DiPaolo Indus. Dev., L.L.C. v. Blair & Latell Co., LPADiPaolo Indus. Dev., L.L.C. v. Blair & Latell Co., LPA
James O‘Connor and Brian D. Sullivan, Reminger Co., L.P.A., 1400 Midland Building, 101 Prospect Avenue, West, Cleveland, OH 44115-1093 (For Defendants-Appellees).
O P I N I O N
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, DiPaolo Industrial Development, LLC, appeals the January 9, 2014 judgment entry of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas granting appellees, Matthew J. Blair and Blair & Latell Co., LPA‘s, motion for summary judgment. The trial court construed appellees’ motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶3} On July 22, 2013, appellant filed a legal malpractice complaint against appellеes in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. The complaint named the following as plaintiffs: DiPaolo Industrial Development, LLC (“DiPaolo Industrial“), Ohio One Contractors & Developers, LLC (“Ohio One“), Source One Contractors & Develоpers, Inc. (“Source One“), and Sergio DiPaolo. The complaint was signed and submitted by Sergio DiPaolo, President of DiPaolo Industrial Development, LLC. It is undisputed that Sergio DiPaolo is not an attorney licensed to practice law.
{¶4} On September 17, 2013, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, which argued that the complaint failed as a matter of law. The motion asserted:
(1) Mr. DiPaolo is not an attorney and lacks standing to prosecute claims on behalf of the Corporate Plaintiffs; (2) Mr. DiPаolo has failed to allege facts sufficient to support his individual claim of malpractice; and (3) Mr. DiPaolo‘s individual claim of malpractice is barred by the one year statute of limitations.
On September 23, 2013, the trial court issued a judgment entry stating that appellees’ motion to dismiss would be construed as a motion for summary judgment as a result of appellees “present[ing] matters outside the pleadings as specifically enumerated by
{¶6} Appellant timely appealed the trial court‘s January 9, 2014 judgment entry. We note that cоunsel for appellant has indicated representation of DiPaolo Industrial, and the brief argues only on behalf of this entity. However, the issues are the same fоr all of the corporate entities. Additionally, no error is assigned from the trial court‘s granting of summary judgment against Sergio DiPaolo and in favor of appellees. Therefore, that portion of the trial court‘s judgment is specifically affirmed.
{¶7} Appellant sets forth one assignment of error:
{¶8} “The trial court err[ed] when it dismissed appellant‘s complaint with prejudice.”
{¶9} Apрellant argues that Sergio DiPaolo, as a corporate officer, was legally allowed to file a complaint on behalf of DiPaolo Industrial. Apрellant‘s lone assignment of error presents three issues for review:
[1.] Whether the court err[ed] in dismissing plaintiff‘s complaint?
[2.] Whether [Sergio DiPaolo], as president for рlaintiff, was legally able to file the complaint?
[3.] Whether existing law that allows corporate officers to file for a corporation in small claims cases extends to common pleas cases?
{¶10} Appellant has apparently misconstrued the judgment of the trial court. Initially, the trial court struck the complaint as it related to the corporate entities, inclusive of appellant, as a nullity. It was treated as if it was never filed on their behalf. With rеgard to the remaining claim of Sergio DiPaolo, the trial court construed appellees’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
{¶11} It was proper for the trial court to strike the complaint and treat it as a nullity as it related to thе corporate plaintiffs.
{¶12}
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law, or to commence, cоnduct, or defend any action or proceeding in which the person is not a party concerned, either by using or subscribing the person‘s own name, or the name of another person, unless the person has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance with its prescribed and published rules.
{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court has long interpreted
{¶14} Likewise, cоurts throughout the state have consistently held that a complaint, or other pleading undertaken on behalf of a corporation by a non-attorney, is a legal nullity. See, e.g., Coburn v. Toledo Hosp, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-00-1215, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 127, *3 (Jan. 19, 2001); Talarek v. M.E.Z., Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007088, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494, *3 (Sept. 10, 1998); Sheridan Mobile Village, Inc. v. Larsen, 78 Ohio App.3d 203, 205 (4th Dist.1992). “When a non-attorney files a complaint in a court in violation of
{¶15} In this case, appellant‘s complaint was a legal nullity, as it was filed by Sergio DiPaolo as President of DiPaolo Industrial. By filing a complaint signed in his personal capacity, Sergio DiPaolo attempted to engage in the practice of law on behalf of the corporate entities. As a result, the trial court properly identified appellant‘s complaint, with regard to those entities, as a legal nullity and struck it. It was not until after striking thе complaint as related to appellant that the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on Sergio DiPaolo‘s remaining individual claim for legal
{¶16} Appellant also asks this court tо address “whether existing law that allows corporate officers to file for a corporation in small claims cases extends to common pleas сases.” Appellant fails to present any case law that extends
{¶17} For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in all respects.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.