8 D.C. 626 | D.C. | 1874
stated the case, and delivered the opinion of the court:
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in permitting the street or common highway at the intersection of K street north and Fifth street west, in the city of Washington, to remain out of repair and be in a dangerous condition, whereby the plaintiff was greatly injured.
From the testimony at the trial it appears that the plaintiff was a hackman, was driving his carriage, in which were two passengers, along K street, and when he came to the intersection of Fifth street his horses and hack fell into a ditch which he did not see, and he was thrown from his seat upon
After the evidence was closed, the counsel for defendant requested the court, among other things, to instruct thejury, in substance, that if the defendant had completed the laying of the gas-main, and filled up the trench, under the direction and to the satisfaction of the superintendent of streets, and had given up all control of said street to the contractor who was then working upon it, they must find for the defendant. The court refused so to instruct the jury, and the defendant excepted. It is contended that this refusal was erroneous, for the reason that the ordinance of the late corporation of Washington of June 2,1853, provides that the earth displaced for laying gas-pipes in the streets shall be properly rammed, and the pavement adjusted to the satisfaction of the commissioners of the respective wards wherein such pipes are laid, and the streets, avenues, and pavements returned to the same state as previous to being opened; and for the further reason that the regulations of the board of public works require the superintendent of streets to see that trenches opened in the streets are thoroughly puddled so that the whole filling may be thoroughly wet. Now, the defendant’s counsel say that, by a true construction of these
Another point presented on the record is, that the court refitsed to charge the jury that if the trench was filled up to. the level of the street, and its surface afterward sunk by reason of the action of continued rain, and if such sinking was not the result of defendant’s negligence, then the defendant was not liable.
This instruction, it will be seen, did not refer to the condition in which the street was left or the manner in which the’ work had been performed, but it has reference to the subsequent action of rain upon the trench. It is to be remembered, however, that the defendant is bound to put the street in as good condition as it had previously béen, and there can be no 'doubt that he is also required to exercise a prudent and careful foresight, so as to avoid any injury afterward. Storms and rain-falls belong to the ordinary course of nature, and common sagacity could foresee the consequences which they might occasion to such operations. It was reasonable to expect that the new-made ditch would sink under the action of a heavy rain, unless it had been properly rammed or puddled, and ordinary care could not Only foresee but obviate the danger. It appears that a water-main had been laid about the same time contiguous to and parallel with the said ditch, and over which the plaintiff had passed with entire safety before falling into the defendant’s ditchj thus showing that the contingency of the weather can be guarded against so as to render the streets passable without danger to any one. It is, therefore, clear that the jury should net be instructed that if the sinking was occasioned by the action of continued rain the defendant would not be responsible.
The action of the court below was correct, and the judgment must he affirmed.