Dinmark v. FarrierDinmark v. Farrier
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of defendants Michael Farrier, Jimmy Gibbs, and Wayne Dooley. On Februаry 18, 1986, the plaintiff, Brenda Dinmark, filed a claim for false imprisonment against Michael Farrier and Hudson-Thompson, Inc. On March 17, she amended her complaint to add Jimmy Gibbs, Wayne Dooley, and Big Bear Super Foods. On March 28, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hudson-Thompson, Inc., and on May 7, Big Bear Super Foods was dismissed. The facts surrounding this case are as follows:
On February 23, 1985, between 8:00 and 9:45 p.m., after drinking one beer, Dinmark drove her grandmother to a grocery store. Dinmark illegally parked her car in front of the store. She also had another bеer in her possession. Her grandmother went inside the store, and Dinmark waited in the car for her grandmother to return. Farrier, a policeman working as a security guard, asked Dinmark‘s grandmother to ask Dinmark to move her car because she was illegally parked. Farrier also asked a store clerk to ask Dinmark to move her car. In
I.
Dinmark first argues that the trial court should not have admitted the legal memоrandum prepared by an attorney in her trial on the criminal charges. Defendants introduced at trial a composite exhibit of three docket sheets from Municipal Court thаt showed Dinmark as being acquitted on her criminal charges. No objection was made to these docket sheets. Under the section of the docket sheet entitled “Actions, Judgmеnts, Case Notes,” is the following: “5-2-86 NOT GUILTY. See defendant‘s brief — no response from City Prosecutor.” Dinmark argues that the memorandum should not have been admitted because it was hearsay, legal opinion, and conclusory. Farrier argues that the memorandum was properly admitted in that it was incorporated by reference on the docket sheets.
Farrier cites Burgin v. Sugg, 210 Ala. 142, 97 So. 216 (1923), for supрort of his argument that the memorandum was incorporated by reference. Burgin involved a number of complainants and a judgment that did not specify which complainant was to recover damages. On appeal it was argued that the decree was uncertain because it did not state who would receive the damages. The court held that “[e]vеry judgment of a court of justice must either be made perfect in itself, or capable of being made perfect by reference to the pleadings, or to the paрers on file in the cause, or else to other pertinent entries on the court docket.” 210 Ala. at 144, 97 So. at 218, quoting Flack v. Andrews, 86 Ala. 395, 55 So. 452 (1888). In Burgin, the judgment of the trial court referred to other decrees made by the trial court; therefore, by looking at the other decrees, one could eliminate uncertainty as to who should receive the proceeds and one could determine that thе judgment was complete. In this case, the docket sheet clearly states that Dinmark was found “not guilty,” and the docket sheet clearly makes reference to the memorandum. In this case, the judgment of “not guilty” was complete in and of itself and there was no need to refer to the memorandum for clarity of the result.
However, the admission of the memorandum was harmless error, if error at all. The main purpose of the memorandum was to emphasize that the police officer, when “moonlighting” as a security officer, could not, absent some change in his status, act
II.
Dinmark argues, second, that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury thаt probable cause or the good faith of the person making the arrest is admissible to rebut a claim for punitive damages. In Yancey v. Farmer, 472 So.2d 990 (Ala. 1985), we held that probable cause is admissible to rebut a claim for punitive damages. Dinmark argues that when the trial court defined probable cause, the court, in essence, told the jury that, with probable cause, an illegal аrrest is justified. However, Dinmark‘s argument is misplaced. In the paragraph preceding the discussion of probable cause, the trial court stated the following:
“Now, the good faith of the person making the arrest, the law says, or the existence of probable cause does not justify trespass, does not justify an illegal arrest, good faith doesn‘t.” (Emphasis added.)
At the beginning of the paragraph concerning probable cause, the trial court said the following:
“Probable cause then, can be considered, as far as whether or not you are going to bring any punitive damages.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court, at the onset of its discussion of probable cause, limited it to the area of punitive damages. Therefore, as the instructions were not confusing or misleading, no error resulted.
III.
Dinmark‘s final argument is that the trial court erred when it ruled thаt Farrier was acting in his capacity as a police officer when arresting Dinmark. Dinmark argues that her arrest occurred as a direct result of Farrier‘s working as a security оfficer and not as a policeman. She argues, therefore, that her arrest was invalid and cites Robinson v. State, supra, n. 1. However, as discussed in footnote 1 to this opinion, inasmuch as the police officer in Robinson did not witness a misdemeanor or receive a report of a felony, he was, acting as a security officer. Robinson, supra. In this case, however, Farrier did witness some of the events, and he did not arrest Dinmark until after he had identified himself as a policeman. Farrier‘s status changed when he witnessed Dinmark‘s acts in his presence. He, therefore, was aсting within his authority as a policeman when he made the arrest. See Perry v. Greyhound Bus Lines, 491 So.2d 926 (Ala. 1986), and Robinson, supra. Because Farrier was acting within his authority as a
For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the trial сourt is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
JONES, ALMON, SHORES and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.