220 Conn. 61 | Conn. | 1991
The plaintiffs, James and Darlene Dinan, appealed from a decision of the defendant board of zoning appeals of the town of Stratford (board) sustaining a cease and desist order of the zoning enforcement officer that directed them to terminate the use of their property, which is located in a single-family residence zone of Stratford, as a rooming house. The trial court sustained the appeal, holding, inter alia, that the defi
In its appeal from that judgment, the defendant board presents as the principal issue the propriety of the ruling that a zoning restriction limiting the use of residences in single-family zones solely to families composed of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption is not authorized by the enabling act and violates our state constitutional provisions concerning due process of law and equal protection. We conclude that, as applied in this instance to the occupancy of each floor of the plaintiffs’ two-family house by a group of five unrelated persons, § 1.18 of the Stratford zoning regulations is not ultra vires of the zoning authority given to towns by the enabling act and does not offend our state constitution. We also resolve the remaining issues in favor of the board. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with direction to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal.
The memorandum of decision contains no finding of subordinate facts,
On January 20, 1989, the Stratford zoning enforcement officer ordered the plaintiffs to cease using their property as a rooming house rather than as a residence for two families. The plaintiffs appealed from this order to the board, claiming that the definition of “family” in § 1.18 of the zoning regulations is unauthorized by the enabling act and violates our state and federal constitutions. The board denied the appeal and upheld the zoning enforcement officer in his interpretation of the regulations.
The plaintiffs appealed from the decision of the board to the Superior Court, raising the ultra vires and constitutional issues set forth in their application to the board as well as some additional issues. The trial court sustained the appeal, declaring the definition of “family” in § 1.18 to be invalid as beyond the statutory zoning authority given to municipalities and violative of our state constitution. The court also concluded that § 4.1.4
On the grant of certification by the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (o), the board filed an appeal in that court, which we have transferred to this court. General Statutes § 51-199 (c); Practice Book § 4023. In addition to the principal issue of the validity of the provision of the regulation defining “family” to include only related persons, the board also challenges certain conclusions that the court may have reached, not contained in the memorandum of decision, which relate to whether the plaintiffs’ property is being operated as a rooming house.
I
The trial court concluded that the definition of “family” in § 1.18 of the zoning regulations “is invalid in that it is not related to any objective established” by General Statutes § 8-2,
The plaintiffs do not challenge the authority of the town to establish districts or zones to be used only for single-family residences, such as the zone in which their property is located. “The . . . limitation that a residence may not be used by more than one family is not uncommon in zoning jurisprudence” and has been upheld implicitly by this court. Planning & Zoning Commission v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn. 305, 308, 216 A.2d 442 (1966). Their attack upon the validity of § 1.18 is confined for the most part
Single-family residence districts have been justified as “manifestly in furtherance” of the zoning objective of controlling population density in residential districts. Planning & Zoning Commission v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., supra, 310. Section 8-2 expressly authorizes regulation of “the density of population” and the adoption of provisions “designed . . . to avoid undue concentration of population.” The creation of single-family residence districts is one method of achieving this objective and, therefore, is within the authority granted by § 8-2. It can hardly be disputed that some definition of the term family is appropriate and is implicitly authorized by the statute. Whether the definition of “family” in a zoning regulation can be limited to include only related persons, therefore, involves the enabling act
II
The plaintiffs limit their constitutional attack upon § 1.18 to the claim that its restriction of the term “family” to include only traditional families of related persons violates the due process clause of article first, § 8
The United States Supreme Court has considered zoning ordinances restricting the use of residences to families of related persons in two significant cases. In Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974), the court upheld an ordinance restricting land use to single-family dwellings and defining “family” to mean only persons related by blood, marriage or adoption unless the occupants number two or less.
In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1977), the zoning ordinance defined “family” to include some traditional family relationships but not others. As applied to prevent a grandchild, after his mother’s death, from living with his grandmother, the court invalidated the ordinance as
The plaintiffs rely on several decisions of courts of other jurisdictions that have interpreted their state constitutions as extending to nontraditional families the special status with respect to zoning classification given to traditional families by Belle Terre and Moore under the federal constitution. Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980) (ordinance defining “family” to include an individual, two or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption, or a maximum of five unrelated persons, excluding servants, as applied to twelve adults, including the owner, occupying a twenty-four room, six bathroom house, violates California’s constitutional provision concerning right of privacy); Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 351 N.W.2d 831 (1984) (ordinance limiting occupancy of single-family dwellings to an individual or two or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption and not more than one other unrelated person violates due process clause of Michigan constitution as
Not all interpretations of state constitutions, however, have taken this view. Other state courts, relying on Belle Terre have upheld zoning ordinances restricting single-family homes to occupancy by any number of related persons in contrast to numerical limits placed on occupancy by unrelated groups. Rademan v. Denver, 186 Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974) (single-family restriction upheld as applied to occupancy of dwelling by two married couples and also two unrelated persons seeking to live together as a communal family); Association for Educational Development v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1976) (such an ordinance upheld as applied to exclude occupancy of single-family house by group of laymen seeking to live together as members of a religious society); Durham v. White Enterprises, Inc., 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706 (1975) (such an ordinance upheld as constitutional when applied to renting a house by seven to ten college students on a semester basis).
“This court does not embark upon the resolution of questions involving the validity of [legislation] in the absence of a practical necessity for their determination
In affirming the cease and desist order, the board implicitly adopted the characterization by the zoning enforcement officer of the existing use of the plaintiffs’ property as a “rooming house.” At the hearing before the board, the plaintiffs contended that they were not
Although the record does not contain any indication that the plaintiffs use their property as a boarding house or fraternity house, their provision for eleven parking spaces available to their tenants suggests the likelihood that more cars are parked on their property than are ordinarily found on the site of a single-family or two-family house. Apart from this difference in the physical appearance of their property as compared to other homes in the neighborhood, the separate rental arrangements that the plaintiffs make with each tenant indicate a lack of cohesion within both five person groups that negates the claim that each group constitutes a family of five unrelated individuals. Even
Traditional families are united not merely by the legal, relationships among them but also by the deep affection that arises from a lifetime of sharing not just common facilities or meals in a home, but every aspect of experience. Nontraditional families may have a similar basis for their unity. Such lasting relationships are likely to generate the interest of a family not only in the home it occupies, but in the neighborhood, its schools, parks and other accouterments of urban living. The transient and separate character of residency by the plaintiffs’ tenants is not as likely to stimulate on their part similar concerns about the quality of living in the neighborhood for the long term.
The municipal legislative body empowered to adopt zoning regulations in Stratford could reasonably have concluded that roomers or such occupants as the plaintiffs’ tenants are less likely to develop the kind of friendly relationships with neighbors that abound in residential districts occupied by traditional families. While the plaintiffs’ tenants continue to reside on the property, they are not likely to have children who would become playmates of other children living in the area. Neighbors are not so likely to call upon them to borrow a cup of sugar, provide a ride to the store, mind the family pets, water the plants or perform any of the countless services that families, both traditional and nontraditional, provide to each other as a result of longtime acquaintance and mutual self-interest. The fact that both families and individuals differ with respect to their habits and conduct in relation to the community does not render invalid the legislative judgment that the probable effect of the kind of occupancy the
We agree with Belle Terre that the police power may be used constitutionally to promote “family values” and “youth values” that contribute to creating “a sanctuary for people.” In authorizing municipalities to adopt zoning regulations “designed ... to promote . . . the general welfare,” § 8-2 permits the consideration of all factors relevant to the quality of living when classifying the uses to be allowed in various zones. In this instance Stratford has chosen to create a zoning district permitting “one-family dwellings” to be occupied by “[a]ny number of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption, living together as a single housekeeping unit,” but allowing also two roomers In addition to the family of the occupant or, with the necessary approval, a total of not more than five roomers. Stratford Zoning Regs. §§ 4.1.1, 1.18, 4.1.4. “A boarding or rooming house” is a permitted use in a two-family zone. Stratford Zoning Regs. § 5.1.
The restriction of the definition of “family” to related persons is an exercise in legislative line drawing that serves to provide an element of cohesion not to be found in the occupancy of the plaintiffs’ property by ten individuals with separate rental agreements and no common bond of significant duration. That the line is imperfect in that it may exclude some unrelated groups that may function in the community in essentially the same manner as a traditional family, insofar as zoning objectives are concerned, does not render it invalid. “[Ejvery line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included.” Belle Terre v. Boraas, supra, 8. As previously noted, the plaintiffs can prevail only if their own constitutional rights as property owners are violated and cannot rely on possible applications of the regulation to other groups that may
The only constitutional rights the plaintiffs can assert in this case are economic in nature and do not involve such suspect classifications as race or gender. “We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .’’Id. Section 1.18 is valid as applied to the plaintiffs, if there is a rational basis for excluding from a zone established for occupancy by single families a group of ten unrelated individuals with no mutual link other than their occupancy of the same dwelling under separate rental arrangements with the plaintiffs. We conclude that there are sufficient reasons relevant to the objectives of zoning set forth in § 8-2 to justify the distinction made by § 1.18 between a family of related persons and the group of ten unrelated individuals who occupy the plaintiffs’ property.
Ill
In addition to the issue of the validity of § 1.18 as applied to prohibit the plaintiffs’ current use of their property, the board in its appeal claims that the trial court improperly concluded that § 4.1.4 of the zoning regulations was inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ property. The court declared that § 4.1.4, which allows “[t]he letting of rooms to not more than two persons in addition to the family of the occupant” or, with permission of the planning and zoning commission, “to a total of not more than five persons,” was not pertinent because “you don’t have a family of an occupant here” and “[tjhat applies to a situation where you have a single-family house in a single-family zone and it’s to allow the people who live there to have a couple of boarders.” Our determination in Part I that the restriction of “family” use of a dwelling to occupancy by a traditional
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
The trial court announced its decision from the bench on August 9,1990, in which it found aggrievement on the part of the plaintiffs and also stated certain conclusions. A memorandum of decision finding aggrievement and restating the court’s conclusions was filed on August 10, 1990.
“[Stratford Zoning Regulations §] 4.1.4. The letting of rooms to not more than two persons in addition to the family of the occupant of the family dwelling unit, provided that the commission, may with the approval of the health officer, grant permission for the letting of rooms without table board, to a total of not more than five persons. All dwelling units legally occupied by more than 5 but not more than 8 roomers at the time of adoption of these regulations may be continued as nonconforming uses at the same locations.”
General Statutes § 8-2 provides in part: “The zoning commission of each city, town or borough is authorized to regulate, within the limits of such municipality, the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures; the percentage of the area of the lot that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts and other open spaces; the density of population and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, including water-dependent uses as defined in section 22a-93, and the height, size and location of advertising signs and billboards. Such zoning commission may divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape and area as may be best suited to carry out the purposes of this chapter; and, within such districts, it may regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration or use of buildings or structures and the use of land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings, structures or use of land throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in another district, and may provide that certain classes or kinds of buildings, structures or uses of land are permitted only after obtaining a special permit or special exception from a zoning commission, planning commission, com
The plaintiffs also claim that § 1.18 of the Stratford zoning regulations is invalid under the enabling act because it improperly regulates the identity of the users rather than the uses of property. We agree that the iden
Article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution provides in part: “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”
Article first, § 20 of the Connecticut constitution provides in part: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law . . . .”
The ordinance in Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1974), defined “family” to mean “ ‘[ojne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.’ ”
The special status given to traditional families, both extended and nuclear, by Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531 (1977), raises a federal constitutional question of the validity of proposals for zoning regulations that restrict the number of occupants of a building on the basis of floor area as applied to such families. This method of controlling population density has been advocated by some courts and commentators as an alternative to zoning restrictions based on occupancy by a single traditional family. Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979); see note, “Single Family Zoning: The Ramifications of State Court Rejection of Belle Terre on Use and Density Control,” 32 Hastings L.J. 1687, 1708-1709 (1981).