78 Mass. App. Ct. 775 | Mass. App. Ct. | 2011
Lead Opinion
Because the plaintiff, William B. DiGregorio, had been convicted, for a third time, of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating Equor (OUI), the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (registrar) was prohibited by statute from restoring his driving privfleges until a designated date. See G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(£>), (l)(c)(3). The main issue on appeal has to do with how long this automatic statutory prohibition lasts. The plaintiff argues that he can seek restoration of his driving privileges upon the eight-year anniversary of his third conviction. The defendants maintain that the operative date is eight years after the registrar learned of that conviction. DiGregorio also appeals from the denial of his request for a hardship license. We reverse the judgment insofar as it affirms the date that the defendants set as to when DiGregorio can seek restoration of his license.
Background. The plaintiff is a chiropractor who Eves in Wales, a Massachusetts town that lies near the Connecticut border. He has a long history of driving infractions in both States. In 1997, he was convicted in Massachusetts of OUI, his first such conviction. He was then convicted of OUI in Connecticut on April 18, 2000. For this conviction, Connecticut suspended his driving privileges in that State, and on May 24, 2000, Connecticut placed a notice of that suspension in the National Driver Register (NDR), an interstate repository for the sharing of driving records.
On November 29, 2002, the registrar suspended DiGregorio’s license because he had been convicted of illegal possession of a Class D substance earlier that year. Upon DiGregorio’s application, the registrar restored his license on January 16, 2004. However, in the process of reviewing the request, the registrar checked DiGregorio’s driving history in the NDR system and learned of his 2000 OUI-related suspension in Connecticut. As
Nevertheless, it is apparent that DiGregorio continued to drive at least for a time, because he was again arrested in Connecticut for GUI in June of 2004.
In January of 2005, Connecticut informed DiGregorio that he could not get his driving privileges there restored until he completed a certified alcohol treatment program. He successfully completed such a program in 2007,
Although Connecticut had lifted its suspension, the registrar’s February, 2004, revocation of DiGregorio’s Massachusetts license remained in effect. He applied to have his license restored, and this prompted the registrar to check the NDR records. There, in April, 2007, the registrar found the references to the 2000 and 2004 Connecticut convictions (as noted infra, the registrar learned of the suspensions that were based on the incidents underlying the convictions in 2004 and 2007, respectively). On December 26, 2007, the registrar sent DiGregorio a notice that, effective January 5, 2008, his license (which, at the time, was already under an indefinite suspension) was being revoked for an additional eight years because he had been convicted of a third OUI charge.
DiGregorio filed a timely appeal with the board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds (board). He also requested — by way of alternative relief — that the board give him a hardship license. After the board held a hearing on May 6, 2008, it issued an order upholding the registrar’s revocation of his license until January 5, 2016. In an accompanying “ [statement of [r]eason for [d]ecision,” the board explained its view that it was statutorily “mandated to take action and suspend the appellant’s license for eight years” and that the registrar could do so only upon receiving official notice of the third OUI conviction. Although the board did not expressly rule on DiGre-gorio’s request for a hardship license, it declined to offer him that relief. The board also specifically concluded that his having to hire a paid driver, which he had already been doing at the time of his hearing, “to get to and from his obligations” amounted to only an “inconveniencef],” not a “hardship.”
On DiGregorio’ s judicial appeal filed pursuant to G. L. c. 30A,
Discussion. 1. Length of the revocation. We begin by providing a quick road map to the applicable statutory provisions. Along with its neighboring sections, G. L. c. 90, § 24, governs the licensing consequences of driving while intoxicated.
Because DiGregorio’s most recent OUI conviction was his
Statutory text is, of course, the principal source from which courts, and agencies, are to discern legislative purpose. See Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). “Where the words are ‘plain and unambiguous’ in their meaning, we view them as ‘conclusive as to legislative intent.’ ” Water Dept. of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010), quoting from Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 839 (1986). Courts must follow unambiguous statutory language “unless ‘following the Legislature’s literal command would lead to an absurd result, or one contrary to the Legislature’s manifest intention.’ ” Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009), quoting from White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 253 (1998).
The defendants have not pointed to any ambiguity in the language of § 24(l)(c)(3); indeed, they pay virtually no attention to that language.
Even if we could deviate from the unambiguous language that the Legislature has enacted, the defendants have not presented any compelling reason to do so. Their principal argument is that relying on the date of conviction for out-of-State violations would create serious adverse policy consequences, because the registrar retains no control over the timeliness of the information that other States enter into the NDR system. Specifically, they suggest that relying on the “date of conviction” will allow hazardous drivers back on the road sooner or allow them to escape due
In light of the unambiguous language of the statute, we con-
2. Denial of hardship license. DiGregorio also seeks to challenge the board’s declining to issue him a hardship license. The registrar urges us not to reach the issue on the ground that Di-Gregorio’s request for a hardship license was premature even under his interpretation of the statute. Whether his request was premature cannot be definitively resolved on the current record.
In any event, DiGregorio has not shown that the board erred in denying him hardship relief. It is certainly true that having to hire a driver to get to work could amount to more than an “inconvenience” (the board found he was “inconvenienced” but did not suffer a hardship), especially where, as here, the board acknowledged that the applicant faced financial difficulties. However, Di-Gregorio has not pointed to any evidence in the record documenting the extent of the burdens he faced, such as, for example, what he had to spend on his driver and whether he could afford this. His arguments that the board erred in denying him a hardship license therefore would fail on the record here even if his request were properly before the board.
Conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the judge erred in affirming the decision of the board insofar as the board ruled that DiGregorio’s license revocation must by statute extend to January 8, 2016, rather than to October 4, 2012, the eighth anniversary of his third OUI conviction. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and a new judgment shall enter directing the board to revise its decision consistent with this opinion to order the registrar of motor vehicles to correct the termination date for the mandatory revocation of the plaintiff’s license to October 4, 2012.
So ordered.
The May 24, 2000, date appears to be the date that Connecticut entered the suspension in the NDR system (a step that the board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds, which heard the appeal of the suspension at issue here, characterized as “plac[ing] a hold on [DiGregorio’s] license via the NDR system because of the 2000 alcohol offense”). It is not clear whether the Connecticut suspension began on May 24, 2000, or on an earlier date. In a footnote in their brief, the defendants suggest that the May 24, 2000, suspension was unrelated to the 2000 OUI incident. This assertion appears to be inconsistent with the board’s findings and the administrative record.
The board found that DiGregorio “was driving in Massachusetts throughout the time his license was suspended in Connecticut” (emphasis supplied). The evidentiary basis for this finding is not clear. This fact is not established by the documentary materials in the administrative record, and notwithstanding a reference in the board’s decision that it “heard testimony” from a registrar witness, the parties have stipulated that the hearing before the hearing officer “only contained argument and not evidence.” Further, as the defendants acknowledge, DiGregorio was prevented from producing a transcript of the hearing, because the recording that the board made was inaudible.
Even though the February 15, 2004, license suspension remained in effect, the registrar sent DiGregorio a new license suspension notice on April 25, 2007. This notice makes reference to the NDR entries from July 6, 2004, and November 24, 2004.
Pursuant to a waiver approved by Connecticut, the treatment took place in Massachusetts at Wing Memorial Hospital in Palmer. The program, which was State-certified, included a diagnostic evaluation and thirty-six group therapy sessions. At DiGregorio’s completion of the program, the program coordinator certified that “Mr. DiGregorio demonstrated sound progress and was in compliance with our treatment plan goals. His motivation, participation, and attitude were all above satisfaction throughout the duration of the treatment.” On this basis, she recommended that his driving privileges be restored.
In its decision, the board noted its concern that DiGregorio “remains a threat to public safety,” and it made subsidiary findings to that effect. Specifically, the board found that DiGregorio “has failed to address his alcohol problem,” that “[h]e reports that he is still drinking despite three OUI arrests,” that he “does not have any support system in place,” and that he “appears to be in denial about his addiction.” The evidentiary basis for these findings is not at all clear, because the documentary evidence was to the effect that DiGregorio had addressed his alcohol problems through two years of
As discussed infra, applications for hardship licenses cannot be filed immediately upon a license revocation.
The registrar also has broad authority to suspend or revoke licenses on a case-by-case basis “whenever the holder thereof has committed a violation of the motor vehicle laws of a nature which would give the registrar reason to believe that continuing operation by such holder is and will be so seriously improper as to constitute an immediate threat to the public safety” (G. L. c. 90, § 22[a], as appearing in St. 1969, c. 637), or when the registrar “has reason to believe the holder thereof is an incompetent person to operate motor vehicles, or is operating a motor vehicle improperly” (G. L. c. 90, § 22[6], as appearing in St. 1969, c. 637). However, these provisions do not apply to licensing issues related to OUI violations. See G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(6).
In its decision, the board (twice) cited to G. L. c. 90, § 24(c)(l)(2), a subsection that does not exist. As is evident from the context and from the statutory language quoted in the board’s opinion, the board intended to cite G. L. c. 90, § 24(l)(c)(3).
The defendants characterize this provision as establishing a mandatory eight-year term of revocation, and they seek to frame the question before us as determining when that eight-year period begins. Our dissenting colleague effectively does the same. However, that is not how the statute is structured. It does not set a minimum period of suspension; rather, it merely sets an end date by which the registrar is no longer prohibited from restoring one’s driving privileges.
Our dissenting colleague maintains, based on a hypothetical factual scenario, that our interpretion of the statute in accordance with its unambiguous language might lead to results contrary to the Legislature’s intent. On this basis, he suggests that Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., supra, allows us to interpret the statute as the registrar would prefer it to have been written. We respectfully disagree that the Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. case provides such license.
The requirement that the registrar treat an out-of-State violation “as if said violation had occurred in the commonwealth,” G. L. c. 90, § 22(c), could provide support for the registrar’s interpretation (that the period begins when she receives notice and ends eight years later) only if late notice of an in-State violation would also toll the running of the revocation period. The registrar’s receiving late notice of in-State convictions has historically been a problem (even if recent legislative and administrative modifications have at least partially ameliorated this). See Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 386 Mass. 528, 530-531 (1982) (discussing coordination problems between the court system and the registrar). A number of Superior Court cases cited by both parties have held that when the registrar is not provided timely notice of in-State convictions, the running of the revocation period is not tolled by the late notice, but instead remains keyed to the “date of conviction.” In their brief, the defendants appear to concede that these cases were correctly decided, and they attempt merely to distinguish them on the basis that those cases involved in-State convictions. However, when pressed on the point at oral argument, the defendants took the position that those cases were not only distinguishable but incorrect (even though the defendants apparently chose not to appeal them). The defendants have not indicated what would allow the registrar to toll the running of the mandatory statutory revocation period when she receives late notice of an in-State conviction, and, in any event, that issue would turn on the meaning of § 24(l)(c), not § 22(c).
We do not mean to suggest that improvements could not be made to shorten the length of time between out-of-State OUI convictions and in-State revocations based on those convictions. Massachusetts is not powerless to address the tardiness of out-of-State officials. For example, the Legislature may wish to consider placing the onus on offenders to notify the registrar of out-of-State convictions or risk facing additional revocation time if they do not. But whether to modify the statute to provide for such fixes falls to the Legislature. See Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 386 Mass. at 538-539.
Our factual conclusions rest entirely on the board’s findings and the registrar’s own uncontested records. For example, the registrar’s records indicate the NDR entry that the registrar discovered in 2004 identified the 2000 Connecticut suspension as for “DRFV ALCOHZDRUG.” This demonstrates that the registrar had actual notice of the 2000 OUI incident long before the conviction of that offense was posted.
The board highlighted that DiGregorio continued to drive for some time notwithstanding his suspension, and it suggested that its ruling was based in part on its concern that DiGregorio could “avoid the eight-year penalty entirely.” But to the extent that DiGregorio avoided any punishment for driving after his license was suspended on February 15, 2004, this has nothing to do with the registrar having inadequate revocation authority. Similarly, because
This question turns on what type of hardship license he was seeking. If he was seeking a general hardship license, then he would not have been eligible for such a license until October 4, 2008, a date that had not yet arrived by the time of the board’s hearing. See G. L. c. 90, § 24(l)(c)(3) (third-time OUI offender can apply for a hardship license only “after the expiration of four years from the date of [the third] conviction”). If, alternatively, he was seeking a limited hardship license “for employment or education purposes,” then he could have applied for such a license on October 4, 2006, a date that had passed by the time of the hearing. Ibid. DiGregorio maintains that his request that the board provide him a hardship license by way of alternative relief included a request for a limited license. Our review of the record does not resolve this conundrum, because there is no hardship license application in the documentary record, and a hearing transcript that might have answered what type of hardship license DiGregorio was seeking could not be produced. See note 4, supra.
Nothing in our decision should be interpreted as preventing DiGregorio from filing a new application for a hardship license in accordance with procedures established by the registrar.
Concurrence in Part
(dissenting in part and concurring in part). Given my belief that the statutes at issue here have to be read in conjunction, I respectfully dissent.
There are two operative statutes at play, G. L. c. 90, §§ 22(c) and 24(l)(c)(3). Section 22(c), as amended by St. 2006, c. 134, § 1, provides, in pertinent part, that “ [i]f the [Registrar of Motor Vehicles (registrar)] receives official notice . . . that a
Once the notice specified in § 22(c) has been received, we turn to § 24(l)(c)(3) to ascertain what actions the registrar should take. The two statutes must be read together. Section § 22(c) triggers § 24(l)(c)(3). The majority seizes upon the phrase “eight years after the date of conviction” in § 24(l)(c)(3) to ascertain the end date for a license revocation. In the majority’s view, as the language in § 24(l)(c)(3) is clear and unambiguous, the end date here is eight years after the defendant’s third conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OUI), which occurred in Connecticut.
Passing over the obvious — that nothing in c. 90, § 24, is ever clear and unambiguous
The majority observes that the registrar apparently knew of the 2000 conviction. Even if that were so, the registrar did not
Demonstrating the need for the two statutes (§ 22[c] and § 24 [l][c][3]) to work in concert, let us assume, for example, that the registrar first officially learned of the second Connecticut conviction nine years after the fact. In the view of the majority, there is no action the registrar could take under G. L. c. 90, § 24(c)(l)(3), as the eight-year revocation time period would have expired. This interpretation not only gives § 22(c) short shrift but ignores it entirely. What is the point of requiring notice under § 22(c), which triggers action pursuant to § 24(l)(c)(3), if the registrar upon receiving the notice is powerless to act? The majority also ignores the very principle that it recites, ante at 780, that courts must follow unambiguous statutory language “unless ‘following the Legislature’s literal command would lead to an absurd result, or one contrary to the Legislature’s manifest intention.’ ” Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009), quoting from White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 253 (1998). Skipping over whether the result here is absurd, it certainly is contrary to the Legislature’s manifest intention to protect its citizenry by keeping repeat drunk drivers off of its roads.
The ruling by the majority places the registrar in an untenable position and makes her obligation to monitor those convicted out-of-State of drunk driving difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. The decision places the registrar at the mercy of the posting dates of our sister States, over which Massachusetts has no control, and fails to take into consideration the dictates of § 22(c) and the purpose of the statutory provisions. For these reasons. I would affirm the decision below.
“We start with the observation that wading through the various provisions of c. 90 is akin to driving a car without windshield wipers on a dirt road on the side of a mountain at night during a blizzard.” Commonwealth v. Chown, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 684, 687, further appellate review granted, 457 Mass. 1107 (2010).
General Laws c. 90, § 27, regulates the records of the courts of the Commonwealth and mandates that certain motor vehicle infractions be sent to the registrar. There is a stark distinction between State courts that do not follow the dictates of § 27 and foreign states. Massachusetts can control the former; it has no authority over the latter.
The majority casts some doubt on this. See ante at note 4. As there is no transcript, it is somewhat difficult to conclude that the board somehow made this up.