DONALD L. DIONNE, as the Trustee, of the Bankrupt Estate of Ruby Mae Simmons, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus RUBY MAE SIMMONS, a.k.a. RUBY MAE SIMMONS RASHID, and ABDUL R. RASHID, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 98-6136
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
January 11, 2000
D. C. Docket No. 98-C-0331-W. [PUBLISH]
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
(January 11, 2000)
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and OWENS*, Senior District Judge.
* Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
This case requires that we review a district court order that without the benefit of reviewing the record or holding a hearing on the merits, withdrew the reference to the bankruptcy court. The district court order also reversed the bankruptcy court‘s order denying the debtor‘s motion to dismiss, and refused the bankruptcy court‘s recommendation that the debtor be held in contempt. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. Background
This case arises from Ruby Mae Simmons’ (the “Debtor“) sixth filing for bankruptcy dating back to March 1988. Before us is her most recent Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
The day before the hearing was to be held, Debtor filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. This automatically stayed the proceedings in state court. The case was assigned to Judge Bennett in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama.2 In her petition for relief the Debtor identified her only creditor as Pake. The following day Pake filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case, but this motion was denied. The bankruptcy court appointed Donald L. Dionne as trustee (the “Trustee“), and because the Debtor had listed no assets for distribution, a Bankruptcy Rule 2002(e) notice was sent to creditors.3
On August 28, 1997, Pake moved for relief from the automatic stay. This motion was granted on September 11, 1997, and as a result the Debtor was evicted from her home. Pake then obtained a judgment of $19,892.64 for damages in the state court proceeding.
On September 24, 1997, at a § 341 meeting, the Debtor admitted that she owed monies to at least four other creditors not listed on her petition: Tucker Motors, Liborious Agwana, Alabama Power, and a student loan lender.
On October 22, 1997, the Debtor made a motion to dismiss her Chapter 7 proceeding, and the Trustee objected to the dismissal. The Trustee had become aware that the Debtor possessed two automobiles and a bank account, causing him to pursue an investigation into the location of one of the Debtor‘s vehicles, a 1994 Cadillac, which she had not listed on her petition. The Trustee also initiated two adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court to obtain possession of the 1994 Cadillac and to obtain deposit account monies. The bankruptcy court issued a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to order the Debtor to turn over the Cadillac, monies, and accounts to the Trustee.
The Trustee attempted to depose the Debtor on February 5, 1998, to obtain information that would lead to the location of the 1994 Cadillac, which supposedly was in the possession of the Debtor‘s husband Abdul Rashid. The Debtor did not show up for the deposition. The Debtor was brought before the bankruptcy court on February 9, 1998, by the U.S. Marshal, but she refused to answer any questions, claiming she had a privilege against self-incrimination. The next day the Debtor again asserted her privilege and refused to be deposed.4
On February 10, 1998, the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court issued notice under F. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c)(5)5 requesting that all parties file their claims because assets
The Debtor continuously denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of the Cadillac or her husband who supposedly was in possession of the car. The Trustee found evidence of at least 80 phone calls that the Debtor made to the Debtor‘s husband, as well as letters she addressed to him. The Bankruptcy Court submitted a report and recommendation that the Debtor be held in contempt of court until she divulged information regarding the location of her remaining assets. The report and recommendation of the bankruptcy court was forwarded to the United States District
| Claimant | Date Filed | Amount of Claim |
|---|---|---|
| S. Lee Pake | 2/23/98 | $19,892.64 |
| City of Tuscaloosa | 4/17/98 | $381.76 |
| Alabama Power | 4/24/98 | $260.84 |
| Bell South | 5/11/98 | $1,187.18 |
| DCH Regional Medical Center | 5/22/98 | $461.16 |
| DCH Regional Medical Center | 5/22/98 | $470.00 |
| Total: | $22,653.58 | |
The Trustee located and took possession of the 1994 Cadillac on February 17, 1998. Currently the Debtor‘s vehicles are being stored in a warehouse under the Trustee‘s control.
The bankruptcy court‘s recommendation and report was assigned to Judge U.W. Clemon on February 19, 1998. That same day, without a hearing and without giving notice to the trustee, Judge Clemon withdrew the reference of the case to the bankruptcy court and dismissed the entire bankruptcy case. The district court also refused to hold the debtor in contempt of court.
II. Discussion
This Court reviews the determination of law, whether from the bankruptcy court or the district court, de novo. See Yale Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1494 (11th Cir. 1997), and reviews the bankruptcy court‘s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. See id.
A. Withdrawal of Reference
A district court may, for cause, withdraw the reference of a case or proceeding in bankruptcy under
The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely
motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organization or activities affecting interstate commerce.
As this court noted in Park Lane:
Although this Court has not yet articulated criteria for determining the existence of cause for withdrawal, other courts have. In Holland American Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit noted in dicta that in determining whether cause existed a district court should consider such goals as advancing uniformity in bankruptcy administration, decreasing forum shopping and confusion, promoting the economical use of the parties’ resources, and facilitating the bankruptcy process. Id. at 998
Parklane, 927 F.2d at 536 n.5 (citations omitted). It can be inferred from the district court‘s memorandum order that the district court assumed there were no claims against the bankruptcy estate, and that the case was being handled inappropriately by the bankruptcy court. This assumption might be due to the fact that the district court never viewed the record before withdrawing the reference and
None of the goals suggested in Holland American Ins. Co. were advanced by the district court‘s withdrawal. Dating back to 1988, this debtor had a history of grossly abusing the bankruptcy process. By withdrawing the reference, the district court did not facilitate the bankruptcy process. Instead, the district court decision hindered the process, and its actions threatened to allow the Debtor to once again evade her creditors, hardly promoting the most economical use of the parties’ resources. The district court should have taken into consideration the possibility that claims might be filed against the bankruptcy estate before it withdrew the reference of the case.
We conclude that the case was not being handled inappropriately by the bankruptcy court, and the district court was mistaken in believing that it was. The bankruptcy court‘s actions were not cause for withdrawing the reference to the bankruptcy court under
B. Contempt charges
The Court of Appeals reviews a district court‘s grant or denial of civil contempt in a bankruptcy proceeding for abuse of discretion. See In re Jove Engineering, Inc., 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996). Soon after the contempt recommendation was filed the Trustee located and took possession of the Debtor‘s Cadillac and deposit monies, thereby mooting the issue. The district court may have been erroneous in its finding that there was no credible evidence about the Debtor‘s ability to comply with the bankruptcy court order to disclose the location of the Cadillac, but it is not necessary that we decide whether the district court abused its discretion. As there was no longer a need to hold the Debtor in
C. Reversal of Refusal to Dismiss
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court‘s denial of the Debtor‘s motion to dismiss. Section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for voluntary dismissal after a notice and hearing for cause. See
The district court in its memorandum opinion stated:
In the first place, the record does not disclose good cause for denial of Simmons’ petition to dismiss the bankruptcy petition. The only known creditor has apparently obtained all that he is entitled to. Whether he has or not is irrelevant, since he absented himself from the first meeting of creditors and has not filed a claim against the bankrupt estate. In fact, no one has filed a claim against the estate!
What, then is the justification for keeping this case on the presumably congested docket of the Bankruptcy Court? Surely, it cannot be that the Trustee needs to collect the assets of the bankrupt estate - for there are no creditors. What will he do with these assets once they are collected, other than turn over 40% of their value to his attorney? The Bankruptcy Court plainly erred by denying Simmons’ petition to dismiss the petition.
Memorandum Opinion, February 19, 1998. The district court suggests that cause was needed for the bankruptcy court not to grant the Debtor‘s motion to dismiss. Section 707(a) clearly states that a case shall only be dismissed for cause. See
It is clear that the district court was mistaken as to the status of the case. We have already discussed supra as to why no claims had been filed at the time the district court ordered the dismissal.
We conclude that the bankruptcy court was correct when it did not find cause for dismissal. The bankruptcy court judge found that it would be in the best interests of the creditors and the Debtor to deny the motion and to allow her debts to finally be resolved. See In Simmons, 97-72040, (Bankr. N.D Ala.) Transcript of Nov. 5, 1997 at 26. We agree with the bankruptcy judge that the Debtor‘s history of abuse warranted the bankruptcy court‘s denial of the Debtor‘s motion. When dismissal will only allow the Debtor to hinder creditors, secret assets, and further the Debtor‘s abuse of the system, dismissal of her voluntary petition is not
III. Conclusion
The district court erred in withdrawing the reference to the bankruptcy court as there was no cause for a permissive withdrawal under