J. Richard Dietrich, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. Dobos, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15AP-2 (C.P.C. No. 12CV-11863)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
November 24, 2015
2015-Ohio-4866
KLATT, J.
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on November 24, 2015
Organ Cole LLP, Shawn J. Organ and Erik J. Clark, for appellee.
Clifford O. Arnebeck, Jr., for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant, David A. Dobos, appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that denied him leave to file an answer and granted plaintiff-appellee, J. Richard Dietrich, default judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm that judgment.
{2} On September 19, 2012, Dietrich filed suit against Dobos, Lora G. Dobos, and Sheridan Worldwise, Inc. The complaint sought damages caused when defendants failed to repay a $150,000 loan that Dietrich had made to Sheridan Worldwise. Eventually, Dietrich obtained a default judgment against Sheridan Worldwise, and he voluntarily dismissed his claims against Lora Dobos. This appeal concerns solely Dietrich‘s claims against Dobos.
{3} Dobos was served with the complaint and summons via certified mail on September 29, 2012. Dobos, therefore, had to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint by October 29, 2012. Dobos did not do so. Rather, on October 29, 2012, Dobos filed for bankruptcy. Dobos informed the trial court of his bankruptcy the next day, October 30, 2012, by filing a document entitled “Suggestion of Bankruptcy.” The bankruptcy filing stayed the instant action against Dobos.
{4} Approximately one year later, on October 7, 2013, the bankruptcy court granted a discharge to Dobos under
{5} The trial court reactivated this case on November 14, 2013. It granted Dietrich default judgment against Dobos five days later, on November 19, 2013.
{6} Dobos appealed the November 19, 2013 judgment to this court. We reversed that judgment because the trial court entered default judgment without first setting a hearing and providing Dobos with timely notice of that hearing. Dietrich v. Dobos, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1053, 2014-Ohio-4023, ¶ 17.
{7} We entered judgment remanding this matter to the trial court on September 16, 2014. When Dobos filed nothing in the trial court, Dietrich renewed his motion for default judgment. The trial court scheduled the renewed motion for a non-oral hearing on October 14, 2014. One day prior to the hearing, Dobos moved for leave to file his answer. The next day, Dobos filed a memorandum in opposition to Dietrich‘s motion for default judgment.
{8} In his filings, Dobos argued that his failure to timely answer was the result of excusable neglect and, thus, the trial court should extend the 28-day answer period pursuant to
{9} In each evaluation, the examining psychologist addressed whether Dobos’ mental health affected his ability to participate in the bankruptcy litigation. Dr. Peter M.
{10} The third psychologist, Dr. Daniel L. Davis, also considered whether Dobos’ mental health played a role in his failure to respond to the complaint in the instant action. Davis determined that Dobos was most likely best diagnosed with an unspecified mood disorder and an unspecified anxiety disorder. Davis also stated that Dobos “became overwhelmed and[,] due to his extreme stress and defensiveness[,] engaged in avoidance behaviors that resulted from his psychological condition.” (R. 100, 101.)
{11} In a judgment dated December 2, 2014, the trial court denied Dobos’ motion for leave to file an answer and granted Dietrich default judgment. Dobos now appeals that judgment, and he assigns the following errors:
Assignment of Error No. 1: THE TRIAL COURT BELOW ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DAVID A. DOBOS BY DENYING HIS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE PLAINTIFF‘S COMPLAINT.
Assignment of Error No. 2: THE TRIAL COURT BELOW ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DAVID A. DOBOS BY GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF‘S RENEWED MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM.
{12} By his first assignment of error, Dobos argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for leave to file an answer. We disagree.
{13}
{14} A trial court exercises its discretion in deciding a motion for an extension under
{15} In the case at bar, Dobos blames his failure to timely answer on his mental disorder. No previous Ohio case has addressed whether neglectful conduct caused by a mental disorder is excusable under
{16} We recognize that the test for excusable neglect under
{17} Here, the question is whether Dobos’ mental disorder interfered with his ability to file a responsive pleading when it was due. As we stated above, Dobos had from September 29 to October 29, 2012 to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. Dobos relies on three psychological evaluations to prove that his mental condition impaired his capacity to timely respond. However, all of the evaluations were conducted long after the relevant time frame. Davis and Barach examined Dobos in December 2013, and Serednesky assessed him in April 2014. The lengthy gap between the relevant time period and the diagnoses of mental illness lessens the efficacy of the evaluations. Moreover, two of the evaluations—those of Barach and Serednesky—focus on the wrong time period. They appraise whether Dobos suffered from a mental disorder in the summer of 2013. Only one evaluation, written by Davis, appears to adjudge Dobos’ mental condition in October 2012. Consequently, we disregard Barach‘s and Serednesky‘s evaluations and consider only Davis’ evaluation.
{18} According to Davis, Dobos’ psychological condition caused him to avoid dealing with the litigation against him. Davis, however, did not opine that Dobos’ mental disorder prevented him from understanding and attending to his obligations in that litigation, or that it compromised his ability to appreciate the consequences of failing to meet his obligations. Given these shortcomings, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Dobos’ failure to timely file an answer was inexcusable. While Dobos’ psychological condition may explain his inaction, it does not excuse it. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Dobos’ motion for leave to file an answer, and we overrule Dobos’ first assignment of error.
{19} Because we have found no error in the denial of Dobos’ motion, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Dietrich‘s motion for default judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Dobos’ second assignment of error as well.
{20} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule both assignments of error, and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and HORTON, JJ., concur.