b) to General Statutes pursuant person right denied the part “[a]ny vides relevant may . . 1-210 . copy records under inspect [§] of Information Com to the Freedom appeal therefrom with said commis by appeal a notice of mission, filing often appeals to the commission Although sion. . . .” adopted complaints, regulations are referred to as “ ” appeal “an ‘[c]omplainf by the commission define stat general under to the commission [§ 1-206] 1-21j-1 (4). Agencies (b) Conn. State Regs., utes.” then receipt appeal, of the notice of commission, upon registered certified or upon parties, all “shall serve other copy together of such notice mail, a Statutes such commission.” General notice or order of the commis Moreover, actions before 1-206 (b) (1). Certainly, by the rules of pleading. are not governed sion governed commission are before the proceedings Agen Conn. State procedure. Regs., See formal rules formality how alone, Procedural seq. et cies § 1-21J-1 proceeding an administrative does not convert ever, branch into a by an of the executive agency conducted Any superficial in a court of law. action conducted civil pro procedural governing rules similarities between and court actions the commission before ceedings obvious difference cannot overcome the a civil case within two distinct place take that the two separate government. branches statutes confirms that privilege to other Reference phrase to use the “civil did not intend the commission. include before action” to list civil actions Virtually all of the statutes *12 separate contexts as proceedings and administrative example An illustrative privilege applies. in which General very chapter in same as 19a-17b. appears § pro- the information provides Statutes 19a-25 § pur- health “for the department cured any morbidity mortality or pose of reducing be condition, shall be confidential and shall cause or solely purposes of medical or scientific used for the specifies research . . . .” Section 19a-25 “[s]uch . . . shall not be admissible as evidence information any any kind in court or any any in action before shall it be tribunal, board, agency person, or nor other in any way, disclosed in whole exhibited or its contents part, by any representative or in officer or any facility, [department [p]ublic or of such [h]eaith by any person project in such a research participating except may necessary by any person, or other as project for the the research furthering added.) which it relates.” (Emphasis evinced a clear intent in 19a-25 that the information § any any

at issue is not to be disclosed “in action of in kind,” specifies agencies and actions court and before separate applies. in which the See contexts General Statutes 52-146b made (communications also § any “in not disclosable absent waiver civil clergymen preliminary thereto, or criminal case or or any in or administrative Gen- legislative proceeding”); eral Statutes 52-146c between (b) (communications waiver “in patient privileged absent psychologist in commit- actions, juvenile, probate, civil and criminal pre- ment and arbitration proceedings, liminary or and in proceedings, to such actions General legislative proceedings”); administrative Statutes 52-146k communications (b) (confidential between battered women’s counselor or sexual assault “in counselor and victim not disclosable absent waiver any any proceeding legisla- civil or criminal case or or General proceeding”); tive or administrative Statutes judicial between branch 52-146n(b) (communications employee employee program assistance counselor any “in not disclosable absent waiver civil or criminal any administra- proceeding legislative case or or or General Statutes 52-146o proceeding”); (a) (physi- tive may patient cian not disclose surgeon by personal communications or information obtained any “in patient, consent, examination of absent civil preliminary any action or thereto or in proceeding or administrative It probate, legislative proceeding”). practice, legislature’s is difficult to reconcile *13 privileges, specifying separately case of all of these that the extends both the context of civil privilege propo- actions and administrative with the proceedings, sition that “civil action” as used in 19a-17b encom- § passes court actions and before the proceedings both commission.12 specific the legislature

When the has not enumerated privilege applies, contexts in which a it has other ways scope preclude defined the of the privilege example, legislature disclosure under the act. For the has extended certain both to civil actions and privileges administrative the proceedings defining privilege very that the information stating broad terms proceedings Interpreting “civil action” to include before the commission necessarily proceed privilege the to other administrative would not extend agencies, ings before other administrative or before other tribu boards, primary arguments undercutting one of the in favor of nals or thus broadly—namely, interpreting interpretation “civil action” so that the broad is, public policy underlying peer privilege, review would effect any public proceedings. prevention review disclosure Statutes General See, e.g., generally. is “confidential” by judicial investigations (governing 51-51l family or commissioner compensation judge, council of “[a]ny investiga providing and support magistrate, cause probable or not there whether determine tion to has 51-51i Statutes under §] that conduct [General called any individual be confidential occurred shall information providing purpose of for the by the council investigation of such knowledge his not disclose shall on of the council decision party prior to a third respondent unless the exists, cause probable whether disclosure investigation that such requests confidentiality cov statement of a blanket Such open”). approach legisla Yet another and all venues. ers incorporate tois in other contexts ture has taken attorney- such as the act, in the expressly privilege 1-210 (b) Statutes See, General privilege. e.g., client dis require shall be construed (“nothing [act] closure of . . . [10] . . . communications privileged relationship”). attorney-client by the scope similarly broadened not, did have, could but applicabil its by expanding privilege by provid actions, civil either beyond the context of ity confidentiality, protection general a blanket ing the act. into incorporating by expressly conclude, foregoing, on the basis of We plainly in 19a-17b (d) action” as used term “civil before not include does unambiguously 1-2z. Section See General Statutes the commission. *14 medical of a prevents (d) review peer process in the engaged review committee into discovery or introduction subject being from disclosure does not bar the action, in a civil but evidence Therefore, to the act. pursuant of such information public is a plaintiff undisputed it is because require mandatory disclosure agency (a) 1-210 §§ see General Statutes act; ment of the records are requested and that 1-212 (a); 180 properly

records under the act, the commission ordered requested exception disclosure of the records, with the applicable exemption.13 of those that fell under an lightly. We do not reach this conclusion We, like significant public policy dissent, are mindful of the purpose underlying peer privilege, namely, review promote public safety by encouraging health and positions they might “committee members to take they they thought going not otherwise if take were subpoenaed malpractice in the middle of a case.” (Internal quotation omitted.) Bridge- marks Babcock v. port Hospital, (1999). 790,825, Conn. privilege grounded “physicians is on the belief that openly perfor- . . . would not feel free to discuss the practicing hospital, mance of other doctors in the with- out assurance that their discussions in committee privileged (Internal would be confidential and . . . .” quotation omitted.) preventing marks Thus, Id. a mal- practice litigant acquiring, peer from in a civil action, through discovery review records and use of those by introducing records them into evidence furthers this purpose by protecting participants peer in the process being testify regarding hauled into court to proceedings.14 review records or requested Because we conclude that disclosure of the records was required act, (a) under the we further conclude that 45 C.F.R. 60.13 does plaintiff bar not disclosure of the four records that the asserts were obtained provision specifically provides: “Nothing from the data bank. That in this paragraph prevent party shall the disclosure of information which is applicable authorized under law to make such disclosure.” [s]tate 45 C.F.R. (a); opinion. only § 60.13 see footnote of this The act not authorizes the plaintiff disclosure; mandatory. to make the it makes such disclosure Sec (a), therefore, inapplicable. tion 60.13 14 separate provision protects participants A in § 19a-17b provides: (c) from defamation actions. Section 19a-17b “There monetary liability part of, shall be no on the and no cause of action for damages any against, shall arise member of a medical review committee any proceeding performed scope for act or undertaken or within the provided such committee’s functions that such member has taken action or made recommendations without malice and in the reasonable belief that the act or recommendation was warranted.” *15 the possibility the recognize We by allowing undermined may be privilege review peer proceedings. peer the act of under disclosure is “out speak, cat, so to contends, the plaintiff As the Commissioner permitted. disclosure once bag” App. supra, 17 Conn. Kadish, v. Health Services possible It is therefore dissenting). J., (O’Connell, chilling the same may have the act under disclosure by enacting to avoid sought legislature effect that the convert however, cannot possibility, That 19a-17b. admin- it make the “disclosure”; nor can “discovery” a civil present case at issue proceeding istrative of the term definition Indeed, extending action. before the commis- to include “civil action” evil than inter- be a opinion, greater in our would, sion acknowledge we though even the law as written preting served. being is not policy of 19a-17b public we have law, interpreting that in We do not believe that, drafting possible it. It is authority to rewrite certain foresee that did not 19a-17b, subject of become proceedings might the vast because request information a freedom of and are hospitals agencies are not majority of We the act. provisions of therefore, subject to the not, subject to that are however, that records emphasize, the act are not disclosure under action for or in a civil into evidence or introduction consti- if those records provider, care a health against that were and not “documents review material tute ” ‘acquired.’ Babcock ‘recorded’ or independently Thus, 822. Hospital, supra, Bridgeport may succeed under malpractice litigant although exempt of records that are disclosure obtaining act in prevents the nevertheless discovery, Furthermore, pur- in a civil action. use of such records in atten- person who was “no (d), suant to § permitted shall be such committee meeting dance at a *16 required testify any or such civil action as to the content of such . . . .’’In any case, the task of changing the law lies with the legislature, not with judiciary. the “In construing statute, cardinal principle of construction is to ascertain the intent of legislature. passed by If an act the legisla- ture is within its constitutional power, it is not the attempt business the court to interpreta- to twist the tion of the law to conform to the ideas of the judges as to what the law to be or to ought attempt to make the law coincide with their justice. ideas of social The judicial function should province not invade the legislature.” Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 97, 26 A.2d 582 (1942) (Avery, J., dissenting). is reversed judgment and the case is remanded

to the trial court with direction to plain- dismiss the tiffs appeal.

In opinion this PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE ZARE- LLA, Js., concurred.

NORCOTT, J., I dissenting. respectfully disagree with majority’s conclusion that General Statutes 19a- 17b (d) inapplicable in proceedings before the free dom of information commission (commission) and, that certain therefore, records held plaintiff, director policy of health affairs for the Univer planning sity of Center, Connecticut Health are exempt not disclosure under the freedom of information act (act), General Statutes 1-200 seq. my view, majori et In ty’s interpretation narrow of the ambiguous language effectively of 19a-17b (d) reads the “shall not be sub ject discovery” out language of the statute and will have a effect on chilling future review proceedings, thereby very purpose defeating of the statute. respectfully I Accordingly, dissent. “The part: in relevant provides (d)

Section conducting review committee of a medical discovery or intro- subject not be review shall against for or any civil action into evidence duction which the matters out of provider arising care a health committee, review such subject to evaluation are meeting at a was in attendance person who and no testily required to permitted shall be committee such pro- of such the content action as to such civil *17 anal- focuses its properly majority . . .” The . ceedings and action,” “discovery” and “civil ysis on the terms indicates plain meaning their concludes by afforded protections the intended for legislature discovery pro- the formal apply only to 19a-17b (d) party one tools used namely, pretrial the cess, in court trial, for preparation information obtain however, the mean- my view, In in a civil matter. action clear when the is and ambiguous, of those terms ing considered, I con- statute is of the also (d) intended clude that the disclosure of preclude the commission. in an action before objec statute, fundamental construing “When [o]ur intent apparent effect to give tive is to ascertain words, we seek to ... In other the legislature. of the meaning manner, in a reasoned determine, case, facts of statutory applied as to the language [the] actually language of whether the including question meaning, determine that ... In apply. seeking does 1-2z us first to consider Statutes directs General relationship to other itself and its text of the statute considering text and If, after such examining statutes. plain text is meaning of such relationship, such or unworkable yield absurd and does not unambiguous of the meaning evidence of the results, extratextual . The test to deter considered. . . statute shall not be when read statute, is whether the mine ambiguity susceptible to more than context, one reasonable interpretation.” quotation marks (Internal omitted.) Construction, Inc., Hees Burke v. 1, 10, 290 Conn. A.2d 373 (2009). that,

It is well settled the construction of the “[i]n phrases words shall statutes, be construed language commonly according approved usage . . . 1-1 ordinarily General Statutes We (a). . dictionary look to the definition of a word to ascertain commonly approved usage.” quotation its (Internal Gelormino, State marks omitted.) 373, 380, respect With (2009). to the term “discov majority ery,” that, conjunc concludes when read in prohibition tion with the statute’s on “introduction into evidence,” that term was intended to refer to its diction ary definition, practice,” under the heading “[t]riai pre-trial party devices that can be used one “[t]he to obtain facts and information about the case from the party party’s preparation other order to assist the Dictionary for trial.” Black’s Law Ed. A sub (6th 1990). *18 sequent dictionary, however, edition of that same also “discovery” defines the term in as, part, relevant “[t]he process act or of or finding learning that something previously unknown”; was Dictionary Black’s Law (7th virtually Ed. a definition that is 1999); identical to that which, majority notes, for the term “disclosure” as the typically is associated with under the act. proceedings See id. in (defining as, part, “disclosure” relevant “[t]he process act or of known that was making something previously my In unknown”). view, each of these read “discovery” of ings perfectly the term reasonable in and, context of 19a-17b I conclude accordingly, legislature’s is, very use of that term at the Construction, e.g., Hees v.Burke least, See, ambiguous.1 Inc., supra, 290 Conn. 10. 1 concluding In that the term refers “discovery” only pretrial process obtaining majority information for use at states: subsequent trial, meaning “The must be understood as it is ‘discovery’ employed similarly is unclear of “civil action” meaning not 19a-17b, which does language

based on the of disclosure purposes that term for the define Dictionary Ed. (7th Black’s Law proceedings. review broadly as action however, defines the term 1999), “[a]n or civil protect private or enforce, redress, brought definition does not That litigation.” a noncriminal right; in proceeding must be a court specify that the action no action, as a civil and there is order to be classified in our case in the statutes or indication, clear either I Accordingly, the case. conclude law, that that is statute, in which the within a civil action as one of the two circumstances ‘discovery’ play—in words, is best understood into other comes ” (Emphasis original.) conjunction concept in In in with the of ‘evidence.’ legislature my view, however, from the fact that the deemed it does not follow evidence, that it intended the to be inadmissible only evidentiary “discovery” apply in the limited sense of the term. term simply prevent peer enacting legislature’s was to intent in If the trial, being its into evidence at then introduced exclusively pretrial “discovery,” understood as a device use of the term essentially designed goal, ultimate would be redundant to achieve that likely adequately the statute’s would be addressed because such concerns explicit prohibition .” into evidence . . . General Statutes on “introduction interpret legislature’s Thus, (d). use of the § 19a-17b it is reasonable to evidentiary “discovery” mere as an indication that it had more than term broadly prevent release, mind, and that it intended more concerns sought “disclosure,” regardless of whether it was of such information specific evidentiary purpose. differently, legislature’s inclusion Put for prohibition “discovery,” on “introduction of the term in addition to ” evidence, party’s knowledge of such informa that a third mere into indicates sought avoid, something a view that accords tion was “discovery.” definition of the word with the disclosure oriented acknowledge governing the of a civil 2 I that the rules commencement part, statutes; elsewhere in the see General Statutes action are set forth 52-91; have, determining and that our cases as a factor §§ 52-45a may proceeding properly as a civil whether an administrative be classified *19 procedure proceeding action, commencing for to deter examined the requirements sufficiently 52- §§ whether it is similar to the set forth in mine Center, See, e.g., v. Tavares Pediatric 45a and 52-91. Board Education of 544, 557-58, Waterbury Waterbury (2006); 888 A.2d 65 v. Police 276 Conn. Chieppo Union, 401, 407, (1979); v. Robert E. 176 Conn. 407 A.2d 1013 646, 652, majority McMichael, Inc., (1975). A.2d 1085 As the 169 Conn. notes, however, process filing appeal for an before the commission is strikingly similar, although identical, requirements set forth in not interpretation

an of the term “civil action” that includes an action before the brought private commission a seeking individual to enforce his or her right squarely information under the act falls within the com- dictionary mon term, definition of the and is a reason- Compare, e.g., Regs., Agencies §§ § 52-45a and 52-91. Conn. State 1-21J-23 complaint (requiring and other documents submitted to commission 1-21j-26 signed), Regs., Agencies (requiring complaint § Conn. State and permitted by Superior other documents to be served in same manner as Court), Regs., Agencies 1-21j-28(commencement § Conn. State of action upon filing complaint commission, occurs which must include com plainant’s name, address, telephone and fax numbers and concise state facts, including sought), ment of relevant nature of relief with General requires (commencement Statutes 52-45a of civil action writ of summons describing parties, place appearance, filing return date and and date for accompanied by complaint), (requiring General Statutes 52-91 first pleading “complaint contain[ing] . . in civil action to be . a statement of constituting relief, the facts the cause of action and ... a demand for the remedy sought”). which a . . . shall be statement of the Moreover, prior categorically similarity our cases have not stated that such only classifying proceeding is the relevant factor in an administrative as a contrary, recognized civil action. To the we have on several occasions that purpose containing for which statute term such as “civil action” important determining proceeding was enacted is an factor in whether a scope specific falls with the of that term it is used context of that particular Light Costle, statute. See Connecticut & Power Co. v. 179 Conn. 415, 423, (1980) (“the scope proceedings 426 A.2d 1324 which will be term, precise uncertain, depends upon included within a whose reach purpose particular Chieppo question”); the nature and of the statute in McMichael, Inc., supra, (examining purpose Robert E. 169 Conn. 653-54 determining legislature statute as factor in whether intended administrative proceeding Zoning Appeals, action); to constitute civil Carbone v. Board of 602, 605, (1940) (“the scope 126 Conn. 13 A.2d 462 which depends upon will be included within the term as used in the statutes purpose particular question”); nature and statute Fishman v. Co., App. 339, 344, Middlesex Mutual Assurance Conn. may (“[w]hat legislature have intended to be a civil action for some purposes may others”), denied, not be a civil action for certs. 806, 807, 499 (1985). prior law, therefore, A.2d 57 Our case does not foreclose possibility legislature intended an action before commission specific protecting peer to be considered a civil action in the context of 19a-17b, appropriate from disclosure under and it is for us to examine the behind 19a-17bin order to determine if the See, e.g., Light Costle, did so intend. Connecticut & Power Co. v. supra, 423-24.

187 In of the statutory light reading language. able statute, I of the majority’s equally reading reasonable action,” term “civil as used conclude that the also is 19a-17b, ambiguous. context of § “we look statutory ambiguous, language When the his itself, legislative of the statute to the words enactment, its tory surrounding circumstances and and implement, it was policy designed the legislative and common relationship existing to its legislation mat the same principles governing general law Fredette v. quotation omitted.) ter.” marks (Internal Conn. 821- Guard, 813, Air National 283 Connecticut In ultimate 22, (2007). doing so, 930 A.2d 666 “[o]ur objective apparent ... is to discern and effectuate the marks quotation intent of the legislature.” (Internal A.2d Cote, 603, 614—15, State v. 286 Conn. 945 omitted.) Thus, 412 we are bound to construe the statute (2008). purpose in a manner that will reflect achieve the enacted; Roberts, for which it was see McGaffin 393, 407, denied, Conn. cert. (1984), 1050, 1747, U.S. 105 S. Ct. 84 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1985); way to refrain from the statute in a “interpret[ing] purpose.” Curry would thwart v. Allan S. Good [that] man, Inc., 390, 412, 944 A.2d 925 (2008). then,

I begin, concept a discussion of the review, aspect which has become an entrenched of the provision quality health care the United throughout States. Peer review “are essential improvement continued in the care and treatment of patients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clini practices qua cal is a sine non of adequate health care.” Hospital, Inc., 250, Bredice v. Doctors 50 F.R.D. 249, (D.D.C. 1970), 'd, aff 479 F.2d 920 Cir. “The (D.C. 1973). [peer improvement, through is the review] self-analysis, efficiency procedures of medical techniques.” end, Id. To that health care facilities have, the United States form or throughout some *21 pro mechanisms “with another, peer created review jected alia, professional inter edu goals of, continuing renewal cation, quality patient care, evaluation of the of complaint malpractice and privileges, investigation of Kadish, review.” Commissioner Health Services v. of (O’Connell, J., 582, App. 577, 17 Conn. denied, 806, 563 A.2d cert. dissenting), (1989). 1355 consistently have recognized,

Courts and scholars efficacy review is threatened however, part many physicians and other a reluctance on the participate process. in that This providers health care factors, from a number of generally reluctance stems liability, exposure entanglement “fear of including loss of referrals from malpractice litigation, [and] Creech, comment, . . . .” “The Medi- other doctors C. A Jurisdictional Sur- Privilege: cal Review Committee see also Yuma Rev. vey,” (1988);3 67 N.C. L. 179 Superior Court, Medical Center 175 Ariz. Regional by one’s 72, 75, (App. 1993) (“[r]eview 852 P.2d 1256 only time peers hospital consuming, within a is not likely to bad unpaid work, generate feelings it is also quotation marks unpopularity” and result in [internal omitted]). virtually every concerns,

In an effort to address such adopted privilege statute. state has regard scope these statutes differ with Although protected it, and the materials with- 3Indeed, physician’s qualifications, competence, and ethics all are “[a] requested question to review called into when a medical staff committee application privileges, for staff to determine the extent of his clinical his quality privileges, work. The nature of these activities or to assess the of his participants may professional friends, suggests lose as well that committee addition, referrals, physicians reviews. In as from who receive unfavorable well, may exposed members, hospitals and the the committee costly defamation, arising litigation alleging from the most common claim Hall, “Hospital Proceedings R. Committee committee activities.” 245, Reports: Legal Status,” (1975). Am. Med. Their J.L. & the strong on exception they are founded out and are proceedings, peer policy in favor of participa- and facilitate encourage primarily intended means of achiev- principal proceedings. tion such from participants immunizing consist ing goal materials used liability precluding civil being in such made the statements for subsequent in a action into evidence introduced “Medical Peer Gosfield, comment, see G. damages; Industry,” 52 Health Care Protection Review L.Q. by maintaining and also 552, 553 Temp. (1979); by prohibiting confidentiality of such *22 the Gerity, v. 520 See, e.g., Morse public.4 disclosure to the purpose the of Conn. Sup. 470, 1981) (“[I]f F. 472 (D. to evaluate their is doctors encourage the statute would disclosure, without fear of peers not any proceedings, of hampered by public release be has sued. The dan- patient the who just involving those peer review exists professional candid inhibiting of ger . . . The overrid- by potential the mere for disclosure. to the medi- importance of these review committees ing have public requires that doctors profession cal and the atmo- peers their in an unfettered freedom to evaluate confidentiality. No effect sphere complete chilling of to function effec- if the committees are can be tolerated 114—15 Love, 111, (Fla. v. 599 So. 2d Cruger tively.”); commit- peer afforded to review 1992) (“[t]he the effect of the prohibit chilling tees is intended to of statements made to or potential public disclosure by prepared for and used information [medical review func- carrying peer committee in out its review] Inc. v. Virginia, Levin, HCA Health Services tion”); of 417 obvious 215, 221, (2000) (“The 260 Va. 530 S.E.2d [a]ct (A) (LexisNexis 2008). [4] At today, expressly least one . . . .” jurisdiction, (Emphasis has pursuant provided foreseeing added.) [that peer Ark. Code Ann. state’s] very review issue that we are presented . . . [f]reedom 16-46-105 of “shall not [i]nformation (a) (1) 190 open and frank discus- promote intent is to

legislative care peer process among review health during sion improve- the overall of providers goal in furtherance of system. peer health care If review informa- ment of the there would be little confidential, tion were not participate process.”).5 incentive to 5 Hospital, Inc., supra, also, e.g., 50 F.R.D. 251 See Bredice v. Doctors overwhelming public having [peer proceed (“[t]here an interest in review is ings] flow of ideas and advice can held on a confidential basis so that the Center, Misevch, unimpeded”); Inc. v. 113 Aiiz. continue Tucson Medical 38, 545 P.2d 958 protection justified by overwhelming 34, (1976) (“[t]he is confidentiality public maintaining interest in of the medical staff meet freely ings flow to further the care and treatment so that the discussion can Hospital Superior Court, 846, 853, patients”); v. 41 Cal. 3d West Covina 119, Rptr. (peer “expresses (1986) Cal. review statute 718 P.2d public legislative judgment that the interest in medical staff candor extends immunity beyond damages requires degree confidentiality”); West Hospital Superior Court, supra, (“[E]xtemal peer v. access to Covina by investigations stifles candor and inhibits conducted staff committees in-hospital practice objectivity. quality will . . . medical be ele [T]he inquiries confidentiality.”); armoring vated staff with a measure of Balti University Maryland System Corp., Medical 321 Md. more Sun Co. confidentiality necessary 659, 668, (1991) (“[A]high level of peer By protecting review. these records from for effective medical statute], access in those situations covered [the system outweighs recognized that a of effective medical *23 Claypool Mladineo, complete public disclosure.”); v. 724 So. 2d need for 373, 1998) prohibit chilling (Miss. (“[the] is intended to 383 potential public statements made to or information effect of the disclosure of by prepared carrying committee in out for and used the [medical review] peer quotation omitted]); its review function” marks Virmani [internal Corp., 449, 478, 515 Presbyterian (1999) S.E.2d 675 Health Services 350 N.C. public’s proceedings, (“[t]he interest in access to . . . court records and by compelling public protecting outweighed interest in documents is effective, confidentiality peer in of medical review records order to foster exchange among peer frank and uninhibited medical review committee Center, Holum, 148, members”); Trinity Inc. v. 544 N.W.2d 155 Medical quality 1996) (“[P]hysicians unwilling (N.D. would be to serve on assurance openly performance committees, feel free to discuss the and would not hospital, practicing in the without assurance that then- of other doctors privileged. It was this discussions in committee would be confidential and open physician participation, purpose encourage frank and and the improvement patient care, privilege.”); resulting which underlies the Sand Bryan, M.D., Ltd., Super. 491, 494, 361 Pa. 522 A.2d 1138 erson v. Frank S. peer protected (“Generally, hospital findings (1987) and records are review

191 scant, history Although legislative indicates that it was cast from the same mold as the peer See, e.g., review statutes of our sister states. 23 Proc., 24, 1980 Sess., p. 7096, Repre H.R. Pt. remarks of sentative Richard Lawlor review statute intended (peer confidentiality peer pro to “allow for some review ceedings any hospitals and medical facil regard .6Indeed, purpose we have ities”) recognized peer by 19a-17b is to facilitate review proceedings participants from protecting liability preclud civil the materials used ing therein from introduced being into evidence in an action for damages; see Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, 251 Conn. 790, 824-25, 742 A.2d 322 and also (1999); protecting confidentiality of such proceedings. id., See 825 where . (“[o]nly . . peer review . committees . . are assured of confidenti ality they] feel free to enter into uninhibited discus [will sions of their peers” quotation marks [internal Pisel v. omitted]); Hospital, 314, Stamford 326, 430 A.2d 1(1980) (“[t]he purpose of is to [§ 19a-17b] public scrutiny protection from encourage .... for such is to activity result, hoped, improved increased which will it is care.”), appeal denied, 624, health (1988); 517 Pa. Barnes v. Whittington, 493, (Tex. 1988) (Phillips, J., 751 concurring) S.W.2d 497 C. (“The [peer legislative judgment statute reflects a review] the overall quality by shielding of medical care will be elevated certain in-house evalua public professionals likely tions from disclosure. Medical are more to come professional incompetence forward with informat ion about and misbehavior protected personal liability when disclosure.”). Proc., 2, 1976 Sess., p. 516, Anthony See also 19 S. Pt. remarks of Senator (bill immunity give physicians Ciarlone serving intended to on committee); Proc., 6, Sess., p. 2384, Representa 19 H.R. Pt. remarks of (“[T]his necessary tive Morris N. Cohen bill is a most bill if we are to continue checking delivery on health care in our Peer review committees must [s]tate. constantly judge peers. giving the services rendered their Without them immunity, they so.”); Proc., this 9, would not be able to do 19 H.R. Pt. *24 Sess., p. 4094, Representative Healey (“opinions remarks of T. James of the subject discovery medical review committee ... are not to or introduction person into meeting evidence and ... no who is in attendance at a of such permitted required testify committee shall be to in civil actions as to opinions committee”). of said keep peer studies, discussions and deliberations Services confidential”); Commissioner Health supra, App. (O’Connell, J., dis Kadish, 17 Conn. review committee's senting) (“[t]he peer from the concern that designed chilling are be free they expose its members public would become the litigation glare to the involvement of civil public attention”). my view, majority’s interpretation

In narrow the the statutory fails to reflect or effectuate language the and intent in 19a- enacting § clear legislature’s that is intended to First, 17b. to the extent action prevent litigants obtaining in a court preparation in their for trial— review materials to assist that, in it is— majority large part, which I with the agree statutory of the majority’s interpretation language the effectively out with protection reads that of the statute care respect public throughout to all health facilities prohibition the remains Specifically, although state.7 the through materials the formal discov- obtaining on such a will able to circum- ery process, litigant hereafter be the simply filing request vent that under safeguard information, thereby eviscerating exact act for the same discovery was any protection prohibition that the provide. illogical meaning- intended to It would be discovery for the to have enacted the less for a against at all if it intended provision litigant obtain hospital privileged able to the same public be We are information disclosure under the act.8 through only public particularly troubling will It is that health care institutions adversely impacted by majority’s today, private conclusions health subject provisions Accordingly, are act. care institutions not disadvantage comparison to their institutions sit at a distinct competitors respect assuring provision private continued process. quality through care health an effective 8 my view, In this decision in Police v. Freedom court’s Chief of of Informa Commission, 377, inapposite. (2000), tion agree majority Although I with the Police v. Freedom Chief of ofInforma proposition supports fact that certain informa tion Commission does not tion is not to disclosure under rules of

193 statutory lan- interpretation bound to avoid an Kelly result. See leads to such an unworkable guage 580, 616, (2005) Conn. Haven, v. New 275 in a manner that we construe a statute (“It is axiomatic purpose or lead to will not thwart its intended a construction that absurd results. . . . We must avoid result that bears fails to attain a rational and sensible sought to directly legislature on the quotation omitted.]). marks achieve.” [Internal practical standpoint, moreover, having From a pursuant act, litigant such materials obtained during will be able to use what was said and done questions what peer proceedings review to determine ask, them, during of whom to ask the formal evidence that discovery process in order to discover thereby essentially provid- at trial, would be admissible blueprint with the for an effective trial ing litigants Supe- Regional See Yuma Medical Center strategy. plain- Ariz. Court, supra, (“Inherent rior [the] ability tiffs’ to obtain information from another source plaintiffs’ part that such infor- knowledge is the on [the] mation exists. . . . Herein lies the real benefit to [the] plaintiffs [obtaining peer review materials that are not themselves admissible in it informs evidence]: [the] plaintiffs peer participants what the review consider to be relevant case— plaintiffs’ information [the] plaintiffs information of which be might [the] consequence, public pro- As a health care unaware.”). viders will participate be reluctant to in the necessarily subject act, mean that it also is not to disclosure under the it subject does not follow that the fact that certain information is not discovery necessarily subject disclosure under the rules of means that it differently, presented question to disclosure under Put the act. here is prevent whether the intended 19a-17b to the disclosure of in an action before the commission such that those subject materials are neither rules disclosure under the nor act, analyzed question to disclosure under the that was not raised or Police v. Freedom Commission. Chief of of Information they say and do that what knowledge

process used indirectly, albeit may, such during malpractice against action subsequent *26 in an ongoing precisely peers. their This is themselves or one of to avoid when it legislature sought result 19a-17b. enacted § majority’s conclusions a result of the

Second, as health public case, this all subject will be to disclosure potentially care institutions scru- beyond ensuing context. litigation made and documents submitted tiny the comments undeniably chilling will have in such health care discourage review and will effect on their relationships with risk their providers—who and the reputation profession within the peers, their referrals— practice through success of their continued a result defeats process. Such participating enacted, 19a-17b was purpose for which § the clear Kelly interpretation. such an See we are bound to avoid supra, 275 Conn. 616. Haven, v. New only permissible I conclude that Accordingly, of 19a-17b interpretation ambiguous language “shall not language intended the is that the ... civil action” to disclo- seeking the commission include an action before under the act. peer review information sure of medical affirm the of the trial court judgment Because I would dissent. effect, respectfully I JR., ET AL. v. ANTHONY EARLINGTON, OMAR ET AL. ANASTASI 18042) (SC (SC 18044) McLachlan, Norcott, Palmer, Rogers, J., Js. Zarella and C.

Case Details

Case Name: Director of Health Affairs Policy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission
Court Name: Supreme Court of Connecticut
Date Published: Aug 25, 2009
Citation: 977 A.2d 148
Docket Number: SC 18286
Court Abbreviation: Conn.
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