Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND * RYAN DILLON-CAPPS,
*
Plaintiff,
*
V.
* Civil No. 24-3744-BAH OHANA GROWTH PARTNERS, LLC, ET AL. *
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ryan Dillon-Capps ("Plaintiff'') filed the above-captioned complaint pro se on December 27, 2024, along with a number of documents which have been docketed as motions including: (1) motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis "with limited attorney designation," ECF 2; (2) "Complaint Integrated Appendix: State-Level Negotiations and Systemic Oversight Relief," ECF 3; (3) "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Interlocutory Partial Summary Judgement," ECF 4; (4) "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Conditional Permissive Joinder," ECF 5; and (5) "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Ex Parte Hearing," ECF 6.
The 29-page complaint includes as attachments the civil cover sheet, ECF 1-1, proposed summonses, ECF 1-2, proposed United States Marshal service of process forms, ECF 1-3, and the following documents: "Complaint Integrated Appendix·: Pretext," ECF 1-4 (6 pages), "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Parties," ECF 1-5, "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Coverup," ECF 1-6, "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Counts," ECF 1-7; "Prefatory ~ppendix A: Table of Defendants," ECF 1-8, "Prefatory Appendix B: Cause of Action Table," ECF 1-9, "Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Immunity," ECF 1-10, a document which appears to be a resume of one ' . i "Timothy A.," EOF 1-11, and what appears to be a list of exhibits, ECF.1-12. These documents,
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nearly all of which are typewritten by Plaintiff and are not exhibits themselves, total 265 pages.
Plaintiff also filed l~o affidavits, ECF 7, and supplemental exhibits totaling over 2 [1] 000 pages, ECF 16.. On January 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Urgency," ECF 17, which appears to
The Coml f-~• each of the m,li;os arul the -plaint below.
supplement the mo,tion for an ex parte hearing, ECF 6.
I. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis With Limited Attorney Designation (ECF 2) ! I
The motiob to proceed in forma pauperis, to the extent it seeks to proceed without pre- I . . • payment of the filing fee, will be granted. The Court· declines to designate Plaintiff a "limited . I I I . •, • attorney." First, ~he meaning of this designation is not clear. Second, under this Court's Local
I Rules, except in libited circumstances not applicable here, "only members of the Bar of this Court
11 • I
may appear as counsel in civil cases." Loe. R. 101.l(a). •
II. Plaintiff Will Be Directed to File an Amended Complaint • I: .
As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, section 1915(e)(2)(B) of28 U.S.C. requires ,, . I • . this Court to conduct an initial screening of this complaint and dismissal of any complaint that (i)
1· .
is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks . .
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); ii •
see also Lomax J.i Ortiz-Marquez, 140·S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020). The Court is mindful of its . obligation to conJ!rue liberally a ~omplaint filed by a self-represented litigant. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. ~9, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, liberal construction does not mean tqat this Court can ignore a clearlfailure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep 't Jf Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v. City of • Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a district court may not "conjure up • questions never squarely presented"). Here, Plaintiff's complaint suffers a number of deficiencies which are described more fully below. Some of Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed, and Plaintiff will be directed to file an amended complaint that conforms with the directives herein.
In the "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Counts," Plaintiff lists twenty-two counts, most of which contain "sub-counts." See ECF 1-7. Plaintiff appears to number one hundred seventy-one (171) sub-counts. See id. at 71. The causes of action include violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and related employment claims, insurance fraud, constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. §. 1983 (for violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments), mail fraud, wire fraud, consumer protection violations under federal, Maryland, Washington, D.C., California, Washington, Tennessee, and Florida law, various conspiracy claims, and violations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See generally id.
. The complaint stems from a now-closed state civil action (C-03-CV-24-002264) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. See ECF I, at 2. From what the Court can piece together, it appears that Plaintiff's former employer, Ohana Growth Partners, LLC ("Ohana"), sought and obtained an injunction against Plaintiff relating to the employment contract. See ECF 1, at 2-3
6 ("The lawsuit, filed on June 14, 2024, falsely stated that Ryan Dillon-Capps had refused a lawful order, and they were seeking injunctive relief because the refusal was a breach of employment agreement and a breach to duty of loyalty. Count III went so far as to say that refusal was ,in violation of criminal statute Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law., §7-302."); id. at 5 1 17 (alleging that a TRO was issued on June 17, 2024, without notice to Plaintiff and that a preliminary injunction and civil contempt hearing was held soon thereafter); id. at 12-13 1 50 (explaining that on June 14, 2024, Ohana, through counsel (Miles & Stockbridge), "filed the civil action against Ryan Dillon- ,,
Capps seeking terriporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief under the pretext that the Plaintiff refused ti;provide Global Administrator rights to their employer")> During the pendency
I! of that action, Plaiptiff was subject to "a punitive contempt fine of $2,500 per day" and a "show cause order seeldJg incarceration," which Plaintiff contends is emblematic of "a deliberate pattern • of misconduct" add a "systematic effort to suppress valid claims." ECF 1, at 5 11 18-19. Plaintiff
. contends that the l~tate suit was brought in retaliation for taking leave under the FMLA and that the defendants,· iJ~luding Ghana, Ghana employees, opposing counsel, and the court staff and judges, ~onspired to continue violating Plaintiffs FMLA and other rights. See ECF 1, at 14-17 11 50-62; id. at 1·1156 (accusing defendants, including opposing counsel and state court judges, of "interfer[ing] with FMLA leave, den[ying] ADA accommodations, violat[ing] federal prohibitions on injunctive orders, deJ:J:ying] federal supremacy, violat[ing] appointment doctrine, breach[ing] consier protection laws in Washington D.C., Maryland, Washington, c:lifomia, Florida, and TeJnessee, violat[ing] federal injunctive prohibitions, interfere[ing] with the Plaintiff's FMLA l~eave, and viol~t[ing] Ryan Dillon-Capps['s] 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 13th, and 14th Amendment lights[, and t]uming a civil lawsuit into a series of systemic human rights abuses that induced disso[~iative episod~s and dissociative amnesia"). Plaintiff contends that the lawsuit and "the state couk's continued assertion of jurisdictio~ over this matter was unlawful [under the Norris-LaGuardial ~ct], constituting a fundamental overreach." ECF 1, at J 1 8. The suit ·was voluntarily dismiJ~ed sometime in Gct~ber or November 2024. See ECF 1-5, at 18 1 98, at 21 ,
116.
• Plaintiff nrunes as defendants their former employer (Ohana), several Ghana employees and supervisors, sl,veral judges of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimot County, opposing counsel in the state action, and the heads of two professional 4·
ethics bodies. See generally ECF 1~5. As described below, Plaintiff will be directed to file an amended complaint that does not include the allegations over which this Court does not have jurisdiction and for which Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief. The amended complaint should not name as defendants those who are immune from suii.
A. Quasi-Appeal of the State Action: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from sitting "in direct review of state court decisions." D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,482 n.16 (1983) (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood. of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970)). The following requirements must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and ( 4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state-court judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saµdi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 615 FJd 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the second and fourth requirements are the key to determining whether a federal suit presents an independent, nqn-barred claim). If applicable, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal plaintiffs claims and the claims must be dismissed. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; Rooker v. Fidelity Tru~t Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). "[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself." Davani v. Va. Dep't ofTransp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp, 544 U.S. at 280 (2005)).
This doctrine also prohibits a district court from reviewing constitutional claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision .. Shooting Point, LLC v .. Cumming, 368 F.3d
.5
379,383 (4th Cir) 2004) (citations omitted). "A federal claim is 'inextricably intertwined' with a '' ' I state court decision if 'success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state I' • I
court wrongly decided the issues before it."' Id. (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)); see t.zso Curley v. Adams Creek As~ocs., 409 F. App'x 678, 680 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Rooker-Feldman precluded subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim that the state court violated her due process rights by failing to give her notice before disposing of real property owned ~y her); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997) i (holding that a ifederal claim is "inextricably intertwined" where "in' order to grant the
federal ... relief [1] sought, the federal court must determine that the [state] court judgment was I'
erroneously entei:ed or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual") ( quoting Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486,491 (3d Cir. 1997)).
i In other ~ords, Rooker-Feldman applies "when the federal action 'essentially amounts to nothing more thdn an attempt to seek review of [the state court's] decision by a lower federal court."' Davis v. Durham Mental Health Devel. Disabilities Substance Abuse Area Auth., 320 F.
Supp. 2d 378, 38~, (M.D.N.C. 2004) (quoting Plyler, 129 F.3d at 733). "[T]he key inquiry is not
1' whether the state[ court ruled on the precise issue raised in federal court, but whether the 'state- court loser who files suit in federal court seeks redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself."' Willner v. Frey, 243 F. App'x 744, 747 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davani, F.3d at 718). "[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be !
appellate review pf the. state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's i claim that the st~te judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Brown & Root, Inc. v.
Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)) Plaintiff, of course, retains the ability to exercise their appellate rights in the state court system. See Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202 ("[T]he [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine reinforces the important principle that review of state court decisions must be made to the state appellate courts, and eventually to the Supreme Court, not by federal district courts or courts of appeals.").
Even if Plaintiff di_d not raise these issues in the state proceeding, the Court still lacks jurisdiction to hear them now under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. "[E]ven if a claim is not presented to .a state court, or by inference is not ruled upon [ even if presented], a plaintiff is not-entitled to bring that claim in federal court if the claim was one that should have been brought in the state court." Guess v. Board of Medical Examiners, 967 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Feldme:n, U.S. at 483 n.16); see also Edmonds v. Clarkson, 996 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va.), ajf'd, 165 F.3d 910 (4th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff attempts to frame the factual allegations as amounting. to a vast conspi_racy to violate their constitutional rights orchestrated by their former employer, opposing couns_el, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, its staff and judges, and bar counsel. See, e.g., ECF 1, at 16 1 59 ("After County Administrative Judge Robinson Jr., Director of Investigations Bernstein, Bar Counsel Degonia II, and Judges Stringer and Mayer learned that the harm induced exceeded what the Plaintiff could recover from and without relief would function as a death sentence; The conspirators efforts focused on ensuring the Plaintiff cannot seek or obtain relief by obstructing avenues for potential redress .... "); id. at 18171 ("There is no question that.from the mo1:11eµt the lawsuit was filed Ohana Growth ·Partners, LLC, Miles & Stockbridge, P .C., Circuit Court of Baltimore County, and Baltimore County Office of the Clerk for the Circuit Court were violating •
federal rights, protections, statutes, and supremacy."); id. at 20175 ("Every single piece of paper ,
from the opposing party in litigation, every letter of every word from adjudication or magisterial • decision, and every minute of every day since the commencement of action on June 14, 2024, is a ,
violation of one ~~ more of the Plaintiff's constitutional and federal rights and protections.").
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However, Plaintifi essentially disputes the state court's imposition of the preliminary injunction I:
and subsequent rulings. See ECF 1, at 19170 ("Every ruling.by the circuit court judges exceeded the bounds of thLr judicial discretion because every ruling judge unanimously supported the
I • employer's positio [1] d in an employment dispute filed as an injunction."), id. 172 ("The ruling judges ' " ruled in favor of 1 case without proper purpose. The court record stands as a body of evidence
'' reflecting bias against the Plaintiff and favoritism toward the Jaw firm and employer."); id. at 23 90 ("If every filijg lacks a proper purpose, then every ruling iri their favor is equally without a ! '' proper purpose. This means every filing and ruling-essentially, anyone other than Ryan Dillon-
i
Capps who has t4<en action in, on, or around this lawsuit-has violated one or more fundamental rights or legal prirn;iples."). Asking the Court to review those rulings violates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Plaintiff alleges violation of their First Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, ·Ninth, Thirteenth, and ' Fourteenth Amendment rights stemming from the initial TRO hearing, preliminary injunction and
contempt hearing~, and subsequent rulings of the state court. See, e.g., ECF 1, at 5 11 17-20. I,
Fundamentally, Plaintiff contests the state court's granting of the preliminary injunction against them and the con~ 1 mpt rulings that followed. Accordingly, "[d]etermination of plaintiff's claims in [their] favor arid awarding the relief [they] seek□ would necessarily require this court to find that the [state] cof rt proceedings were conducted in an improper manner, produced an improper result, or both." €arter v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs, No. 18-cv-116, 2018 WL 2994818, J; •
at *4 (E.D.N.C. ~ay 21, 2018). As such, the Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to the claiµis asserted by Plaintiff stemming from the state court rulings, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them. See Hairston v. Jackson, No. 20-cv-174, 2021 WL ,,
! 1087471, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 22, 2021) (finding the Ro·oker-Feldman doctrine precluded the court from hearing plaintiffs claims because plaintiff asked the federal court to review and reject the family court's judgment); Burke v. Superior Ct. of Keene, NH, No. 12-cv-85, 2013 WL 319341, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 2, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-cv-85, 2013 WL 323334 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2013) (dismissing complaint alleging the entry of a divorce decree and child support order without proper notice to plaintiff in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Pannell v. North Carolina, No. 23-cv-12, 2024 WL 4853311, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 6, 2024) ( dismissing complaint alleging corruption and unethical behavior throughout the course of divorce proceeding in state court based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Hinson-Gribble v. Purvis, No. 16- cv-845, 2017 WL 9487214, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-cv-845, 2017 WL 2226567 (E.D.N.C. May 22, 2017) (refusing to consider injuries allegedly resulting from improprieties in state divorce proceedings in light of Rooker-Feldman doctrine). "To the el\tent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the state court rulings or enforce such rulings, his remedy lies in the state appellate courts and not in this federal court." See Millholland v.
Abbeville Cnty, No. 20-cv-4368, 2021 WL 260420, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2021) (citing Moore v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 15-cv-515, 2016 WL 775783, at*4 (E.D. Va. Feb.
25, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-cv-4368, 2021 WL 252585 (D.S.C. Jan.
26, 2021).
For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims contesting the rulings in the state action. Those claims must therefore be dismissed.
B. Judicial Immunity
Further, Plaintiffs claims against the state court judges must be dismissed under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judges "are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,"
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including under§ [1983, "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done m~liciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,356 (1978) (quoting
I
Bradley v. Fisher,; 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872)); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. . I
1976). "Ifjudges;;llere personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frJ,olous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid I I rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27
I (I 988). "[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mirel~s v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judicial immunity can only be overcome if
' the suit is for ajuage's non-judicial acts, or the judge, acting in the course of their judicial duties, ,, "acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction."' Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 (quoting Bradley, I .
Wall. at 351).
Throughout the complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the state court acted without jurisdiction because its injuJtion (and all subsequent rulings) violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See, e.g.,
' ,, ' ECF I, at 5 120 ("The lawsuit's unlawful and jurisdictionally prohibitory nature, stemming from
I violations of theiNorris-LaGuardia Act (NLA), voids any claim of immunity."). The Norris LaGuardia Act ",was designed primarily to protect working men in the exercise of organized, 1·
economic power) 'which is vital to collective bargaining." Bhd of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & ' I ' Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957); see also Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Loe. .
770,398 U.S. 235,250 (1970) (explaining that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted in response to a time when "(ederal courts generally were regarded as allies of management in its attempt to '
prevent the orgabization and strengthening of labor unions; and in this industrial struggle the
' injunction became a potent weapon that was wielded against the activities oflabor groups"). While the Norris-La Guardia Act's applicability here is otherwise doubtful as the underlying injunction
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does not concern organized labor, it plainly does not apply to the state court that issued the rulings. The language of the statute makes clear that it applies only to federal courts. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (forbidding a "court of the United States" from issuing certain injunctions); id. § 113 ("The term 'court of the United States' means any court of the United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred or defined or limited by Act of Congress, including the courts of the District of Columbia."). For this reason alone, the injunction (and subsequent rulings) did not violate the Norris-LaGuardia Act, so Plaintiffs contention that the state court acted outside its jurisdiction is without merit.
Quasi-judicial immunity also protects the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. "Absolute immunity 'applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are basic and integral part[ s] of the judicial function."' Jackson v. Houck, 181 F. App'x 372, 373 (4th Cir. 2006)( quoting Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see also Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405,406 (4th Cir. 2012) ("[A] court clerk is generally entitled to quasi-judicial immunity." (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1983))); Jarvis v. Chasanow, 448 F. App'x 406{4th Cir.
2011). "This formulation 'enables the immunity to operate where the need for liability in damages is low and the need for a backstop to judicial immunity high."' Jackson, 181 F. App'x at 373 (quoting Sindram, 986 F.2d at 1461). Plaintiffs claims against the Clerk appear to stem from the deficiency notices issued in the underlying state case. See ECF 1-5, at 22-24; ,i,i 119-130. These are the kinds of quasi-judicial actions within the purview of judicial immunity. "Courts have consistently held that a 'clerk or deputy clerk's receipt and processing of a litigant's filings are part and parcel of the process of adjudicating cases."' Sibley v. Roberts, 224 F. Supp. 3d 29, 37 (D.D.C.
2016) (quoting Sibley v. United States Supreme Court, 786 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 (D.D.C.2011)), qff'd, 696 F. App'x 526 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Reddy v. 0 'Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, .130 ' (D.D.C. 2007) (fitjding a court clerk absolutely immune from suit where allegations included that the clerk failed tdidocket plaintiffs filings); Fuller v. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d 2~4, 207 (D.D.C.
. I 2017) (collecting ~ases); McCoy v. Berkeley Cnty. Clerk of Ct., No. 8:17-CV-3323-JFA-JDA, 2018 I WL 8335332, at T3 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:17-CV- I
3323-JFA, 2019 WL 2177418 (D.S.C. May 20, 2019). 1. •
Judicial iinmunity protects the judge defendants, including Judge DeSimone Jr., Judge Truffer, Judge Blrranco, Judge Alexander, Budge Battista, Judge Mayer, Judge Stringer, .and II " Judge Robinson H., and the Clerk of Court, defendant Julie Ensor, from this action. They must
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be dismissed as defendants.
C. Bar Couri~el and the Maryland Commission for Judicial Disabilities Plaintiff Jrings claims against Tanya C. Bernstein, Director and Investigative Counsel for I I the Maryland Cohlmission on Judicial Disabilities, and Thomas DeGonia II, as Bar Counsel for I'
the Attorney Grif ance Commission. While the causes of actions asserted against each is unclear, ' Plaintiff appears Fb allege that each failed to investigate the complaints Plaintiff made against the
defendantjudgesland counsel. See ECF 1-5, at 20-22, ~~ 105-118. However, there is no general right to an inves,igation of a complainant's grievances. See Ross, 493 F. App'x at 406 (citing Doyle v. Oklaho!na Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1568 (10th Cir. 1993)) (finding frivolous claims • I·
against the Maryl,and Attorney Grievance Commission for failure to investigate plaintiffs' claims); Doyle, 998 F.2d [1] at 1568 ("Fairly analyzed, [the plaintiffs] argument is that the Federal i
Constitution impLes a duty on the defendants to do various things for him (investigate and process • his grievance, somehow help him alter state court judgments by filing a formal disciplinary complaint agains/ a lawyer, prevent perjurious statements in court, and so on), or to someone else (investigate and/m commence disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer). Substantive due proc.ess rights do not remotely relate to such claims."); Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that crime victims do not_ have a constitutional right to a criminal prosecution). Plaintiffs claims against Tanya C. Bernstein, Director and Investigative Counsel for the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities, and Thomas DeGonia II, as Bar Counsel for the Attorney Grievance Commission, for failure to investigate Plaintiffs complaints must be dismissed.
D. State of Maryland
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and· its departments are immune from citizen suits in federal court absent state consent or congressional action. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State of Maryland has not waived such immunity for claims of constitutional violations brought.under§ 1983. See Pevia v. Hogan, 443 F. Supp. 3d 612, 632 (D. Md. 2020). In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment does not generally-bar a request for prospective injunctive relief, id ( citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974)), but "to avoid an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit on this basis, the complaint must be lodged against a state official, and it must 'alleg[e] an ongoing violation of federal law and see[k] relief properly characterized as prospective,"' id. (quoting VerizonMd., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n a/Md., 535 U.S. 635,645 (2002)).
Plaintiff appears to seek to hold the State of Maryland liable for damages for the alleged violations of Plaintiffs federal statutory and constitutional rights. See ECF I, at 29 ,r 3 ("Without the State of Maryland, [the defendants] would have been unable to accomplish life threatening harm, reputational destruction, and financial ruin. Therefore, the State of Maryland should immediately pay for all monetary relief and everyone else should become a debtor to the State of Maryland."); ECF 1-5, at 25 ,r 137 ("The widespread negligence and complicity of M_aryland's judicial officers, court staff, commissions, and administrative entities reflect a systemic pattern of *14 I I
corruption that ti~~ liability directly to the State."). The claim for damages is barred by. Eleventh Amendment sovJeign immunity. And while Plaintiff repeatedly references "ongoing violations,"
I !
these allegations ~e conclusory and Plaintiffs central complaints stem from past actions taken • during the pended~y of the state action, which has now concluded. See, e.g., ECF 1-5, at 26 ~
1· I ("The plaintiff made extensive efforts to notify Mary land officials and agencies of ongoing ' '
violations throug~ formal submissions, email correspondence, and detailed documentation of procedural failur~~- Despite these efforts, filings were obstructed, ignored, or dismissed, oftep under pretextual deficiency notices or mootness declarations."); ECF 1-10, at 9 ~ 6 ("The Plaintiffs claims, under federal civil rights statutes and constitutional protections necessitate ! federal oversight to rectify ongoing harm. Injunctive relief is essential to restoring compliance with
federal law and edsuring accountability for the Defendants' egregious violations."). Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly llleged ongoing violations of federal law that can be properly redressed through
I
prospective injun?five relief and would permit this action to proceed againstthe State of Maryland. ' '
Accordingly, the State of Maryland must be dismissed as a defendant.
- E. Conspiracl Claims
Plaintiff alleges both federal and state conspiracy claims against all the defendants. Under federal law, the"' [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)] provides a private right of action foJ ,treble damages to [ a ]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of
I' a violation' ofth~ [1] Act's criminal prohibitions." Brown v. Registrar of Deeds for Clevel;nd Cnty., No. 1:24-CV-00~83-MR-WCM, 2024 WL 4896698, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 26, 2024) (additional internal quotation-marks omitted) (quoting Bridge Vi Phoenix Bond & Jndem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 641 (2008)); see Lso 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). A civil RICO claim includes: "(l) conduct [causing
I.
injury to business or property]; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering
'
!'
activity." Whitney, Bradley & Brown, Inc. v. Kammermann, 436 F. App'x 257,258 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,496 (1985)). Plaintiff also appears to allege . a conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 18 U.S.C. § 241. As an initial matter, 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 is a federal_ criminal statute that does not create a private right of action. See McKenzie-El v. Internal Revenue Serv., Civ. No. ELH-19-1956, 2020 WL 902546, at *15 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2020) ("The sections of Title 18 cited by plaintiff [18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242] do not create a private right of action. Nor do they unambiguously provide plaintiff with either a private right or remedy."); Turner v. Beal, No. 18-cv-100, 2018 WL 10156104, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2018), aff'd, 748 F. App'x 565 (4th Cir. 2019). The Fourth Circuit has explained:
To state a claim for conspiracy to deny equal protection of the Jaws under section 1985(3), a plaintiff must plausibly allege:
(!) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the Jaw to all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 360 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Simmons v~ Poe, 47 _F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)).
In Maryland, a civil conspiracy claim is "a combination of two or more persons by an agreement or understanding to accomplish an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal, with the further requirement that the act or the means employed must result in damages to the plaintiff." Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 290 (Md. 2005) (citing Green v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm 'n, 269 A.2d 815, 824 (Md. 1970)). Maryland courts have "held consistently that civil conspiracy 'is not a separate tort capable of independently sustaining an award of damages in the absence of other tortious injury to the plaintiff."' Mackey v. Compass Mktg., Inc., 892_ A.2d 479,494 (2006) (quoting Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 290).
Upon reviewing the complaint and all of its attachments, the Court concludes that 1: Plaintiffs allegations that the defendants, including their former employer, state court judges and I
staff, opposing c~unsel, and professional ethics bodies conspired against plaintiff resulting in
adverse rulings iJ ,the state case do not plausibly rise to the level of asserting a conspiracy claim I I , ,
under any of the federal statutes or state common law doctrines asserted .. As such, these claims I
will be dismissed\· I'
F. Remainin~ Claims and Amended Complaint ,.
The Courtiis unable to tease apart the remaining claims against the remaining defendants.
1· As such, Plaintif( will be directed to file an amended complaint that does not include the causes of j I , ' action or defendants the Court dismisses herein. To be clear, the Court makes no finding as to the I
viability of any Jmaining claims. Plaintiff is reminded that the amended complaint will replace I
I
the current complaint. See Young v. City oflvft. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting i ' '
Crysen/Montenay: Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000)) (noting that I • I
amended pleadings supersede original ones except for the limited purpose of appellate review of
claims dismissed! in original complaint that were not included in amended complaint).
• Under Feh. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the
' claim showing t1~t the pleader is entitled to relief." Moreover, each "allegation must be simple, concise, and dirt;t." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(l). "Threadbare recitals of the elements ofa cause of action, supporte9 by mere statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ', (citing Bell At/. 'f;orp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This Court's Local Rules also
require that "[a]ny pleading that states a claim for relief shall set forth each count separately and provide a clear s{atement of the supporting facts for each count." Loe. R. 103.l(c) (D. Md. 2023). • I,
Local Rule 103 diso limits complaints to forty (40) pages in length. Loe. R. 103.l(d). . .
I
Accordingly, Plaintiff's amended complaint must comply with these rules and include all allegations (as limited by herein) against each of the defendants they name so that the amended complaint stands alone as the sole complaint in this case.
III. "Complaint Integrated Appendix: State-Level Negotiations and ~ystemic Oversight Relief'' (ECF 3) ' '
In this motion, Plaintiff seeks an order mandating "daily state-level negotiations between the Plaintiff and representatives of [the Maryland Attorney General's Office, the Supreme Court of Maryland, Judiciary Oversight Committees, Office of the Inspector General, and Office of the Maryland State Prosecutor]," appointing a special master to investigate the Maryland Judiciary, removing a number of state judges and clerks from their judicial appointments and positions, "[a]ssign[ing] a temporary County Administrative Judge, Count Clerk for Baltimore County, Bar Counsel, and Director of Investigations or require approval for such appointments by the Court," and "halt[ing] [all] nonemergency maintenance" of the Maryland Judicial Information Systems and direct the Maryland Judiciary to "preserve all records." ECF 3, at 3-4.
• Plaintiff has not pointed the Court to any authority (and the Court seriously doubts any exists) that would permit this Court, at the request of a prose litigant, to essentially take over the Maryland Judiciary. Nor do Plaintiff's allegations raise a plausible claim that such a drastic remedy is warranted here. Plaintiff is not the first and surely not the last litigant to come away from contentious litigation unhappy. Regardless, Plaintiffs remedy does not lie in federal oversight of the state court system.
IV. "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Interlocutory Partial Summary Judgement [sic]" (ECF 4)
In the "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Interlocutory Partial Summary Judgement," Plaintiff appears to take issue with the state action plaintiffs' (who are defendants here) voluntary dismissal of the state case. See ECF 4, at 3 ("In conclusion, the timeline of filings and procedural
Ji
actions, as detaile<;I in Exhibit 110, conclusively demonstrates that the Defendants were provided
• 1: ) sufficient notice !Ind opportunity to respond. Their voluntary dismissal following months of delays
!
and procedural stalling further emphasizes their intent to evade accountability. Based on these ,,
findings, the Co11f1 should determine that the requirements for adequate notice have been met and ,
1,
grant interlocutocy partial summary judgment for the Plaintiff."). I·
While the' precise relief sought in this motion from this Court is difficult to discern, it will • be denied as preriiature to the extent it seeks summary judgment in this action and will be denied
' • under the RooketFeldman doctrine to the extent it seeks to appeal the state court's dismissal of the state action and declination to rule on the motion in that case.
1: ,, V. "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Conditional Permissive Joinder" (ECF 5) ' 1·
In the "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Conditional Permissive Joinder," Plaintiff 1{ .
references Chishbim v. ,Ohana Growth Partners, LLC, Civ. No. 24-1924-SAG, an FMLA action , .
filed by a former 'employee of Ohana, as a fitness trainer at one of Ohana's Planet Fitness franchise I .
locations. See E~F 5; see also ECF I, in Civ. No. 24-1924-SAG. In that case, Judge Gallagher
j granted Ohana's ration to dismiss, and.the case was closed on November 18, 2024. See ECFs 22 and 23 in Civ. 1'10. 24-1924-SAG. Plaintiff here "requests a conditional permissive joinder of
i:
Chisholm as a cd'Piaintiff, subject to the Court's approval and Chisholm's consent." ECF 5, at 3.
Federal courts uniformly do not allow pro se litigants to represent others, even their own 1:
children. See My_ers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395,400 (4th Cir. 2005); Wenger v. ,' " '
Canastota Central Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by
Winkelman v. ·PJ;ma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Devine v. Indian River Sch. Bd., 121 F. ' , I.
3d 576, 581-82 (ii I th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Winkelman, 550 U.S. 516 (2007);
Johns v. San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986). This prohibition is designed to protect the interests of the litigants from being compromised by one who lacks the legal training necessary to adequately protect them. It aiso recognizes that lay persons are not bound by the same ethical obligations placed upon lawyers.
See Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868. F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994).
Judge Gallagher has already dismissed Chisholm's complaint, Chisholm does not appear to know of Plaintiff's suit or request for joinder, and Plaintiff, as a prose litigant, may not represent Chisholm. As such, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
VI. "Complaint Integrated Appendix: Emergency Ex Parte Hearing" (ECF 6) The Court construes Plaintiff's "Complaint Integrated Appendix, Emergency Ex Parte Hearing," ECF 6, as supplemented by the "Notice of Urgency," ECF 17, as a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). TROs are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
Under that rule:
The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not l,e required.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b )(I). "The purpose of a TR{) is to 'preserve the status quo only until a preliminary injunction hearing can be held."' ClearOne Advantage, LLC v. Kersen, 710 F. Supp.
3d 425,431 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Hoechst Dia/oil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 422 ( 4th Cir. 1999)). Preliminary injunctions and TROs are "extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances." MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) .. They are not "awarded ' I I
as ofright." Win)er v. Nat. Res. De"': Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munafv. Geren, I : :/·
553 U.S. 674, at 689-90 (2008)). To succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction or TRO, a
i'
movant "must est~blish [I] that he fa likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer
I
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his ' '
favor, and [4] tha~i an injunction is in the public interest." Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., I
722 F.3d 184, 188: (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).
i
Plaintiffs' :motion fails because Plaintiff has not provided the procedural prerequisites I '
under Rule 65(b)(l). See Womack v. Freedom Mortg, Civ. No. GJH-19-3182, 2019 WL
13401859, at *I~~- Md. Nov. 13, 2019) (denying TRO for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.
I, 65(b)(l)'s requir~ments); TFFI Corp. v. Williams, Case No. AW-13-1809, 2013 WL 6145548, at *3 (D. Md. Nov.bo, 2013) (same)). Further, the motion is devoid of any factual allegations that I •
would support a finding that Plaintiff has met any of the four required factors, nor can the Court
I glean that Plaintiff has met this burden based on the allegations submitted with the other
I
documents. As sµch, Plaintiffs request for an emergency ex parte hearing is denied. '
VII. Conclusion I I The Court recognizes that based on Plaintiffs submissions, the past year has undoubtedly I
been a stressful time in Plaintiffs life. Nothing in this opinion is intended to minimize that fact. In particular, thJ affidavit of Plaintiffs spouse, ECF 7-1, contains ·troubling details regarding Plaintiffs wellbting, which the Court will not repeat here but has thoroughly reviewed. That affidavit also highlights many of Plaintiffs positive attributes, including that Plaintiff"has always
' been the person that others tum to in their darkest moments-a steady and reliable presence when
!, no one else is the~~-" Id. at 4. Separate and apart from this litigation, the Court encourages Plaintiff to seek assistance from licensed professionals, who are much better equipped than the courts to help those in Plaintiff's situation and are better suited to assist Plaintiff in addressing the concerns Plaintiff's spouse eloquently and empathetically describes.
For the reasons stated herein, it is this 8th day of January, 2025, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:
(I) Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for designation as limited attorney, ECF 2, is GRANTED insofar as Plaintiff seeks waiver of prepayment of the filing fee but otherwise DENIED;
(2) Plaintiff's motions at ECFs 3, 4, 5, and 6 are DENIED;
(3) Defendants Judge DeSimone Jr., Judge Truffer, Judge Barranco, Judge Alexander, Budge Battista, Judge Mayer, Judge Stringer, and Judge Robinson Jr., Julie Ensor, and the State of Maryland are DISMISSED;
(4) Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file an amended complaint that complies with the directives of this memorandum and order by January 31, 2025;
(5) Plaintiff IS FOREWARNED that failure to comply with this Order in the time specified will result in dismissal of this case without further notice; and (6) The Clerk SHALL PROVIDE a copy of this memorandum and order to Plaintiff. Isl Brendan A. Hurson United States District Judge