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Dillon v. Rogers
596 F.3d 260
5th Cir.
2010
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*1 260 (“Without regard

965 to whether SORNA implemented by Washington any DILLON, or oth Keith Mark Plaintiff- state, registration er under it is re Appellant, quired.”); Gould, United States v. (4th Cir.2009) (“SORNA’s requirement that a sex register offender ROGERS; Brad Thompson; T.W. Ser applies registration whether would be ac geant Edwards; Sergeant Walker; complished through pre-SORNA registra Deputy Hartzglou; Lieutenant Holli tion facilities under SORNA-compliant field; Pietsch, Thomas Defendants- programs.”), petition cert. (Sept. filed Appellees. 2009) (No. 09-6742); United States v. Dixon, Cir.2008), No. 08-30419. granted

cert. sub nom. Carr v. United — United States Appeals, Court of States, —, U.S. Fifth Circuit. (2009);4 L.Ed.2d 631 United States v. Hinckley, Cir.2008) Feb. 2010. (rejecting an impossibility challenge to SORNA because defendant “had notice

of his obligations regis [and] could have Oklahoma,

tered in which would have

made him compliant with both state and law”).

federal

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that Heth’s conviction did not

violate his process due rights because he

was required to register under SORNA

regardless of whether SORNA’s adminis- requirements

trative had implement- been

ed Colorado or Texas. Heth’s other

arguments are foreclosed prece- circuit

dent. We therefore AFFIRM judg-

ment of the district court.

AFFIRMED. questions presented The for review before 2. Whether the Ex Post pre- Facto Clause Supreme Court in prosecution 2250(a) Can v. § United cludes States under of a person are: underlying whose offense and travel in interstate predated commerce both SOR- person 1. Whether a criminally NA's enactment. prosecuted 2250(a) § under for failure to Certiorari, Petition for Writ of Can v. United register underlying when defendant’s States, 08-1301, No. (Apr. WL offense and travel in interstate commerce 22, 2009). We note that Helh traveled to El predated both SORNA’senactment. Paso, Texas, after SORNA’senactment. *5 Gisleson, Herman, Herman, E.

Soren Cottar, L.L.P., Orleans, LA, Katz & New July Dillon section Pub. Jus- In filed this (argued), Kimmel Phyllis Adele DC, alleging Dillon. suit violations of his civil tice, P.C., Washington, for during pro- his incarceration. He rights I, Atty. Wayne Landry, Asst. Michael pro se until late March after ceeded LA, Charles, De- Lake for (argued), Gen. represented by he was counsel. In which fendants-Appellees. 2007, Appellees filed a motion November Dillon’s suit for failure to ex- to dismiss remedies, shortly haust administrative magistrate judge hearing thereafter Appellees’ recommended that mo- this case BENAVIDES, DENNIS and granted. Before tion be the district ELROD, Judges. rejected magistrate’s Circuit court recommen- 12(d) Ap- and under Rule converted dation

BENAVIDES, Judge: Circuit summary motion into for pellees’ motion parties judgment, as had submitted appeals Keith Mark Dillon Appellant beyond their briefing going evidence with judgment summary dismissal on from the allegations pleadings. the factual in their § for under 42 of his suit U.S.C. Subsequently, granted the district court being while allegedly he suffered abuse summary judgment for in March Jena, For prisoner as a Louisiana. held ground on that Dillon had failed below, vacate the reasons described we to exhaust administrative remedies before and remand of the district court bringing appeal this suit. followed. This development further of the record *6 this case.

II. I. Litigation Under the Re Prison 29, (“PLRA”), 2005, prisoners Hurricane August prop when form Act must On in “such erly Katrina made landfall southeastern exhaust administrative remedies Louisiana, a being pris- prior filing Dillon was held as as are available” to a section concerning prison the Jefferson Parish Correctional action conditions. oner at 1983 1997e(a) (“Jefferson”), (2006); § v. the New Or- 42 U.S.C. Center within Woodford 83-84, metropolitan to the dev- Ngo, leans area. Due 548 U.S. 126 S.Ct. (2006). hurricane, a caused the Loui- 165 L.Ed.2d 368 Louisiana has astation the Safety Remedy and Proce Department two-step of Public Administrative siana (“DPSC”) (“ARP”) inmates, they Dillon which are Corrections evacuated dure Au- use in required filing and other inmates from Jefferson on to before suit district 325(A) 22, § tempo- to a La. Admin. tit. gust 2005 moved them court. Code (“Jena”). (2009). Jena, Generally, in the rary facility Louisiana inmate commences alleges step grievance process by that he and mis- of the Dillon was beaten the first by Appellees September writing in late a letter to the warden of his or her treated Jena, during briefly his result- out the basis for setting 2005 detention at institution injuries. sought. claim and hearing in loss and other his or her the relief ing 325(G)(1)(a). abuse, early grievance § this in The letter Shortly alleged after days written within of the DPSC transferred Dillon to should be 90 October (“Allen”) subject is of the alleged event the Allen Correctional Center Kinder, Louisiana, days The 40 temporary complaint. fa- Id. Warden has and the grievance to day is received cility at Jena closed. from 266 following If is a request. to the Id. hausted administrative

respond remedies institution, to a the inmate question Carty transfer new mixed of law and fact. v. (5th Cir.2009). Thaler, grievance a an action taken regarding files 252 institution, or her former the former by his while it a of law Similarly, question is complete processing “will institution as qualify whether administrative remedies 325(G)(8). § through step.” the first being “available” under 42 U.S.C. Furthermore, 1997e(a), § the inmate believes the availability may “[i]f sometimes complaint sensitive and would ad- questions turn on of fact. v. See Snider versely (2d complaint Melindez, affected if became Cir. institution,” 1999). he or [his her] known may skip the file his or step she first exhaustion Since is an affirmative complaint directly her with Louisiana’s As- defense, the burden is on to Secretary sistant of Adult Services. that Dillon demonstrate failed to exhaust 325(G)(6)(a). § available administrative remedies. Jones may proceed The inmate the second to Bock, 199, 216, v. U.S. step of the ARP to the Secre- appealing (2007). Consequently, L.Ed.2d tary the DPSC if he or is dissatis- she Appellees must establish beyond perad response. with the first step fied venture all of the essential of the elements 325(G)(2)(a). § If never the inmate re- summary defense of to warrant response step grievance, to a ceives first in their favor. See Martin he or she proceed

then is entitled to to the Dish, Cmty. Coll. Alamo step process second of the upon expi- (5th Cir.2003). of the step response ration first time limit. 325(G)(4)(a). § If the is not inmate satis- A. fied with the step response, second he or seriously Dillon does not dispute that he she then file suit district court. 325(G)(2)(b). satisfy failed the steps of the ARP that § prerequisite filing

are section *7 Rather, argues III. action. he suit that his should not barred no because there was grant “We review the of sum remedy “available” to him 90- during the novo, mary judgment applying de the same day period following the abuse. alleged as standards the district court.” In re Alternatively, argues he also to his failure Egleston, 448 F.3d 811-12 Cir. exhaust should be excused on the basis 2006) (internal omitted). quotations Sum estoppel “special the circumstances” mary judgment appropriate is when “the surrounding his detention at Jena. pleadings, the discovery and disclosure file, on any materials and opposition Appellees’ affidavits In to mo- show various genuine that there is any seeking case, no issue as to to tions dismiss this Dillon material fact and that the movant is enti affidavits alleging submitted that no ad- judgment tled to grievance as a matter of law.” procedures ministrative were 56(c). prisoners Fed.R.Civ.P. “We construe all facts available to at Jena and inferences in light prisoners explicitly and the most favorable were told not to sub- nonmoving party to the reviewing grievances. when mit Dillon when asserts that grants judgment.” of motions for summary sought he to file an com- administrative Earle, Murray v. plaint after he late at Jena was abused in Cir.2005). has prisoner September Appellee Rogers Whether a ex- Brad any any relief or approxi- provide him to kneel down for to take action ordered “forget” response complaint,” him to to a an hour told whatsoever mately claims not grievance. required a He also under filing about prisoners’ outgoing checked PLRA because is no “available” guards there destroyed writings detailing Chumer, mail and remedy. Booth v. 532 U.S. abuses, blocking filing him from a “sensi- 736, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 La. Admin. grievance Johnson, tive under (2001); issues” also Days see 325(G)(6)(a). Nevertheless, 22, § (5th Cir.2003) tit. Code (per cu- lawyer a hand- give visiting Dillon did riam) (finding remedy “unavailable” when expected which he grievance, written injury prevented him prisoner’s from fil- dis- lawyer to the Dillon to deliver DPSC. ing grievance), by implication overruled he had filed suit that covered after Jones, grounds by on other 549 U.S. at lawyer grievance failed to forward the had 216, 127 S.Ct. 910.1 are unable We to the DPSC. whether administrative reme- determine dies were “available” Dillon for because Dillon to the DPSC transferred

After not sufficiently developed the record was 90-day early October Allen in granted when the district court summary he have filed a period during which could Appellees. for 325(G)(1)(a) had grievance under section not not do so until yet elapsed would The district not court did address alleges Dillon

late December. any whether administrative remedies were and inmate Captain that Allen’s Wheaton Jena, to Dillon instead available at focus him that he counsel Dennis Coleman told analysis on ing its whether remedies were grievance an could not file administrative at Allen. agree available We with the at for abuse suffered at Jena. Nev- Allen court that focus should be district on ertheless, Dillon claims to have submitted availability at Allen—if remedies were Allen, grievances requesting at several Allen, Dillon available to at their unavaila injuries at treatment for sustained medical bility at Jena would not suffice to excuse actual- inquiring Jena and whether he was alleged his failure to exhaust. Dillon was ly filing grievance from at Allen barred September at Jena in ly beaten late griev- at if these abuse Jena. Even early transferred and was October 2005. qualify filed at Allen could as “first ances Allen, at he arrived he could have step” applicable to the claims When grievances suit, timely grievance filed a for mistreatment pursued advanced in this Dillon never anytime ARP them the “second of the before late December step” Jena 325(G)(4)(a). Admin. process under section See La. Code tit. *8 325(G)(1)(a) (establishing 90-day § dead B. incident). filing grievance following line for impediments filing grievances If render argues may pro Dillon this suit facility, unavailable remedies at one reme ceed because there were no administra may again become available once a tive to exhaust at dies remedies “available” transferred, prisoner ad has been unless Jena and Allen. When “the relevant procedure authority problems lacks there are other at the new facili- ministrative course, seeking remedy 1. an does from further administrative relief. Of administrative 83-84, simply Woodford, unavailable because not become 548 126 See U.S. at S.Ct. timely prisoner properly filed a has not 2378. grievance consequently barred and is later 268 Rich,

ty. Bryant v. approach See 530 F.3d circuit’s “strict” to the PLRA’s Cir.2008). (11th requirement. 1379 Days, See 322 (citing F.3d at 866 Spurlock, Richardson v. Consequently, we turn to assess (5th Cir.2001) 260 F.3d availability of at ing the remedies Allen. Wright Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d arguments concerning Dillon raises two (5th Cir.2001)). Under our ap strict First, availability at Allen. he contends proach, we have found that mere “substan that of the closure Jena resulted the tial compliance” with administrative reme unavailability of administrative remedies dy procedures exhaustion; satisfy does not 325(G)(8) provides at Allen. Section that instead, required prisoners we have to ex “if request inmate] files a after trans [an haust properly. available remedies See an by sending fer on action taken Wright, 358; Spurlock, 260 F.3d at institution, the sending institution will our approach strict complete processing through the first absolutely does not possibili foreclose step.” La. Admin. Code tit. ty prison that officials’statements concern 325(G)(8). § Since Jena closed after Dil ing administrative remedies can render transfer, lon’s he asserts Jena could not such remedies unavailable. long We have “complete processing” grievance, of his recognized importance of ensuring that and therefore there was no administrative inmates have avenues for discovering the remedy available to him at Allen for the procedural rules governing griev their abuse he suffered at Jena. ances, see Alexander v. Tippah County, Second, Dillon argues that his Cir.2003) 351 F.3d (per cu failure to exhaust should be excused be riam) (premising ruling that remedies Captain cause Wheaton and inmate coun prisoner’s were available on knowledge of sel Dennis allegedly Coleman him told grievance procedures); Ferrington v. La. he grievance could not file a at Allen for Corr., Dep’t 315 F.3d of abuse suffered at Jena. While Dillon Cir.2002) curiam) (per (premising ruling styles this an estoppel argument, as these that remedies were available on fact that by statements Wheaton and Coleman prisoner “was well general aware of the conceivably could impact any whether rem procedural requirements described in the edies were “available” to Dillon under 42 handbook”), inmate as Eighth has the Cir 1997e(a). § Croak, U.S.C. See Brown v. Weber, cuit. See Gibson v. (3d Cir.2002) (con (8th Cir.2005) (premising ruling that cluding that statements prison officials remedies were available on prisoners’ ad about remedy process administrative mission receipt prisoner of guidebook unavailable). render remedies The district guidebook’s explanation of appli “the rejected court Dillon’s assertion that these grievance procedure cable and its applica exhaustion, statements excuse relying on life”). tion aspects to all of inmate When a Krol, Lyon v. Vande Eighth where the prisoner has no means of verifying prison Circuit prisoner’s held mistaken officials’ claims about the administrative “subjective” understanding grievance of a grievance process, incorrect statements procedure is irrelevant determining *9 officials indeed make un remedies whether actually remedies are available. available. (8th Cir.2002). The district court also found that Dil allowing Unfortunately, we are unable to deter- rely lon to on Wheaton’s and Coleman’s mine whether the district grant court’s of statements would be inconsistent with summary this judgment was appropriate, as no in not clearly has conducted this case Since record does establish discovery been aas result. fragmentary provision the record is whether this was in force while First, in the enough Allen, there is not evidence we find inappropri- Dillon was at it what Dillon knew or concerning record ate at this to rule on its meaning. time Cf. sys- the ARP have discovered about could Carpenters Local Union No. us to determine whether tem for Whea- PratC-Famsworth, Inc., 527- alleged ton’s and Coleman’s statements (5th Cir.1982) (concluding that sum- Since Dillon made remedies unavailable. mary “inappropriate” was be- grievances at Allen and asked the filed complete copy cause record did not contain grievance a lawyer visiting to mail Jena bargaining agreement being of collective DPSC, that directly to the it is clear Dillon interpreted). understanding sys- of the ARP had some problems These notwithstanding, Appel- is what Dillon tem. What less clear lees assert that there is sufficient evidence or could have discovered about the knew in the record to demonstrate that adminis- grievance a proceed manner to with proper trative remedies were at Allen. available at after its closure regarding events Jena they point to Specifically, DPSC records not and his transfer. The record does showing that from date of Dillon’s copy a the Allen inmate hand- contain of early transfer to Allen in October guides the ARP system book or other July until the this suit was in date filed on that Dillon could have relied instead of 2006, 53 at filed evacuee-inmates Allen and Coleman. The record does Wheaton grievances. During the period, same incarceration, upon prison that of- indicate directly DPSC headquarters received five usually system the ARP ficials describe grievances from evacuee-inmates. While at new inmates orientation. be- this evidence demonstrates that Katrina Katrina, Dillon was incarcerated at fore grievances and Rita file evacuees did while Jefferson, parish facility, and the record Allen, they at and that also sent grievances that like suggests DPSC facilities Allen directly headquarters, grievance procedures have to DPSC there is no could different any grievances indication of these parish than facilities do. Without firmer that con- and, have grip place on what Dillon could discovered cerned that took events at Jena truth did, about the of Wheaton’s and Cole- they any remedy even if that was in claims materials like an inmate man’s light facility’s available in of the closure. handbook, we cannot determine if sum- Due to fragmentary nature of the rec- mary judgment warranted. was ord, permit we direct the district court to discovery concerning Dillon to conduct ex-

Second, argument, ques- during oral we availability haustion and the of administra- Appellees’ counsel about the appli- tioned tive remedies. cability this situation section 325(G)(8)’s step” directive that a “first

grievance concerning pro- Jena should be C. response, cessed at Jena. In counsel stat- In arguing addition to that administra- operating ed DPSC was under unavailable, tive were Dillon con- remedies “emergency procedures” while Dillon was should Allen, estopped tends that at incarcerated Jena and raising from the defense of exhaustion. “could consequently suspend the DPSC to his Specifically, points this he treatment any necessary” during period, rules as Jena, Rogers alleg- Brad process Appellee the rule all “first where such as that Jena edly Rogers’ Dillon to step” grievances from transferred inmates. ordered kneel *10 270 “forgot” filing

office until he griev- may estopped, about a may be while others not be” ance, York, and where alleg- (quoting Hemphill corrections officials v. New 380 F.3d (2d edly destroyed all outgoing containing Cir.2004))); mail 689 Sur v. Glidderir- Also, grievances. Durkee, (7th Cir.1982) as another basis for es- 681 F.2d toppel, alleged Dillon relies on the (explaining advice “may each defendant be from indicating Wheaton and Coleman ... estopped only by reason of its own ac- tions”). filing grievance problems at Allen for Consequently, Appellees are not Jena was possible. not estopped from raising exhaustion as an affirmative defense.

“Estoppel equitable is an doc injustice trine invoked to avoid in particu D. cases,” lar “a hallmark of the doctrine Finally, Dillon asserts that his application.” is its flexible Heckler v. failure to exhaust should be excused be Cmty. Health Servs. County, of Crawford cause of this case’s “special circum Inc., 51, 59, 467 U.S. stances,” namely Katrina, Hurricane his (1984). L.Ed.2d 42 In a number of PLRA Jena, evacuation to arrange the ad-hoc cases, we have held that estoppel provides ments surrounding his detention at the a basis for excusing prisoner’s failure to temporary facility, and alleged abuse See, exhaust administrative remedies. prisoners of there. While allega Dillon’s e.g., Days, 866; 322 F.3d at Wendell v. tions, true, if indicate that conditions at Asher, (5th Cir.1998), 162 F.3d Jena reprehensible, were we do not be by implication overruled grounds on other lieve grants this us license to carve out Jones, 549 U.S. at 127 S.Ct. 910. new exceptions to the PLRA’s exhaustion case, in this we conclude that requirement, an area authority where our estoppel is appropriate. not A party Gibbs, is constrained. v. Cf. Clifford claiming must, estoppel among other Cir.2002) (finding that things, demonstrate that he or she “rea PLRA forbids courts recognizing from sonably relied on the conduct of the other prejudice” “undue exception to PLRA’s to his injury.” [or substantial her] Man requirement). To the extent Nelson, garoo v. that Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath Cir.1989). case, In this Dillon cannot disrupted system, Louisiana’s ARP we be show detrimental reliance on the alleged lieve such can issues addressed ana interference with the process ARP at Jena lyzing whether any administrative reme it because was not the cause of his inabili 1997e(a). dies are “available” under section ty after his transfer grievance to file a concerning his treatment at Jena. Fur TV. thermore, although the alleged statements by Wheaton and Coleman well case, have Since we remand this we must also unavailable, rendered remedies as de address procedure by which the dis- above, they scribed estop cannot Appel trict court should resolve disputes pertain- lees. Neither Wheaton nor ing Coleman are to exhaustion of administrative reme- case, defendants in Appellees this are dies. When filed their motion to being sued their individual capacities. dismiss for failure to exhaust administra- Zenk, See Macias remedies, they tive attached affidavits and (2d Cir.2007) (noting that “depending on in support records of the factual claims in pertaining defendant, the facts to each it kind, their responded motion. Dillon possible that some individual defendants providing several copies affidavits and *11 However, may by judges. resolved opposing his motion be we support grievances that motion to dismiss. Faced with also conclude when courts rule on Appellees’ the facts al- of going beyond beyond exhaustion on the basis evidence this evidence the district parties’ pleadings, pleadings, nonmoving party in the the the should leged motion to dis- Appellees’ granted protections converted the of court Rule 56. summary judgment. miss into a motion for Consequently, we find that the district 12(d) “[i]f, that on a motion provides Rule converting court did not err in Appellees’ 12(b)(6) 12(c), matters out- under Rule summary judg- motion into a motion for to and pleadings presented 12(d). the are side ment under Rule. court, the motion must

not excluded the A. summary judgment be treated as one for above, on sum- under Rule 56.” As noted right jury There is a to a trial judgment, all facts and inferences mary under the Seventh Amendment for actions light must be construed in the most favor- brought seeking under section 1983 legal Murray, nonmoving party. able to the City Monterey relief. See v. Del Monte of at 284. 405 F.3d Ltd., 687, Monterey, Dunes at 526 U.S. 709, 1624, 119 S.Ct. however, L.Ed.2d 882 argue, that the dis Appellees (1999). however, right, This does not trict court should not have converted their Instead, guarantee jury resolution of all they that factual dis motion. assert that putes litigation. have on their motion to arise the course of court should ruled and, necessary, any Judges if resolved fac power dismiss have the to resolve certain concerning tual exhaustion on the disputes threshold issues without the participation In support the evidence before it. basis of jury adjudication of a before the of a case position, point of to the this example, subject on its merits. For when decisions of three of our sister circuits jurisdiction matter over a case turns on Pavey Conley, v. 544 F.3d 741-12 facts, disputed judges power have the Rich, Cir.2008), Bryant v. 530 F.3d at disputes resolve in assuring these them Terhune, 1373-77, Wyatt v. 315 F.3d See, jurisdiction. selves of their courts’ (9th Cir.2003). 1108, 1119-20 In these e.g., Rymer, v. Wetmore 169 U.S. 120- cases, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh (1898); 18 S.Ct. L.Ed. 682 agreed judges may all that resolve Circuits Vill., Century Chatham Condo. Ass’ns v. concerning of disputes factual (5th Cir.1979). Inc., participation of a remedies without said, prisoner’s That failure to exhaust jury. they diverged as to the deprive administrative remedies does not proper procedure deciding ques these subject jurisdiction in courts of matter Wyatt Bryant, In both tions. suits covered the PLRA. See Wood Eleventh Ninth and Circuits held ex ford, 548 U.S. at But haustion should be resolved via an “unenu factfinding power judges is not lim 12(b) merated” Rule motion rather than on addressing subject jurisdic ited to matter summary judgment. a motion for deciding tion. It extends to factual also F.3d at 530 F.3d at 1374-75. On the concerning certain questions affirmative hand, in Pavey, other the Seventh Circuit jurisdiction personal defenses like and ven suggested summary judgment pro ue, by which be waived defendant. proper settling vides a vehicle for exhaus See, Assocs., e.g., Haydel Walk & Inc. disputes. tion 544 F.3d at 741. Co., Coastal Power Prod. (5th Cir.2008) jurisdiction); (personal agree

We with our sister circuits that Nat'l, Inc., phy v. Schneider disputes concerning factual exhaustion Mur *12 Cir.2004) (ven circuit, however, frequently we have 1133, this 1139-40 362 F.3d summary to ue). approved using judgment of and other affirmative address exhaustion personal Exhaustion resembles 12(b). enumerated in Rule defenses not it is an affir and venue that jurisdiction See, Corp. Long v. Hearst e.g., Swanson to that allows defendants mative defense Plan, 1016, 1019 Disability Term 586 F.3d have not invoked the plaintiffs that assert curiam) (5th Cir.2009) (affirming sum (per dispute. a Pa resolving forum for proper to ex mary judgment dismissal failure vey, Supreme F.3d at 741. The Court 544 remedies); Mitchell haust administrative terms, in similar has described exhaustion Airlines, Inc., 225, 227, v. 481 F.3d Cont’l judicial administration” control as “rule of (5th Cir.2007) (approving dismissal of 232 courts, Myers v. Bethle ling access to the summary judg prejudice on suit without Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 50- hem exhaust); Hager v. ment for failure to 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 51 & n. N.A., NationsBank 167 F.3d 247-48 “abstention, (1938), akin to doctrines like (5th Cir.1999) (approving & n. 1 of district govern ... that finality, ripeness and granting plaintiff “procedural court’s safe decisionmaking.” of federal-court timing guards of Rule 56” after defendant moved 140, 144, McCarthy Madigan, 503 U.S. to dismiss for failure to exhaust but relied (1992). 117 L.Ed.2d 291 S.Ct. support allega on to factual affidavits a that Since exhaustion is threshold issue tions); Inc. v. Bearsville Rec Songbyrd, courts must address to determine whether ords, Inc., n. 104 F.3d 775-76 & 3 right in the litigation being conducted Cir.1997) (approving of district court ad time, right forum at the we conclude that dressing affirmative defense of liberative may disputes factual con judges resolve prescription summary judgment); via Car partic cerning exhaustion without penters Local Union No. 690 F.2d at jury.2 a ipation of

499-500, (genuine issue of material B. summary judg fact prevents dismissal on exhaust); Ecology ment for failure to Ctr. Having disputed that determined La., Coleman, Inc. v. 515 F.2d 865- by facts decided about exhaustion of (5th Cir.1975) (same). see no need We judges, we now address whether the dis practice, to from our diverge common Appellees’ trict court’s conversion of mo that consequently conclude the district summary tion to dismiss into a motion for court in addressing Appellees’ did not err appropriate. was The Ninth exhaustion affirmative defense on sum and Eleventh Circuits have both concluded mary judgment.3 questions concerning exhaustion should be resolved on an unenumerated C. 12(b) dismiss, via sum motion and not matter, pro As final we now mary judgment. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374-75; Wyatt, summary at 1119-20. In vide a brief of how district courts cases, today 2. We we have held that do not determine who should In number under PLRA “on exhaustion is considered concerning serve as factfinder when facts ex- pleadings proof,” “long without as go prisoner's also to the merits of a haustion plaintiff alleged as the has exhaustion with Pavey, claim. at 741-42. In See specificity, lack of admissible evi sufficient case, regarding availability this the facts dence in the record does not form the basis overlap of remedies at Allen do not with the Wilson, for dismissal.” Underwood v. going facts to the merits of claims Dillon's (5th Cir.1998) curiam), (per alleging at Jena. abuse Jones, implication U.S. at overruled questions my un- Parts & HID. In approach exhaustion IIIC view since the should factual insufficiently the PLRA. When the defendant rais- record this case is der defense, developed yet this court as an affirmative cannot know es exhaustion whether judge usually disputes estoppel “spe- should resolve the doctrines of cial concerning prior allowing any applicability. circumstances” have *13 If I therefore proceed reaching ques- the case to to the merits. the believe these plaintiff summary judgment premature stage survives on tions is at this in the exhaustion,4 judge may disput- proceedings. the resolve exhaustion, concerning holding ed facts an Then,

evidentiary hearing necessary. if if judge plaintiff determines that the

the has

exhausted administrative remedies or that

his or her failure to exhaust should be

excused, may proceed the case to the mer- appeal, judge

its. On when the below has factfinder, will rulings

served as we review novo, Ennis, v.

on exhaustion de Powe Cir.1999), F.3d but will ac- America, UNITED STATES of cept judge’s factual conclusions unless Plaintiff-Appellee, they clearly Carty, are erroneous. 252-53. Stacey JONES, Pokey, also known as

V. Defendant-Appellant. reasons, foregoing For the we VACATE No. 08-30725. grant summary judg- the district court’s ment for and REMAND this Appeals, United States Court of discovery develop- case for and further Fifth Circuit.

ment of the record.

Feb. 2010.

DENNIS, Judge, concurring Circuit

part concurring judgment: and in the

I CONCUR in the in this case opinion in the except CONCUR for 910; exhaust, Days, sponte 127 S.Ct. see also 322 F.3d at prac- case sua for failure to sug- 866. These cases should not be read to longer appropriate tice that is no unless fail- gest may beyond that courts never look apparent ure to exhaust on the face of a pleadings resolving questions, plaintiff’s complaint. Lappin, See Carbe v. as the district court did in this case when it (5th Cir.2007). Appellees’ converted motion to dismiss into a summary judgment. motion Underwood cases, many judge In will be able to rule Days were decided before it became clear allowing any on exhaustion without discov- that exhaustion under the PLRA is not a cases, ery. unique in some circum- pleading requirement plaintiffs must sat- allowing stances arise that necessitate Jones, isfy litigation. at the outset of See discovery prior ruling, some such as where 211-12, 910; U.S. at Johnson v. availability of administrative remedies is Johnson, 516 n. 7 Cir. contested. 2004). Consequently, they addressed proper dismissing prisoner’s standards for

Case Details

Case Name: Dillon v. Rogers
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 4, 2010
Citation: 596 F.3d 260
Docket Number: 08-30419
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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