Regina Dipple appeals from the district court’s 2 order affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, which denied Dipple’s application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental social security income. We affirm.
I.
To qualify for disability insurance benefits, Dipple was required to prove that she was disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(a);
Tilley v. Astrue,
On September 19, 1997, Dipple was working as a traffic flagger on a highway construction site near Viola, Illinois. She was struck by a passing car and thrown a considerable distance. Dipple was treated in an emergency room and received computerized tomography scans of her head and back. The scan results were negative for anatomic abnormalities, and Dipple was released that day with prescriptions to relieve pain and prevent infection. After being off work for three months, Dipple returned to her construction employment for only four hours. She then obtained work as a bartender. According to Dipple, she experienced memory problems that interfered with that job and she ceased working as a bartender in 2001.
From 1998 to 2001, Dipple visited Family Physicians Clinic in Davenport, Iowa, for annual examinations. The clinic’s reports indicate that Dipple complained of a sore breast, cough, diarrhea, and cellulitis. In August 1998, Dipple was examined by a *835 plastic surgeon, who documented a scar on her forehead and some residual elevation of her left eyebrow. The surgeon reported that no further treatment was required.
In October 2004, Dipple filed an application for disability benefits, alleging that her disability began in March 2001. She claimed that she had been unable to work because of back and neck pain, hip and leg injuries, dizziness, mood changes and memory loss, all stemming from her 1997 accident. Dipple’s medical records were limited, and the Social Security Administration requested physical and psychological examinations. Stanley Rabinowitz, M.D., reported that Dipple complained of joint and back pain and memory problems, but found Dipple to be “within normal limits” neurologically. Lori O’Dell McCollum, Ph.D., a psychologist, found that Dipple exhibited short and intermediate memory impairment but no long-term memory problems. Dr. McCollum concluded that Dipple could work at a slow pace and that her Global Assessment of Functioning score was sixty-five. Based upon these findings, the administration determined that Dipple lacked a medically determinable impairment and that she was not entitled to disability benefits.
Dipple appealed this initial determination and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in March 2007. The ALJ determined that an additional psychological evaluation was appropriate, and Phillip Kent, Psy.D., a psychologist, examined Dipple in April 2007. Dr. Kent confirmed that Dipple experienced problems with her attention span, although she exhibited no difficulties managing her daily life or making “reasonable life decisions.” Dipple showed “some signs of emotional disinhibition, attention problems with mental calculations, spatial confusion and concrete thinking.” Dr. Kent believed that Dipple’s symptoms were “consistent with an individual who likely sustained a closed head injury,” although “the neurological tests at the time were normal.” He diagnosed Dipple with a cognitive disorder not otherwise specified, alcohol abuse by history, a depressive disorder not otherwise specified, and dependent personality traits.
At a second administrative hearing in June 2007, the ALJ considered Dr. Kent’s report and the testimony of a vocational expert. The vocational expert testified that an individual with Dipple’s impairments could function as a housekeeper, hand packer, or kitchen helper. He opined that there were tens of thousands of such jobs in Illinois and Iowa. The ALJ conducted the five-step test required to determine whether Dipple was disabled as of December 31, 2003, determining (1) whether Dipple was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether Dipple had a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment met or equalled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1; (4) whether Dipple could return to her past relevant work; and (5) whether Dipple could adjust to other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(5)(i)-(v);
Tilley,
*836 II.
We review
de novo
the district court’s order upholding the denial of social security benefits, and we will affirm if the decision of the Social Security Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Stormo v. Barnhart,
A.
Dipple argues that the ALJ’s findings were unsupported by the evidence. She argues that (1) the ALJ’s determination of her residual functional capacity failed to give adequate consideration to Dr. Kent’s report, and (2) the vocational expert failed to provide substantial evidence of significant numbers of jobs that Dipple could realistically perform.
The opinion of a treating physician is accorded special deference and will be granted controlling weight when well-supported by medically acceptable diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2);
Prosch v. Apfel,
Once it is established that the claimant cannot return to her previous occupation, the Commissioner bears the burden to show that a significant number of appropriate jobs exist for the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A);
Johnson v. Chater,
B.
Dipple also argues that the ALJ failed to adequately assess her credibility. In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ must consider all of the evidence relating to the subjective complaints, the claimant’s work record, observations of third parties, and the reports of treating and examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3);
Polaski v. Heckler,
The ALJ noted that Dipple was released from the hospital on the same day that she was admitted and that documentation of ongoing neurological complaints was lacking. The ALJ considered Dipple’s subjective complaints of pain and found that Dipple could lift twenty-five pounds frequently and that she could stand, walk, and sit six-to-eight hours at a time. The ALJ noted that the November 2004 psychological examination revealed no major dysfunction, and that Dipple’s long-term memory was intact. The ALJ also considered the results of Dr. Kent’s April 2007 examination. During this examination, Dipple related that she has a fairly normal daily routine, including accomplishing basic household tasks and playing cards with neighbors on a regular basis. Additionally, Dipple works on her computer and reads. The ALJ concluded that “These are not the actions of an individual who has ‘marked’ limitations in the ability to perform simple, repetitive tasks.”
The ALJ also explained why she rejected Dipple’s complaints of social impairment. Dipple continued to interact successfully with her family and neighbors. There was no evidence of significant problems with social interaction. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Dipple had no more than a “slight” limitation in social functioning. 4
We conclude that the ALJ made adequate findings with respect to Dipple’s credibility. An express credibility determination was not required because the ALJ did not reject Dipple’s subjective complaints of pain, but rather discounted Dipple’s account of her cognitive and social impairments.
See Cline v. Sullivan,
III.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
. A newspaper report of the accident stated that Dipple was "thrown about 500 feet.” The police report indicated that Dipple was struck by a vehicle traveling at thirty-five miles per hour. The diagram of the accident on the police report shows Dipple as having been thrown approximately two car lengths.
. We have considered and find to be without merit Dipple's contention that the ALJ did not adequately consider her "deficiencies in persistence and pace.”