OPINION
In this case, the plaintiff, Direct Action for Rights and Equality (DARE or plaintiff), an incorporated, non-profit community action group based in Providence, Rhode Island, brought an action pursuant to the Access to Public Records Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 2 of title 38 (APRA), to compel the defendant, Bernard E. Gannon,
1
in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Providence (city or defendant), to produce various documents relating to civilian complaints of police misconduct.
2
Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed the order of the trial justice in this matter, and those appeals were consolidated for a single disposition by this Court. We also note that this is the second appeal heard by this Court concerning the current action.
See Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Gannon,
I
Facts and Travel
In a letter dated September 17, 1993, plaintiff requested several documents from the city pursuant to the APRA. Specifically, plaintiff requested the following information:
“a.) Every ‘Providence Police Civilian Complaint report’ (Form 210) filed within the Providence Police Dept. from 1986 to present.
b.) A listing of all findings from investigations that was [sic] conducted by the Bureau of Internal Affairs, in reference to all ‘Providence Police Civilian Complaint reports’ (Form 210) on record from 1986 to present.
c.) Ml reports made by the ‘Providence Police Department Hearing officers’ on their decisions from the findings of investigations conducted in Re: ‘Providence Police Civilian Complaints’ (Form 210) from 1986 to present.
d.) Reports on all disciplinary action that’s [sic] been taken as a result of recommendations made by the Hearing Officers Division since 1986 to present.”
On November 28, 1994, Providence City Solicitor Charles Mansolillo (Mansolillo), responded to plaintiff by stating that records only existed from 1988 to present and, further, he refused to produce the *655 records sought in categories (a), (b) and (d), but agreed to provide the information in category (c) in redacted form. In response to Mansolillo’s denial, plaintiff initiated the present action on May 5, 1995. In its complaint, DARE sought the production of all four categories of documents, $1,000 in damages pursuant to § 38-2-9, plus costs, statutory interest, attorneys’ fees and any other relief that the court deemed proper. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In June 1996, the trial justice granted plaintiffs motion in part and denied defendant’s motion. Specifically, he ordered defendant to produce all the requested records in unre-dacted form.
The defendant appealed the trial justice’s order to this Court. On appeal, we determined that DARE was entitled to get access to the public records in categories (a), (c) and (d), redacting only the names of the complaining citizens and the police officers who were the subjects of the complaints.
See DARE I,
In a hearing on remand conducted in Superior Court on December 17, 1998, DARE requested that fees for reproducing the documents be waived and that the city be fined and- ordered to pay attorneys’ fees. The trial justice reserved his decision on those issues for a later date, but ordered defendant to “produce all records that are the subject of this litigation (1986 to and including the present) to the plaintiff on or before January 8, 1999.” The defendant then filed a motion requesting that the trial justice reconsider his order and provide the city with more time to comply because “some 700 closed case files exist” and it would need additional time to retrieve and redact the relevant information. Additionally, defendant appealed the trial justice’s order to this Court, stating that:
“The City’s objection was primarily predicated upon the [o]rder requiring the City to provide copies of records that the Supreme Court had opined in the instant matter were unavailable to D.A.R.E. The [o]rder as entered clearly mandates that the City must provide all records to the [p]laintiff that are the subject of the litigation. The [o]rder does not state that these records be provided in redacted form. All records means all records.”
This argument was advanced despite a letter from plaintiffs counsel reaffirming DARE’s request for defendant to produce only “those things that the Supreme Court has previously said DARE is entitled to.”
At an emergency conference requested by the city on its motion for stay, this Court stated that the trial justice’s order required defendant to produce only the documents that this Court required in DARE I. Consequently, on January 21, 1999, this Court issued an order denying defendant’s motion to stay the trial justice’s order.
On February 11, 1999, the parties were once again before the trial justice. Besides redacting the names of the complaining witnesses and officers against whom the complaints were made, defendant redacted the names of witnesses, locations, police officers on the scene and in some cases, the race of the parties involved in the incidents. Furthermore, plaintiff expressed concerns that it was not receiving all the records to which it was entitled. 3 *656 Consequently, besides requesting attorneys’ fees and costs, plaintiff moved that defendant be held in civil contempt.
On May 12, 1999, the trial justice issued a bench decision in which he held that the city had no authority to redact location, even if the complaining witness lived there, nor did defendant have license to redact the names of non-complainant witnesses, whether they were police officers or civilians. 4 The trial justice determined, however, that the city did not intentionally attempt to interfere with the workings of the court, and thus denied plaintiffs motion to hold defendant in civil contempt and refused to order a fine. Additionally, the trial justice relied on the 1998 amendment to the APRA, which allowed him to waive the fees to be charged to plaintiff for the cost of retrieval and redaction of the requested documents because the “information requested is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” Section 38-2-4(e), as amended by P.L.1998, ch. 378, § 1. Furthermore, the trial justice ordered that defendant pay to plaintiff all attorneys’ fees incurred after July 20, 1998, the date the general assembly amended § 38-2-9(d) (P.L.1998, ch. 378, § 1). In an order dated May 13, 1999, the trial justice ordered defendant (1) to “produce all records that are the subject of this litigation[, redacting] only the names of complainants and the officers against whom complaints have been made * * *,” (2) to bear the costs for production, retrieval and redaction of relevant documents, and (3) to pay plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by plaintiff from July 20, 1998, through the present. The defendant immediately filed a notice of appeal in this Court, as well as a stay of the trial justice’s order, which we denied.
On May 17, 1999, the trial justice heard arguments from the city on why it should be allowed to redact the Social Security numbers of the complainants and the badge numbers of the police officers against whom the complaints were made. Thereafter, he issued an order allowing defendant to redact the Social Security and badge numbers. The plaintiff timely filed notice of a cross-appeal of the trial justice’s decisions. This Court granted defendant’s motion to consolidate those appeals on March 29, 2000.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) the trial justice erred in failing to hold defendant in civil contempt and should have imposed a $1,000 fine pursuant to § 38-2-9(d); (2) the trial justice should have ordered defendant to pay plaintiffs attorneys’ fees from the commencement of this action; and (3) the trial justice erred in permitting defendant to redact the Social Security numbers of complainants and badge numbers of police officers against whom complaints were made. The defendant argues (1) that the trial justice erred by applying the 1998 amendments to the APRA in the instant matter, and (2) that even if they did apply, they did not authorize the trial justice to waive the costs charged to plaintiff for production and redaction and he should not have awarded attorneys’ fees because defendant did not commit a knowing and willful violation of the statute. We address these arguments below after providing general background on APRA.
*657 II
The Purpose of the APRA
“A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” 5 The Rhode Island General Assembly has effectively codified this philosophy by enacting the APRA and stating that the purpose of such legislation is as follows:
“The public’s right to access to records pertaining to the policy making responsibilities of government and the individual’s right to dignity and privacy are both recognized to be principles of the utmost importance in a free society. The purpose of this chapter is to facilitate public access to governmental records which pertain to the policy making functions of public bodies and/or are relevant to the public health, safety, and welfare. It is also the intent of this chapter to protect from disclosure information about particular individuals maintained in the files of public bodies when disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Section 38-2-1.
Consequently, this Court has long adhered to this purpose and recognized that the underlying policy of the APRA is the promotion of the free flow and disclosure of information to the public.
Providence Journal Co. v. Sundlun,
III
The Retroactivity of the 1998 Amendments to the APRA
In an effort to further promote access to public information, the General Assembly promulgated amendments to the APRA in 1998 that (1) allow a trial justice to “award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff,” § 38-2-9(d), and (2) grant a trial justice the power to waive “costs charged for search or retrieval if [he or she] determines that the information requested is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” Section 38-2-4(e). .
The defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in waiving plaintiffs costs and awarding it attorneys’ fees because those amendments to the APRA did not go into effect until after this action began. We disagree with defendant’s contention.
In
Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of Rhode Island,
On appeal, EHC argued that the trial justice erred in awarding attorneys’ fees because Solas filed the action in September 1997, and the amendment to the OMA providing for attorneys’ fees did not become effective until July 20, 1998.
See Solas,
As in Solas, the attorneys’ fees and waiver of costs provisions in § 38 — 2—9(d) were enacted subsequent to DARE’s filing of its complaint but before the trial justice made a final decision. Thus, we conclude that there is no discernible difference between the two situations and hold that the trial justice did not err in applying §§ 38-2-4 and 38 — 2—9(d) to the present case.
Although the trial justice properly applied § 38 — 2—9(d) 6 to the current action, plaintiff argues that the trial justice should have awarded attorneys’ fees from the time the action began rather than from the date the amendment went into effect. We agree with plaintiffs contention.
Ordinarily, this Court presumes that statutes and their amendments operate prospectively unless there is clear, strong language or a necessary implication that the General Assembly intended to give the statute retroactive effect.
See Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co.,
Again, we refer to
Solas
for guidance. In
Solas,
we held that the OMA, which was enacted before Solas initiated his lawsuit, was “an existing substantive right available to the citizens of this state at the time [Solas filed this action].”
Solas,
In the case before us, we conclude that, at the time plaintiff brought this action, the APRA conferred upon the public the substantive right to have access to public records. Section 38-2-9(d) merely provides the additional remedial measure of attorneys’ fees to that already existing substantive right. Therefore, the trial justice should have ordered defendant to pay attorneys’ fees to plaintiff from May 5, 1995 — the date plaintiff filed its complaint — to the date of this decision.
IV
Awarding Attorneys’ Fees under § 38-2-9(d)
Alternatively, defendant argues that, even if § 38-2-9(d) applies retrospectively, the trial justice erred in awarding plaintiff attorneys’ fees because he should not have made such an award absent a showing of a knowing and willful violation of the APRA. We disagree.
Section 38-2-9(d) provides in pertinent part:
“The court shall impose a civil fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) against a public body or official found to have committed a knowing and willful violation of this chapter, and shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff.”
The crux of defendant’s argument is that the scienter requirement of § 38 — 2—9(d)— that there be a knowing and willful violation of the APRA — -is necessary for imposing a civil fine and for awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff. The trial justice disagreed and determined that the “knowing and willful” language only modified the civil fine provision rather than the attorneys’ fees provision. 7
This Court reviews
de novo
questions of statutory interpretation.
See Pier House Inn, Inc. v. 421 Corporation, Inc.,
Section 38-2-2(6) of the APRA, provides that the term “prevailing plaintiff’ is equivalent to “those persons and entities deemed prevailing parties pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in derogation of the “American Rule” that courts should not award attorneys’ fees absent explicit statutory authority.
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,
Applying the interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to § 38 — 2—9(d), we conclude that the “knowing and willful” requirement is not a consideration when determining whether a court should award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff. Rather, that language is only relevant for determining whether a court should authorize a $1,000 fine against a “public body or official.” This interpretation gives effect to the legislative intent that a “prevailing plaintiff’ be awarded attorneys’ fees as he or she would under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 — with the inquiry focusing only on whether the plaintiff is successful, not the defendant’s subjective intent. Furthermore, we believe that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the APRA would best be served by providing litigants an incentive to bring meritorious claims when they otherwise may be dissuaded from bringing such claims based on the costly nature of hiring competent counsel. If we held that an award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing plaintiff depended on the subjective intent of the defendant, we would discourage the public from bringing such suits and thereby would ignore the stated purpose behind the APRA.
In this case, it is clear that DARE is a prevailing plaintiff. It sought and was entitled to the records from the city. When the city denied its request, DARE brought this suit to compel production of the requested documents. The trial justice and this Court determined that plaintiff was entitled to these records and, accordingly, the trial justice ordered defendant to produce them. Regardless of whether defendant knowingly and willfully violated the APRA, we hold that the trial justice did not err in awarding DARE attorneys’ fees under § 38-2-9(d).
V
Willful and Knowing Violation of the APRA under § 38-2-9(d)
DARE further contends that the trial justice should have ordered defendant to pay the $1,000 civil fine authorized by § 38-2-9(d) because defendant willfully and knowingly violated the APRA. Our standard of review of a trial justice’s findings of fact is deferential, and we will overturn such findings only when the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material evidence or if they are clearly wrong.
Samos v. 43 East Realty Corp.,
VI
Civil Contempt
In addition to our determination that the trial justice did not err in declining to award to DARE the $1,000 fíne authorized by § 38 — 2—9(d), we affirm the trial justice’s decision not to hold defendant in civil contempt for failing to comply with either this Court’s or the trial justice’s own order for defendant to produce three of the four categories of the requested documents.
“A civil contempt proceeding is an appropriate vehicle to enforce compliance with court orders and decrees when attempting to preserve and enforce the rights of parties litigant.”
Trahan v. Trahan,
VII
The Cost of Redaction
The defendant argues that the redaction of the names of the complainants and police officers against whom the complaints were made requires an extraordinary effort and that DARE should bear the cost of such effort. In support of its position, defendant relies on
Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers,
The question of whether the production by defendant of the requested documents was in the public interest presented a mixed question of law and fact. A mixed question of law and fact is one in which “the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard.”
Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
VIII
Trial Justice’s Modification of his Order
The plaintiff avers that the trial justice should not have modified his order of May 13, 1999, to allow defendant to redact the Social Security numbers of the complainants and the badge number of the officers against whom the complaints were made. We disagree.
Litigants have the option of petitioning a trial justice for a modification of an order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. A trial justice’s decision to modify his own order is entitled to deference and “ ‘will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion or error of law.’ ”
Zannini v. Downing Corp.,
In this case, defendant did not file a motion to modify pursuant to Rule 60(b). Nevertheless, on May 17, 1999, the trial justice modified his previous order based on defendant’s informal request. Although we prefer that litigants abide by the rules of court, we decline to overturn the trial justice’s decision to modify based on the absence of a formal motion to vacate. To do so would elevate form over substance. Therefore, we proceed to determine whether the trial justice abused his discretion in modifying his order of May 13, 1999. We determine that he did not.
The APRA does not provide the press and the public with “carte blanche” authority to demand all records held by public agencies.
Providence Journal Co. v. Kane,
In
Kane,
we held that employee numbers are the kind of record that would specifically identify an employee, thus exempting them from disclosure.
See Kane,
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The papers in this case are to be remanded to the Superior Court for a hearing to determine attorneys’ fees pursuant to this decision.
Notes
. Bernard Gannon was succeeded as Police Chief by Urbano Prignano, Jr., Richard T. Sullivan (interim) and Dean Esserma'n.
. At oral arguments the city also argued that the trial justice erred in not redacting addresses and names of complainants' family members from the requested records. But because the city did not preserve this issue for appeal at trial, and did not brief the issue on appeal, we do not address these matters.
. The plaintiff avers that it only received 275 reports of a possible 700 such reports since 1988. Further, defendant only produced reports from 1990 to present.
. The city admitted that it should not have redacted race, the names of the hearing officers or the names of the attorneys.
. Letter from James Madison to William T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) (on file with the Library of America).
. We do not address the need for retroactive application of G.L.1956 § 38-2-4 because that provision deals with the waiver of costs associated with producing the requested documents. The defendant did not actually begin to produce such documents until after the trial justice's order issued on December 17, 1998. Because production of the documents did not begin until well after the enactment of § 38-2-4, there are no production costs predating the effective date of that provision.
. The trial justice found that the use of the comma in § 38-2-9(d) indicated that the General Assembly was expressing two distinct thoughts. Thus, according to the trial justice, "the second portion of the sentence, following the comma[ ], could stand alone, and if it did so, would clearly not have the requirement of a knowing, willful violation.”
. As we noted above, there is no need to address the retroactive application of § 38-2-4(e) because production of the requested documents did not begin until after the amendments went into effect. Because we apply the law in effect at the time of a decision, the trial justice properly applied § 38-2-4(e) to this case.
See Solas v. Emergency Hiring Council of Rhode Island,