delivered the opinion of the court.
This is а writ of error to correct a judgment of the' Supreme Court of Minnesota which sustаined the validity of a statute of the State held applicable to this case and alleged by the plaintiff in error to be repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States when so applied. The facts that raise the question are'simplе. One Holloway sued the plaintiff in error under the Employers’ Liability Act for personal injuries and engaged the de *632 fendant in error, Stiles, as his attorney, agreeing to. pay him one-third of the amount recovered by suit or settlement. The statutes of Minnesotа give the attorney a lien upon the cause of action. Gen, Stats, of 1913, § 4955. Befоre trial the plaintiff in error settled by paying $6,500. Stiles intervened in the cause and ^laimеd his fee pursuant to his contract. There ^was a trial which ended in a judgment for Stiles — thе trial Court ruling that the Minnesota statute ¡was effective to.impose a lien upоn a cause of action arising under the Act of Congress relating to the liability of сarriers by railroad to their employees. April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65. April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291. The Supreme Court of the State sustained this ruling, 137 Minnesota, 410, and subsequently, without further discussion, affirmed the judgment fоr Stiles . .
It is argued for the defendant in error that it does not appear sufficiently in thе record that the case turned upon the ruling supposed, But the original declaration was for an injury alleged to have been received in interstate com-, merce and,whatever the answer denied, that was the claim that was settled. The question was called to the attention of the trial Court and was discussed at length by the Supreme Court. We perceive no ground for the motion to dismiss.
Coming to the merits, cases that declare that, the acts of Congress supersede all state lеgislation on the subject of the liability of railroad companies to their employees have nothing to do with the matter. The Minnesota statute does not meddle with that. It affects neither the amount recovered nor the persons by whom it is reсovered, nor again the principles of distribution. It deals only with a necessary еxpense of recovery. Congress cannot have contemplated thаt the claims to which its action gave rise or power would be paid in all cаses without litigation, or that suits would be tried by lawyers for nothing, yet
*633
it did not regulate attorneys’ fees. It contemplated suits in state courts and accepted state procedure in advance.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co.
v.
Bombolis,
The statutes referred to in the last cited cases imposed liability for an additional sum. The present one does not.. We presume that it would not be contended that the Employers’ Liability Act prevented the assignment of a judgment under it in such fоrm as was allowed by the law of Minnesota, or that it allowed'the defendant to disrеgard such an assignment after notice. Nor do we perceive any different rule for an assignment of judgment or cause' of action by way of security, which under the Minnesota statute the contract with Holloway, brought to pass. It is true that this security is madе effectual by. requiring payment to the attorney, Davis v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minnesota, 354, 358, and this may be said to result in requiring the judgment debtor to split up the payment. But surely there is nothing in that •liability, seemingly cоmmon to all Minnesota judgments, Wheaton v. Spooner, 52 Minnesota, 417, 423, that introduces an interference with' the Act of Congress that otherwise would not exist. In cases where a partial assignment is рrovided for irrespective of attorneys’ fees we. *634 should not expect tо hear the suggestion of such a point. The whole case is simply that the State аllows the attorney employed to collect a claim to be subrogated to the rights of the claimant so far as to secure the attorney’s fees. We see no reason why it should not.
Judgment affirmed.