44 Ga. 119 | Ga. | 1871
We recognize fully the general doctrine contended for by the plaintiff in error. It would have been illegal for Mrs. Dillard to pay the premium to the company during the war, contrary to Act of Congress. And were this a case of a forfeiture for the failure, we should hold that the forfeiture was prevented by the illegality of the performance of the condition. But is this such a case ? The company contracts to pay so much at the death of the insured, if the annual premiums are paid as stipulated. It is clear from the policy and from the known practice of all companies, that the insured has a right at any time to refuse to pay and give up his policy. The contract, upon its face, requires to be renewed from year to year by the payment of the premium. Indeed, a contract of life insurance is, at best, nothing but an undertaking that the company will take the annual premiums paid, invest them safely, and pay to the insured the product, after deducting the expenses of the business. Indeed, if every person insured lived to an average age, this ■would be exactly the contract. But as any individual may .die at any time, the company agrees to pay him what his (premiums would amownt to, making up its losses on him by
If I promise a man to sell him my house, pi’ovided he appear, on a particular day with the money, and he fails for whatever reason other than my fault, he has no right in the house. But if I sell him the house, and it is agreed that he shall forfeit it if he fail to pay me for it in full by a particular day, then the cause of his failure may, both in equity and sound sense, become very material.
"We are very clear that, as the case is made by the record, the judgment is right.
Judgment affirmed.