44 F. 160 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1890
(charging jury.) Gentlemen of the Jury: In the tariff act of 1883 there is a schedule, lettered C, and headed “Metals,” including a great many different paragraphs, running in number from 144 to 216. When these goods arrived, the collector classified them under the last paragraph of this metal schedule, 216, which reads as follows:
“Manufactures, articles, or wares not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, copper, lead, nickel, pewter, tin, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, or any other metal, and whether partly or wholly manufactured, forty-five per centum ad valorem.”
That particular paragraph, as you will see from its phraseology, is a catch-all clause put at the foot of the metal schedule in order to cover
Mr. Van Rensselaer. If your honor will permit me, then; is one request which I did not put in writing, and which I will state to your honor verbally. I request your honor to charge that, in considering trade designation, the jury should take, into consideration not only the trade as represented by the importers, but also trade as represented by the manufacturers of and dealers in domestic articles.
Th.c Court. The trade and commerce of this country is the trade which buys and sells the particular article, whether it comes from abroad or is made here; and the trade and commerce which makes a designation is the trade and commerce between individuals whore the buyer and seller are both engaged in that as their business, not where an individual retails to a consumer, but where both the, parties to the transaction are trade men. That being so, it is immaterial whether the goods which they buy and sell are made abroad or made here. It is the whole trade and commerce in this country, wherever the goods it handles are made, which is to bo considered.
Mr. Van Rensselaer. 1 would like to make a motion, and to ask for your honor’s ruling thereon in connection with my first request to charge, that is, that the clause “Pins, solid head or other ” in the statute must be understood by the jury to mean only such pins, solid head or other headed, as were known as such in trade and commerce at the time of the passage of the tariff act of 1883. 1 move your honor to direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant as to the article “safety pin” on the ground that, in addition to its not being included in the general term “pins,” it is an article which all the testimony shows has no head at all. I claim the construction of the statute to be “pins, solid head or other headed;” there being no comma after “solid-head,” it moans “solid headed or other .headed.” And on that ground 1 move your honor to direct a verdict in favor of the dofendent as to the safety pins.
The Court. I shall deny that motion.
Mr. Van Rensselaer. Your honor will give me the benefit of an exception.
The jury thereupon rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.