*1 Petitioner, DILLARD, Debra APPEALS OF CLAIM
INDUSTRIAL OF COLORADO the STATE
FICE OF Respondents. Bottling Group, Pepsi
No. 05SC494. Colorado,
Supreme Court of
En Banc.
May *2 may claimant combine a mental
rating physical impairment rating for purpose exceeding then-applicable of sixty thousand dollar in favor of the one twenty cap, hundred thousand dollar of both which are contained in section (2005), of Colorado’s Workers’ Com- pensation caps Act.2 This section disability pay- Killian, Jensen, P.C., & Joanna C. Guthro permanent partial disability pay- ments and Jensen, Davis, Butler, R. Damon Barbara No ments. claimant whose rat- Junction, Grand for Petitioner. ing twenty-five percent or less receive sixty than more thousand dollars from com- Cairns, Denver, Gregory Respon- B. for temporary disability payments bined Pepsi Bottling Group. dent permanent partial disability payments; those Suthers, General, Attorney Eric John W. impairment rating claimants who have an Rothaus, General, Attorney Assistant S. twenty-five percent above receive the benefit Section, Denver, Respon- State Services higher cap. of the Appeals dent Industrial of Claim Office Colo- rado. us, In division-spon- the case before (DIME) physician sored medical examination Sbarbaro, P.C., Law Office of O’Toole & person impairment rated claimant’s whole O’Toole, Denver, Frickey Neil D. Law a total of 29%: 23% for the claimant’s cervi- Firm, Frickey, Lakewood, Janet for Amicus spine, cal hip, 2% for the left and 5% for Curiae Workers Education Authority. Deutsch, McElroy, Mulvaney Carpenter, & rating, 5% mental LLP, Kanan, Q. Hosley, L. Thomas Alice physical impairments combined with the rat- Denver, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Civil ings person rating, and converted to a whole League. Justice produced 29%, rating pushing a DIME of Dillard’s above 25%. She Clisham, Biscan, L.L.C., Satriana & Patri- higher therefore asserts entitlement Clisham, Mottram, Denver, cia Keith E. Jean cap contained in section 8-42-107.5. We dis- for Amicus Curiae Colorado Self Insurer’s agree. Along with the administrative law Association.
judge,
panel
of
Ap-
the Industrial Claim
Office,
peals
appeals,
and the court of
we
dissents,
Justice
Chief
MULLARKEY
8-42-107(7)(b)(III),
hold that section
joins
Justice MARTINEZ
in the dissent.
(2005),precludes combining
impair-
a mental
participate.
EID
Justice
does not
rating
physical impairment
ment
rat-
purpose
obtaining
for the
of
the benefit
HOBBS, Justice.
higher cap
set
forth
section 8-42-
granted
We
certiorari to review the court
107.5.
appeals
decision in Dillard v. Industrial
(Colo.
Appeals Office,
Accordingly,
uphold
judgment
Claim
I. 25% would entitle her to above (“Dillard”) worked Dillard Debra higher cap tempo- have the benefit of the Pepsi Bot- assistant ‘for administrative as an rary disability disabili- Junction, (“Pepsi”), in Grand tling Group ty payments under section 8-42-107.5. year, she 19 of that On December Colorado. *3 workplace and in front of her slipped on ice record, According to the Dillard received the hit head on sidewalk. her $51,569.33 temporary disability in benefits and, $79,969.89 in gross, is entitled pain in immediately complained of Dillard partial disability There- permanent benefits. proceeded region. She head and cervical her fore, $60,000 cap, Dillard received under the an ambu- directly emergency room via $8,430.67dn permanent partial disability ben- diagnosed her hospital, doctors lance. At the $120,000 qualifies the efits. If she for inju- and a closed head scalp hematoma substantially she could receive more. ry. later, days pain and stiffness Several and she neck became unbearable II.
Dillard’s un- An MRI again sought medical advice. 8-42-107(7)(b)(III), hold that section We possibly and two damage to one covered (2005), combining a mental precludes spine. After con- in Dillard’s cervical discs rating physical impair- failed, doctors removed treatments servative rating purpose obtaining ment for the fused bones her cervi- her disc and C4-C5 higher forth benefit set plates screws. together with and spine cal (2005). 8^42-107.5, C.R.S. pain adequately not sub- Dillard’s did When side, her repeated operation for doctors A. disc.
C6-C7
time,
pre-
Dillard was
Throughout
this
of Review
Standard
Xanax for
depression
for
and
scribed Serzone
the correct con
This case concerns
could not
anxiety
complained
and
she
8^42-107(7)(b)(III) and
struction of sections
throughout
night.
sleep and often cried
ques
We review
distress
her
blamed her emotional
She
statutory
de novo. Peo
tions of
construction
every-
inability
engage many
physical
Cross,
71, 73
ple v.
recreational)
(as
activities, in-
day
well as
as a
pain,
constant
as well
and
tense
construing
Compen
the Workers’
family.
marriage and
threat
to her
ceived
Act,
objective is to effectuate the
sation
our
However,
initially claim dis-
did not
Dillard
Assembly; we construe
of the General
intent
benefits for
whole,
statutory provisions as a
reconcil
reached maximum medical
When Dillard
conflicting provisions,
pos
ing potential
physician
improvement,
attending
her
deter-
Appeals
v. Indus. Claim
sible. Lobato
Of
body permanent
mined that her total
(Colo.2005);
also
223
see
fice, 105 P.3d
person.
of the whole
rating
was 20%
Heiserman,
Corp. v.
Resolution Trust
anxiety
into account Dillard’s
He did not take
(“[I]f
(Colo. 1995)
courts can
P.2d
an inde-
depression. Dillard received
ordinary meaning of the
give effect to
indepen-
pendent medical examination.
body,
by legislative
the stat
adopted
words
that Dil-
examiner determined
dent medical
as written since
should be construed
ute
impairment rating was
whole
lard’s
that the General
presumed
29%,
impairment for Dil-
upon combining said.”).
clearly
what it
meant
anxiety
physi-
depression and
with her
lard’s
impairments.
cal
statute, we do
we construe a
When
that renders words
adopt a construction
impairment rat-
not
not Dillard’s
Whether or
terms, that
injects additional
superfluous, or
include the mental
should
intent.
legislature’s
obvious
contravene
rating as well as
Cross,
4H Meat, disability partial City benefits.” Mountain Permanent also lim- P.2d at 254. awarded for mental are a worker is for mental ited: As preroga- the General has the disability impairment with doing, City tive reaction to Mountain than twelve weeks un- benefits for no more Meat, precluded through its 1999 amend- victim of a violent crime at less she is the combining impairments injury “physical from a work or suffers physical impairments to reach a whole neurological occupational disease that causes 42—107(7)(b)(I) rating. son Subsection sets 8-41-301(2)(b). Tempo- § damage.” brain legislative policy. out the declaration It disability rary benefits awarded for mental states that “scheduled shall be com- impairment are not cut off after twelve pensated provided on the schedule and against permanent weeks but act as a set-off shall .nonseheduled disability a worker benefits once as medical benefits.” Id. improvement. reaches maximum medical 42—107(7)(b)(II) separates Subsection 8— Replogle, Thornton v. the calculation of benefits for (Colo.1995); Phillips R. Douglas & Susan injuries: scheduled and non-scheduled Phillips, D. Colorado Workers’ inju- Where an causes a [scheduled Practice & Procedure 3.12 ry], the loss set forth in the schedule found *5 us, arises, It in case often before (2) in compensated said subsection shall be that will more than one a worker sustain solely on the basis of such schedule and 1999, type injury. Prior to the act allowed (8) the loss set forth in said subsection [the workers who suffered both scheduled and injury] nonseheduled shall be injuries nonseheduled to combine their solely impair- on the basis for such medical injuries scheduled and nonseheduled into one specified ment benefits in said subsection City formula award. Mountain Meat Co. v. 246, Oqueda, 919 P.2d regard claims, In to mental 1999, in 8-42-107(7)(b)(III) Added subsections 8-42- provides subsection that 107(7)(b)(1) (III), (2005), to C.R.S. ended this “mental or compen- emotional stress shall be system 8-41-301(2) and mandated the calculation of pursuant to sated section permanent partial disability compen- benefit shall not he combined with scheduled or a injury type sation that each shall remain added). injury.” (Emphasis nonseheduled separate compensated solely and be on the 8-42-107.5, (2005), adopted Section C.R.S. applicable statutory schedule or basis ben- 1991,places cap upon total amount efit formula. The General added temporary permanent partial disability to the statute in this 1999 amendment a may benefits that a worker receive from all legislative provision declaration and the we 16, § of her ch. See sec. 8-42- (1) us, construe in the ease now before which 107.5,1991 1291,1311. Colo. Sess. Laws provides for mental and emotional distress version of section 8-42-107.5 effect at the provision under different injury caps time Dillard suffered her total (2) prohibits impairments of the act and such temporary permanent partial disability being from combined with a scheduled or a $60,000 $120,000 benefits at either based injury. § nonseheduled Ch. sec. 8- impairment rating: the worker’s 42-107,1999 Laws Colo. Sess. impairment rating No claimant whose permanent par- twenty-five percent may
These amendments to the or less receive disability provisions sixty tial of the statute re- more than thousand dollars spond City temporary disability payments to our Moimtain Meat decision. judgment, permanent partial disability In that payments. we held “the sched- impairment rating uled must be converted to a whole No claimant whose person rating greater twenty-five percent and combined with than re- injury’s person twenty im- the non-seheduled whole ceive more than one hundred thou- pairment rating in calculating dis- sand dollars from combined dis- prevent combining it to
ability payments and like scheduled and disability payments.6 into a whole impairment rating for the of section Impairment ratings are calculated ref- Thus, 8-42-107.5. the mental lan- Medical Association’s erence to the American guage, “shall not be combined with a sched- Permanent Im- Guides to the Evaluation of injury,” uled or a nonscheduled must have (3d ”), pairment ed. rev. Guides {“AMA meaning. meaning, applied That when (2005) 8-42-101(3.7), § impair- is that mental (“[A]ll impairment ratings un- used ments are not to be combined with scheduled Articles 40 to 47 of this title shall be der calculating or nonscheduled based on the revised third edition” of the applicability higher cap of the contained in Guides); 8-42-107(8)(b.5)(I)(A), section 8-42-107.5. (8)(c), (describing calculation of impairment ratings). Our Mountain Meat decision con- medical We conclude then-applicable provisions wording of the 1999 amendment strued the of the awarding compensation act as operates prevent combining the mental based on com- bining person rating into a physical impair- whole person rating calculating permanent disability into a whole benefits. Assembly’s higher cap The General 1999 amendment order to reach the level contained provided separate in section 8-42-107.5. awards based on calcu- inju-
lations for scheduled and nonscheduled addition, impairments. ries and mental C. singled prohibition out a on mental Application to This Case being physical injuries. ments combined with wording provi Comparing the higher Dillard’s case for the benefit giving sions at issue in this ease and each of combining rests on her mental other, meaning relationship them to each *6 physical impairments per- with into a whole 42—107(7)(b)(III), we find that section 8— rating, physi- son which is what the DIME (2005),unambiguously a bars claimant Contrary cian in this case did. to Dillard’s combining impairments mental with contention, legislature’s per- the treatment of injuries for scheduled or nonscheduled the partial disability manent mental purpose reaching higher cap the contained of plain. claims is The words “shall not be in section combined with a scheduled or a nonscheduled 8-42-107(7)(b)(III), 8-42-107(7)(b)(III) According to injury” section in section mean only impairments always literally they are mental com- say. what 8-42-301(2), pensated according to section claims, regard to mental the clearly specified the also that support legislature’s AMA Guides intent “[mjental or emotional stress ... shall not be prevent to the combination of mental or a physical impairment assigning ment with in a - injury.” phrase This second of 8-42- person rating. According whole to the AMA 107(7)(b)(III) key analysis is the to our be- Guides, “impairment rating” roughly rep- an cause Dillard would have us rule that percentage resents form the extent to merely phrase it: reiterates before person’s which health status is altered compen- “Mental or emotional stress shall be Association, injury. supra American Medical 8412-301(2).” pursuant sated to section Generally, physicians types at 1. all combine However, person” the “shall not be combined” lan- into a “whole assessment. added). guage unique (emphasis to 8-42- Id. at xviii The AMA section 107(7)(b)(III). subsection, preceding Guides even contain charts for the combina- 42—107(7)(b)(II), nothing types section contains tion of different Id. at 254- However, reaching improve up 6. Prior to medical workers who receive either maximum ment, cut-off. to or in excess of their allotted a worker's benefits are not Don Contractors, disability Murphy ald P. Inc. v. Indus. Claim benefits receive no Appeals Office, (Colo.App. 613 benefits. Id. at 614. 916 P.2d
413
test,
par
rational
However,
are not
basis
impairments
Under
unconstitutionality
ty asserting the statute’s
AMA Guides
in these charts. The
included
lacks a le
must show that the classification
impairments
regard
to mental
clearly state
and,
governmental purpose
without
gitimate
empirical evidence
“there is no available
that
basis, arbitrarily singles out a
a rational
any
assigning percent-
for
support
method
to
”
persons
disparate treatment
group of
person ....
of the whole
age
comparison
persons
to other
who are similar
clearly explain:
at 240. The
Guides
Id.
Garhart,
(citing
at
ly situated.
95 P.3d
583
may support the di-
Eventually research
Culver,
646);
971 P.2d at
accord Pace Mem
findings and
link
medical
rect
between
Axelson,
bership
938 P.2d
Warehouse
impairment. Until
centage of mental
any
If
conceivable set
profession must refine its
time the medical
that a
facts would lead to the conclusion
improve
impairment,
its
concepts of mental
purpose, legitimate
classification serves a
limitations,
and continue
to measure
court must assume those facts exist. Christ
judgments.
to make clinical
Co.,
Transp.
933 P.2d
ie v. Coors
Id. at 241.
(Colo.1997); Culver,
Dillard’s assertion 107(7)(b)(III) is to and section 8-42-107.5 in section 8-42- higher contained lower costs the Workers’ that the General 107.5 rests on the assertion govern- system. legitimate can impairments This Assembly for mental intended Culver, purpose. impairments in mental to be combined (listing “maintaining integrity fiscal calculating person rating. We con- a whole compensation system; allocat- Assembly clearly in- the workers’ clude the General among ing equitably fiscal fund- prevented combining burden It tended otherwise. sources, controlling employ- costs injuries with scheduled legislatively-intended providing ers while injuries to reach a whole and nonscheduled injured possible legit- Dil- workers” as physician DIME person rating. The Nevertheless, purposes). government in- imate legislature’s lard’s case contravened arbitrarily sin- the General cannot calculating whole tent in 29% 8-42-107(7)(b)(III). disparate treat- gle out certain individuals for her. of administrative
ment for the mere sake rights of one convenience or sacrifice D. money merely more in the group because *7 system .high- Compensation allows Workers’ Challenge Equal Protection everybody Indus. Claim for else. er benefits disagreed appeals with The court 68, Romero, 62, 69 Appeals v. 912 P.2d Office that sections 8- Dillard’s alternate contention 8-42-107(7)(b)(III), con so 42-107.5 Assembly’s treatment of men The General strued, equal and federal violate Colorado a ration impairment claims demonstrates tal Dillard, guarantees. 121 P.3d protection circumscribing approach to the conditions al agree ap the court of We 305-06. such claims. We payable and amounts for equal protection no violation arises peals that statutory that previously have held therefrom. partial only permanent disabil scheme limits impairment to ity paid for mental benefits Compensation Access Workers’ weeks, any temporary dis and offsets twelve right and Dil is not a fundamental benefits paid for mental benefits is a member does not contend that she lard any dis against award of apply a suspect a class. We therefore Re ability benefits for mental equal pro analysis to Dillard’s rational basis plogle, P.2d at 782-83. 888 v. tection claim. Garhart Columbia/Heal (Colo.2004); that thone, L.L.C., Replogle opinion we observed our 95 P.3d 583 (Colo. Assembly’s im- Elec., choice of mental the General P.2d 646 Culver v. Ace 971 containing was aimed at pairment provisions time, while, awarding same men- III. costs at the qualified claim- tal benefits to Accordingly, judgment we affirm the of the equal protection ants. Id. at 785. Dillard’s appeals. court of appeal legislature assumes because allows a claimant to combine scheduled and MULLARKEY, C.J., dissents, and physical impairments pur- MARTINEZ, J., joins in the dissent. poses determining impairment rating 8-42-107.5, it must the com- in section allow MULLARKEY, dissenting. Chief Justice physical impairments bination of mental with respectfully majority’s I dissent from the However, in the same calculation. opinion holding that the 1999 amendments to rationally into account can take permanent partial disability provision that mental or emotional distress claims are statute, compensation the workers’ subsec- analysis susceptible not as to numerical (II) 42—107(7)(b)(I), (III), tions physical injuries. (2005), prohibit physician including a appellate recognize court decisions Our disability in claimant’s mental the claimant’s impairments can be difficult to purposes of the on Ap ascertain. v. Indus. See Davison Claim imposed by benefits (Colo.2004) peals Office, 84 P.3d dissent, For of this Assembly (observing that the intend General I will refer to the first statute as “the 1999 impairment provisions ed mental amendments” and the second statute as “the Compensation help Act to in elimi Workers’ provision. cap” benefits acting nating frivolous claims while to evalu claims); pay AFL- Nothing express language, legisla- ate and bona fide Colo. in the Donlon, (Colo.App. history, surrounding CIO tive circumstances 1995) (stating Assembly requires by that General ration either statute the result reached ally promotes efficiency majority. Accordingly, cost Workers’ I would hold that system by circumscribing caps must be calculated on the basis that are neither of all benefits regard- received claimant physical workplace nor the result of vio less of the or mental character of lence). nature, imprecise Given their more the claimant’s rationally the General can create
system
for mental
claims
FACTS
by limiting
seeks to contain costs
the extent
Petitioner Debra Dillard suffered serious
to which mental
can in
head,
spine,
to her
hip
cervical
crease worker’s benefits.
During
recovery
when she fell at work.
her
Assembly’s
In view of the General
rational-
accident,
from the
she was unable to work
ly-based
addressing
choice
and received
total
bene-
claims,
equal
we hold that Dillard’s
fits. After she reached maximum medical
protection violation claim does not succeed.
improvement,
she was found to have a
legislature’s
drawing
line
need not be
*8
partial disability.
manent
This case arises
See,
perfect.
e.g.,
Membership
Pace
Ware-
money
because the total amount of
Dillard
house,
(“Simply
A mental
like a scheduled
compelled the conclusion that scheduled dis
ry rating,
person
is convertible to a whole
application
were irrelevant
abilities
impairment rating according to the Colorado
cap provision,
the benefits
and held that
Regulations
compensa-
Code of
on workers’
where a claimant sustained both scheduled
12-5,
tion. Rule
7 C.C.R. 1101-3
injuries,
and nonscheduled
the scheduled in
caps provision,
jury
benefits
section 8-42-
was to be converted into a whole
107.5,
was enacted
1991 to limit the total
and combined with the
award a claimant receives for
appro
to determine the
permanent partial disability.
priate
The differenti
in accordance with
Quackenbush. Schank,
caps represent
legislative attempt
ated
No. 4-497-494.
W.C.
distinguish
injured Rejecting
employer’s theory,
panel
between workers who are
seriously.
Oque
more and less
See Colorado AFL-
noted that Mountain
Meat Co.
Donlon,
(1996); da,
(Colo.1996),
Quacken-
CIO v.
403-04
tion 8-42— majority “key” states that the to its 8-42-101(8.7) 497-494; (“impair- § see also analysis phrase in is a subsection 8-42- 40 to 47 of ratings used under articles ment 107(7)(b)(III) stating that “mental or emo- the revised third based on this title shall be not tional stress shall be combined Association edition of the American Medical injury.” maj. or nonscheduled scheduled Im- out, of Permanent majority points to the Evaluation I op. Guides at 412. The and agree, phrase appear pairment”). that the same does not (7)(b)(II). Describing the subsection ben- demonstrate that the These decisions majority phrase “unique,” as the declares apart from cap provision separate and efits meaning.” that it “must have Id. That mean- sought to overrule amendments that the 1999 ing, according majority, the the to City Meat which in Mountain our decision statute, phrase applies to the benefits expanded permanent awards for dis- and mental stress cannot be included in cal- ability compensation where a worker sustains subject culating cap. Id. benefits and nonscheduled both scheduled view, my phrase meaning In the has where support practice also The decisions statute, legislature placed it in the and it Guides, adhering as directed to the AMA application cap provi- no to the benefits has divi- compensation statute and the workers’ sion. There was no need for the drafters to all regulations, to calculate and combine sion language identical in subsection include Guides, at impairment ratings. See (7)(b)(II) (III). injuries Scheduled are (“The espouse to xix-xx Guides continue “solely” compensated on the basis of the physical all and mental im- philosophy that injuries schedule and nonscheduled are com- pairments person, affect the whole and there- “solely” impairment pensated as medical ben- fore, ratings com- all should be 42-107(7)(b)(II). § efits. See If a claim- 8— (2005) bined.”); 8-42-107(8)(c), § ant has both scheduled and nonscheduled (“the treating physician de- authorized shall injuries, losses shall on “the be impairment rating as a termine a medical injuries the schedule and the nonscheduled percentage of the whole based on the shall be as medical Guides].”). majority ... con- [AMA 42-107(7)(b)(I). When subsec- benefits.” 8— interpreting the 1999 tends that rather than (III) (I), (II), together, tions are read merely of our amendments to undo the effect nonscheduled, scheduled, result is that decision, City the amend- Mountain Meat must be calculat- mental prevent the inclusion of a mental ments also separately and cannot be combined for ed to calculate the benefits partial disability. “special “combine” has because the term majority, Contrary to the I cannot read sub- meaning.” Maj. op. at 412. (III) leg- of the 1999 amendments cap pro- is not defined in the islative intent to amend the benefits The term “combine” and, context, ambigu- vision. “combine” is statute a technical ous it sometimes has because context, prohibition against “com- meaning within the workers’ injuries in- bining” mental Meat, scheme. See Mountain (1) juries may in- mean either that statutes). (discussing ambiguity juries together with a cannot be added clarify Specifically, amendments the 1999 pur- or nonscheduled injuries com-
that mental
are limited
com-
poses of
8-41-301(2),
pensation outlined in section
pensation, cannot be
that mental or emotional stress “shall
be
“impair-
in the calculation of the
included
with a scheduled or nonscheduled
appropri-
rating”
determines,
42—107(7)(b)(Ili).
injury.” §
Subsection
cap.
interpretation
The former
ate benefits
(I) states that scheduled and nonscheduled
context of the 1999 amend-
conforms
narrow title of
compensated separately, and
and fits within the
shall be
ments
permanent partial disabil-
the bill limited to
iterates that mental
are not
*11
understood,
really
... prevent
....
is to
ity
[The bill]
the amend-
benefits. So
a,
they
way
indicating
to calculate
someone from
that
have
explains
proper
ment
disability compensation,
depressed
their
about their scheduled
[sic]
provi-
cap
using
depression
that
and does not affect the benefits
and then
to
8-42-107;
also In re
get
see
a formula award.
sion. See
401, 406,
Breene,
24 P.
14 Colo.
(statements
Berry). Proponent
of John
Id.
(“If
partic-
to a
of a bill be limited
the title
Tim Jackson stated:
subject,
general
ular subdivision
designed
This bill is
to eliminate the men-
embody
pertain-
the bill matters
right
to
tal
award on
stress
remaining subdivisions of such
ing to the
compensation,
leg-
worker’s
similar to the
Applying
subject
relinquished.”).
passed
islation that
the full
cap
to the benefits
re-
1999 amendments
the last two sessions.
speculate
legis-
to
quires the court
(statements
Jackson).
Id.
of Tim
The tran-
change
cap
to
lature intended
hearing
scripts of the
on House Bill 99-1157
any express language ty-
provision without
only
single person, a
reveal that
workers’
provisions together.
separate
ing the two
compensation attorney testifying
opposi-
majority’s interpretation also uses the
The
bill,
possi-
tion to the
was concerned with the
implicit
an
ex-
to create
1999 amendments
ble connection
the enactment and
between
ception
the use of the AMA Guides
Testimony of
the benefits
statute. See
despite explicit
cap provision
the benefits
Bob Turner before the House Business Af-
contrary in
sections 8-42-
directions to
Committee,
fairs &
62d
As-
Labor
General
101(3.7)
8-42-107(8).
reading
Such
sembly,
Reg.
(Hearing Tape
1st
Sess.
99-5-d
remaining provisions of the
renders
1999).
testimony
Jan.
of a bill’s
statutory in-
statute vulnerable to further
however,
opponent,
legis-
indicative
consistencies.
lative intent.
history of the 1999 amend-
legislative
Finally, we must remember that the work
supports my
that no
ments further
belief
compensation
important
an
ers’
law serves
made
amend-
connection can be
between the
public purpose.
“liberally
It must be
con
testimony
cap. The
ments and the benefits
accomplish
pur
strued to
its humanitarian
99-1157,
sponsor of House Bill
of the Senate
pose
assisting injured
workers and their
Owen,
supporters,
two
Senator
John
Meat,
families.” Mountain
919 P.2d at
Jackson,
Berry,
and Tim
shows
the bill’s
Counties,
(quoting
252-53
Colorado
Inc. v.
possibility
purpose was to eliminate the
Davis,
(Colo.App.1990),
aff'd
combining
impairment ratings
mental
County
sub nom.
Workers
injury ratings in
scheduled or nonscheduled
Davis,
(Colo.1991)).
Pool
with a mental benefit get a formula benefit
the schedule and