160 Ga. 487 | Ga. | 1925
(After stating the foregoing facts.) The controlling question in the present ease is whether the act of 1918 (Acts 1918, p. 162) superseded and repealed the existing law on the subject of lunacy at the time of the passage of the act, and abolished the distinction made in the law prior t-o the act of 1918 between lunacy proceedings provided by the Civil Code of 1910, § 3092 et seq., and lunacy proceedings provided by § 3101. Let us see, then, what the code provided on the above subject at the time of the passage of the act of 1918, and also what the act of 1918 provided. The
It will be observed that the act of 1918 does not expressly repeal sections 3092 and 3101 of the- Civil Code of 1910. It will also be observed, by comparing the act of 1918 with the Civil Code of 1910, § 3101, that the act of 1918 provides that where “affidavit is made by any one of such relatives, or other person, that such • person is violently insane and is likely to do himself bodily injury,” etc.; and the language of § 3101 of the Civil Code is that when “any person shall make oath that such insane person, for public safety or other good and sufficient reason, should not longer be left at large, the ordinary,” etc. So there is no real conflict between the act and the section of the code referred to, as to the class of persons who are to be examined, etc.; and therefore it can not be said that there is such a conflict that the act of 1918 repeals section 3101 by necessary implication. As to the difference in the tribunals which are to examine the subject, it is sufficient to say that § 3092 of the Civil Code and the act of 1918 provide for a different class of subjects than those pointed out in § 3101. This distinction is clearly brought out in the case of Reagin v. Powell, 125 Ga. 89 (53 S. E. 580), and the ruling in that case on this point is applicable to the present case.
In deciding the present case the learned trial judge wrote an opinion which so clearly states the issues and decides the question involved that we adopt a portion of his opinion which is as follows: “This petition was demurred to upon the grounds that it set out no ground authorizing the writ of habeas corpus, or entitling the applicant to her liberty. In addition to the facts alleged in the petition, the contention is therein made that the warrant last
From the foregoing the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and in dismissing the petition praying for habeas corpus.
Judgment affirmed.