Dilbert v. NewsomDilbert v. Newsom
Petitioner and appellant Clifford Alan Dilbert sought a petition for writ of mandate to compеl respondent and appellee Governor Gavin Newsom to process his applications
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Writ of Mandate
According to the operative amended petition for writ of mandate (writ petition), in 2016 and 2017, Dilbert filed petitions for clemency and/or commutаtion of his prison sentence with the Governor‘s office. He filed reapplications with the Governor‘s office in 2019 and 2021. Dilbert has not received any communication from the Governor‘s office that his clemency petition has been received or processed.
Instructions made available online by the Governor‘s office (instructions), which Dilbert attached to the writ petition state, “[i]n deciding whether to grant a commutation, the Governor‘s Office will carefully review each commutation application” and consider various enumerated factors. The instructions also say, “[a]pplicants will be notified when the Governor takes action on a commutation application.” The instructions further state that, “[i]f you submitted a commutation application to a prior governor and did not receive notice of a commutation grant, your application is deemed closed. If you submitted a commutation application in the last three years and would like Governor Newsom to re-open your prior application and consider it, yоu may submit a Reapplication for Clemency.” The instructions then explain the process for reapplication.
The writ petition seeks a writ of mandate “direct[ing] the Governor to adhere to his ministerial duty” to process Dilbert‘s clemency petitions and reapplications, “render a decision on those filings,” and “inform [Dilbert] of the decision in a timely fashion.”
Demurrer and Judgment
The Governor filed a demurrer to the petition. The court ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to allow Dilbert to pаrticipate in the hearing on the demurrer either by Zoom or telephone. Dilbert and counsel for the Governor appeared at the hearing on the demurrer by Zoom. On March 30, 2022, the trial court issued an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Dilbert filed his noticе of appeal on May 11, 2022.
DISCUSSION
I
Nature of Writ Relief and Standard of Review
“A writ of mandate will lie to ‘compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station’ (
“When a demurrer is sustained,” to a petition for writ, “appellate courts conduct a de novo review to determine whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. [Citation.] Appellate courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,” and accept as true facts which may be properly judicially noticed, “but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The pleader‘s contentions or conclusions of law are not controlling because appellate courts must independently decide questions of law without deference to the legal conclusions of either the pleader or the trial court.” (Villery v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 407, 413, fn. omitted; Ellena v. Department of Ins. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.) ” ‘Reversible error exists only if facts were alleged showing entitlement to relief under any possible legal theory. [Citations.]’ ” (Ashlan Park Center LLC v. Crow (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1278, quoting Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1497.)
We also note “a fundamental principle of appellate procedure [is] that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
Each argument made in an appellate brief must be “under a sеparate heading or subheading summarizing the point,” and each point must be supported “by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” (
To the extent Dilbert believes he has made an argument that we have not addressed in this decision, wе note his briefing lacked the requisite headings and subheadings, and offered very little in the way of developed arguments and citations. And “self-represented parties are ’ “held to the same restrictive procedural rules as an attorney.” ’ (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 [].) ‘A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.’ (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [].)” (Burkes v. Robertson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334, 345.)
II
Nature of and Law Governing Clemency
“The general authority to grant reprieves, pardons and commutations of sentence is сonferred upon the Governor by Section 8 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of California.” (
“The constitutionally authorized ‘application procedures’ for executive clemency (
“The power to grant clemency is vested in the executive branch [citations], and is an act of mercy or grace.” (People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1082; Santos, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 419; see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard (1998) 523 U.S. 272, 280-281 (Ohio).)
III
Duty to Process Within a Certain Time
As a preliminary matter, we observe that neither
Instead, Dilbert depends on two theories. First, he argues that he has a liberty interest and due process right under the
A. Due Process of Law
“The Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek tо invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” (Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) 545 U.S. 209, 221.) While “[a] state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right . . . , the underlying right must have cоme into existence before it can trigger due process protection.” (Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat (1981) 452 U.S. 458, 463 (Dumschat).)
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1, 7, the United States Supreme Court explained, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of а valid sentence. The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: ‘[Given] a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally dеprived of his liberty.’ Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, (1976).” In Dumschat, supra, 452 U.S. at page 464, the Court stated, ”Greenholtz therefore compels the conclusion that an inmate has ‘no constitutional or inherent right’ to commutation of his sentence.” (See also Ohio, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 283 [“There is thus no substantive expectation of clemency“]; In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 663 [referring to the state constitutional authority for clemency at issue in Ohio as “a similarly worded state constitutional provision regarding the pardon authority of a governor“].) Because the defendant has no federal due process right to clemency, he has no right “to procedures essential to the realization” of clemency. (Dumschat, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 463; see also Santos, supra, at p. 421 [quoting Ohio, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 280-281, “[t]he due process the inmate sоught ‘would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing dеterminations’ “].)
Dilbert fares no better under the California Constitution. Procedural due process under the California Constitution, “extends potentially to any statutorily conferred benefit, whether or not it can be properly construed as a liberty or property interest.” (Conejo Wellness Center, Inc. v. City of Agoura Hills (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1562.) But, “it still requires the deprivation of some statutorily conferred benefit before it is implicated.” (Ibid.) California‘s “[e]xecutive clemency is an ad hoc ‘act of grace’ that may be granted for any reason without reference to any standards.” (Santos, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) Dilbert has pointed to nothing in the
B. Instructions Language
Dilbert cites no authority for his argument that application instructions can create an obligation for the Governor to grant discretionary clemency within a certain amount of
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. In consideration of Dilbert‘s financial circumstances costs are denied. (
HULL, J.
We concur:
EARL, P. J.
WISEMAN, J.*