145 Iowa 250 | Iowa | 1909
Lead Opinion
The following facts are undisputed: The defendant operates a double track railway, passing east and west through the town of De Witt, Iowa. The ticket office, waiting room, and main platform of the station are north of the tracks. Trains move eastward on the north track and westward on the south track, and westbound passengers are required to pass from the main platform over a planked way across both tracks to a platform on the south side in order to board their trains. At about, eleven o’clock of the night of March 31, 19.02, Frederick J. Dieckmann, a traveling saleman, went to the station to take the westbound train, which was due there about twenty minutes later. He purchased a ticket from De Witt to Cedar Rapids, and when the approach of the train was announced, or very soon thereafter, he picked up the grips which he was carrying, and started in the direction of the south platform. At or about the same time the station, agent, taking a lantern, went in the same direction, and both he and Dieckmann were struck by the train,- the
Concerning the details with which this general outline of conceded facts is to be filled, there is some.dispute and uncertainty. There is, however, evidence which tends to show that it was the custom or practice of the agent, on the approach of westbound trains, to call out, “Train west! All passengers cross over to the south side.” At night he carried a lantern, and, after announcing the train, crossed over to the south platform. In so doing he was in the habit of showing the planked way or crossing to the passengers about to depart,, and assisting them over, if assistance appeared to be needed. On the night in question he was heard to make the usual announcement; then, taking his lantern and some mail in his hand, started from the office in the direction of the south platform, followed by the deceased. The éngineer in charge of the locomotive testifies that the train was moving at probably forty miles per hour, and was one minute ahead of schedule time as it entered the De Witt yards and sixteen miles per hour at the east end of the platform, which speed he thinks had been reduced to eight miles when the collision occurred. The headlight would not distinctly reveal to the engineer the form of a man at the distance of one hundred feet, but in his judgment it would do so at fifty feet. Nor an instant, as he approached, his eye was diverted to the air gauge of the engine, and, as he looked forward again when very near the crossing, he distinctly saw two men apparently running across the track to the south, one being slightly ahead of the- other, the one in the rear carrying a lantern. Almost at the same instant, and before any effective measure could be taken to stop the train, both men were struck, with the results already mentioned. A witness for defendant, who claims to have seen the collision, states that the' agent and himself crossed the tracks in safety to the south' platform, and on ■ turning saw Dieck
Plaintiff’s claim for damages is based upon the theory that, when Dieckmann went to the station and purchased a ticket for passage on a train nearly due, the relation of carrier and passenger then became effective, and that the railway company thereupon became bound to exercise the highest degree of care for his safety, and to provide him a safe way to the train and opportunity to reach the platform without injury, as well as to furnish proper escort and direction to the passenger if reasonably necessary to insure such safety. In these respects it is alleged the company was negligent. The defendant denies negligence on its part-, and insists that the intestate was clearly guilty of contributory negligence. Upon a former submission the ruling of the trial court directing a verdict for defendant was sustained, but, a petition for rehearing having been granted, the case has been reargued by counsel on both sides with great thoroughness. The material questions may be considered in the following order:
Directly in point upon this subject is the language of the Supreme Court of Maryland: “Carriers of passengers have in their charge the lives and safety of those they undertake to transport, and are subjected to a responsibility proportioned to the gravity of the trust reposed in them. They are bound to use the utmost degree of care, skill and diligence in everything that concerns the safety of passengers, nor are their duties limited to the mere transportation of them. They are bound to provide safe and convenient
In Mayo v. R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 141, tbe court speaking with reference to alleged contributory negligence of a passenger while crossing a track at a railway station, says: “Although tbe burden of proof still remains upon tbe plaintiff in these cases to show tbe exercise of such degree of care as was appropriate to tbe place,and occasion, yet tbe court will not attempt. to decide tbe question of due care upon tbe preponderance of evidence. Tbe surrounding circumstances, and tbe whole conduct of plaintiff in reference thereto, will ordinarily afford ground for such a variety of inferences as to make tbe verdict of a jury tbe only proper means to determine tbe essential fact. However indicative of carelessness the circumstances may seem to tbe court, if there be any evidence on which it is competent for tbe jury to find that reasonable care was in fact exercised, it is proper to submit it to them.” Tbe same court, in Gaynor v. R. R. Co., 100 Mass. 212, (97 Am. Dee. 96), discussing tbe same question of contributory negligence in crossing a railway track, ■ makes use of tbe following expression : “When tbe circumstances under which tbe plaintiff acts are complicated, and tbe general knowledge and experience of men do not at once condemn bis conduct as careless, it is plainly to be submitted to tbe jury. Wbat is ordinary care in such cases, even though tbe facts are undisputed, is peculiarly a question of fact, to be determined by tbe jury under proper instructions. It. is tbe
Since this case was originally submitted several decisions quite in point have been announced in other jurisdictions, and to some of these we call • attention. Chunn v. Railroad Company (decided by the Supreme Court of the United States November 8, 1907), 207 U. S. 302 (28 Sup. Ct. 63, 52 L. Ed. 219), presents a case where the plaintiff went at night to the station to take passage on a car soon to arrive. The road was double-tracked, and a platform for the use of the passengers had been provided along the outside. The narrow space between the tracks was . also planked, and passengers sometimes stood there when waiting to board the cars. Plaintiff took her stand upon this narrow place. From this position she could, if she looked, see an approaching car from either direction for a distance of at least a quarter of a mile. Standing .there, as the train she was expecting approached, she was struck and injured by another car coming in from the opposite direction on the other track. Having brought action to recover - damages, the trial court directed a verdict for the company, on the theory that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter. of law. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, . which decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. After first finding that the plaintiff w:as not a trespasser, the court proceeds to say that: “She was not as -a matter of law guilty of negligence in failing to appreciate accurately the boundaries of the narrow zone of safety which the defendant’s conduct had left her.”
One who had by daylight observation become' familiar with these conditions and these measurements, and the place of stopping the northbound car, might, and probably would, remain between the tracks after he had held up the signal light and until the train arrived, but a person not possessing this familiarity, and arriving on a dark
These words apply with increased force to the case before us. The deceased was a passenger and entitled to protection as such. He was not only impliedly, but expressly, invited to cross the track in front of the incoming train. It was the only method provided to enable him to take passage upon it. The place, except the small area illuminated by ihe agent’s lantern, was enveloped in the darkness of, night. The only visible sign of the approach
A discussion by the court in Doyle v. Railroad Co., 145 Mass. 386 (14 N. E. 461), is also quite pertinent to the question here presented. The deceased was driving-in the nighttime over a crossing of the defendant’s tracks in the city of Boston. The crossing was guarded with gates, operated by ia gateman, and was also protected by a gong, which sounded on the approach of a train. The gates being open, the deceased undertook to cross; but, before he reached the track on which the train was coming, the alarm was sounded, and the gateman, seeing him, called to him to stop, and, as was claimed, immediately called to him again to go' on'. The deceased evidently either heard the alarm, or saw the approach of the train, for he was seen to start'suddenly, whip up his horses, and endeavor to make the passage, but failed, and was killed.
IVe can iiot say as a matter of law that deceased was guilty of gross negligence. The plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that he had got halfway across before there was any warning, and before the gates were shut; that the first warning he received was'When the gates were shut, and the gateman shouted ‘Stop!’ a shout which he may have heard only as an alarming sound; that then, practically all at once, the deceased whipped his horse, the gateman shouted to him to ‘Come on!’ and opened again the gate in front of him. We do not say that this seems to us the most probable view of the facts, but it is one which the jury might have taken on the evidence. Going on under the circumstances was a mistake, but we can not say it was gross negligence. ■ Something must be allowed for the natural impulse which some people feel when suddenly startled and alarmed to leap forward, and more for the natural tendency to follow the gateman’s directions.
We have ourselves, within the last few weeks, held it error for the court to direct a verdict for the defendant in a crossing accident case where the alleged negligence of the company and freedom from contributory negligence by the plaintiff were sustained by evidence far less persuasive than is presented by the record now before us. See Calwell v. R. R. Co., 138 Iowa, 32.
In the Sweeny case, supra, .it was claimed that' the company’s agent gave the plaintiff a signal .to cross" the track, and the court says: “No express invitation need to have been shown. It would have been only necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the agent did some act to indicate that there was no risk of accident in attempting to pass over the crossing.” In the 'Glushing case the question was upon an implied invitation offered by an open crossing gate, and the court uses this language: “The raising of the gate was a substantial assurance to him of safety, just as significant as if the gateman had beckoned to him, or invited him to come on, and that any prudent man would not be influenced by it is against all human experience.”
In Hartzig v. R. R. Co., 154 Pa. 364 (26 Atl. 310), the plaintiff was acting under the direction of a brakeman in making her exit from a train, and was injured. The court there says: “In such circumstances she can not be charged with contributory negligence for doing what she was told to do by the brakeman. She’ was- still in the charge of the defendant company, and was therefore not a discharged passenger. She was using the means for alighting which were provided for' her, and with the assistance o£ their agent.” The. same rule is affirmed in
We quote also from the Michigan court: “Where passengers are at the appointed place for embarking, with no fences or gates to keep them back, they must generally have the right, if they do so in good faith, to assume that no dangerous orders will be given, and that they may safely act on the direction of those whose legal duty it is to protect them from risk, and who are supposed to know what is safe. Some allowance must also be made for such conditions as stand in the way of full deliberation. It is applying too harsh a rule to hold that persons, who have apparently few moments to decide between the direction of the officers and losing their last chance of passage, should be held negligent in doing as they are invited to do, unless the danger is very obvious.” Clinton v. Root, 58 Mich. 182 (24 N. W. 667, 55 Am. Rep. 671) ; Pool v. R. R. Co., 56 Wis. 236 (14 N. W. 46).
Very closely resembling the case at bar is Warren v. Railroad Company, 8 Allen (Mass.) 237 (85 Am. Dec. 700). There the plaintiff was required to cross the track to reach his train. While awaiting its arrival at the sta
It needs no argument to demonstrate the manifest application of these cases, and the law therein announced, to the case at bar. We further cite, without quotation, Boesen v. R. R. Co., 79 Neb. 381 (112 N. W. 615); Railroad Co. v. King, 99 Fed. 251 (40 C. C. A. 432, 49 L. R. A. 102) ; Warner, v. Railroad, 168 U. S. 339 (18 Sup. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 491) ; Betts v. Railroad, 191 Pa. 580 (43 Atl. 362, 45 L. R. A. 261); Graven v. McLeod, 92 Fed. 851 (35 C. C. A. 47); Railroad v. Lagerkrans, 65 Neb. 566 (91 N. W. 358, 95 N. W. 2) ; Railroad v. Goodin, 62 N. J. Law, 394 (42 Atl. 333, 45 L. R. A. 671, 72 Am. St. Rep. 652).
The only possible escape from this conclusion is for this court to say, las a matter of law, that the danger in making the crossing was so obvious that, as a man of ordinary prudence, the deceased should have refused to follow the agent to the platform. But when we stop to consider what such a holding would involve, it is very clear that we would be thereby invading the province of the jury. In the first place, as the cases hold, over and over
In Railway Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, we have a case where the plaintiff, the keeper of a hotel located on the opposite side of the track from a station, after hearing the whist-le of an approaching train, left his place of business to go to the station, and in attempting to make' the crossing ahead of the train was struck and injured. The principal negligence charged against the railway com
It certainly can not be said, on ány view of the evidence, that the plaintiff observed the highest -degree of prudence in his conduct. He stepped on the track on which he knew the train was approaching, without turning to see how near it was, and the injury has resulted in consequence. Thus stated, the fact would appear tó be gross negligence, if not utter recklessness; but there are other circumstances to be taken into consideration before judgment can be pronounced upon the character of the act. The plaintiff heard the whistle a half a mile off. He knew he had the time, which would be required for the train to pass over that distance, in which to cross over to the depot, a distance of less than one hundred feet. He also knew that all trains coming on this track stopped at the depot, and that they .checked their speed and approached it slowly. He had also some reason to expect the ringing of the bell. But whether the bell was rung or not it may well-be claimed he had abundant reason to believe the^re was ample time to cross the track before the train in the ordinary course could possibly arrive, even though he walked along leisurely as he must . have done. He looked for the train, indeed, as he came out of his hotel, but he had 'less than the usual occasion for looking when he knew about how far off the train was, and that, relying upon the ordinary mode of management, as he
The .case of McIntyre v. R. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287, is also so directly in point, and the discussion of the subject of contributory negligence in following the direction of the carrier’s agent is so applicable to the circumstances now under consideration, that at the risk of seeming tedious we now quote therefrom. The passenger, laden with a bandbox, bundle, basket, and flowerpot, and piloting her aged parent, also incumbered with baggage, undertook to pass • from one car to another while the train was in motion, and the platforms slippery with sleet and ice, fell between the cars. She attempted to make the passage because the seats in the car were all filled, and the brakeman told her to go into the next car, where she would find room. In an opinion by Fullerton, J., it is said:
She had a right to a seat, and it was the duty of the defendant to provide her with one. If in discharging that' duty they required her to perform an act which was perilous in itself, and in doing which she lost her life, the negligence, if any the act involved, should be imputed to the company alone. ... I admit that passing from one car to another in a 'dark and stormy night, incumbered with baggage, and having charge of an aged person, was an act fraught with imminent peril, and, if done without sufficient reason, one involving great negligence. But, having been undertaken at the request of -the company, it is to be regarded as their act, and attempted at their risk. Unless this view of the case is adopted, railroad companies may be guilty of the grossest wrongs without incurring liability.
The trial court erred in refusing to submit the case to the jury, and a new trial must be ordered. — Beversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — Believing that the opinion of the majority on the question of the contributory negligence of the deceased is based on an erroneous conception of the evidence, I can not assent thereto'. As I read the record, there is absolutely no support for the assertion that the agent, Barker, was either leading, directing, or assisting the deceased across the tracks. The testimony of the engineer is not, in my judgment, in conflict with that of the witness Gabbert, who testified that he and the agent crossed to the south platform alone, and that after they had reached there he looked back and saw the deceased fall on the north track, pick himself up, start forward, and fall on the south track in front of the train,