This is аn original proceeding in this court to compel Mrs. Mike Holm, secretary of state, to place petitioner’s name on the ballot as a candidate for the Republican nomination for governor in the primary election to be held on September 14, 1954. Petitioner tendered his affidаvit of candidacy together with the filing fee to the secretary of state on July 21,1954. After the refusal of the secretary of state to acceрt the affidavit and filing fee, petitioner, pursuant to M. S. A. 202.08, applied to the chief justice of this court for an order directing the secretary of state to place petitioner’s name on
The premise upon whiсh the secretary of state bases her refusal to permit petitioner to file as a candidate for the Republican nomination for govеrnor is that petitioner is disqualified to be a candidate for that office in the 1954 elections by Minn. Const, art. 4, § 9, which provides:
“No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he is elected, hold any office under the authority of the United States or the State of Minnesota, except that оf postmaster, and no senator or representative shall hold an office under the state which has been created or the emoluments оf which have been increased during the session of the legislature of which he was a member, until one year after the expiration of his term of offiсe in the legislature.” (Italics supplied.)
Petitioner was elected state senator from the 62nd legislative district at the general election on November 7, 1950, and qualifiеd for said office on January 2, 1951. He continues to hold said office and was a member of the legislature during the 1951 regular session which enacted L. 1951, c. 712.' Chapter 712 amended M. S. A. 350.02 to increase the salary of the governor to $15,000, thereby increasing the emoluments of that office within the meaning of art. 4, § 9, of thе constitution. The secretary of state contends that since petitioner’s four-year term as a state senator will not expire until January 1955 and оne year will not have elapsed after the expiration of his term before he would take office as governor if successful in the
The principal contention advanced by petitioner in opposition to the secretary of state’s position is that the words “expiration of his term of office in the legislature” fоund in art. 4, § 9, are ambiguous and invite judicial construction. The substance of his argument is that art. 4, § 24, which now fixes the term of office of state senators at four years, prescribed only a two-year term for that office from the time our constitution was adopted until it was amended to its present form in 1877. Petitioner argues that it is not clear whether art. 4, § 9, in disqualifying a senator from holding an office, the emoluments of which have been increased during the session of the legislature of which he was a member “until one year after the expiration of his term of office,” refers to the original two-year term or to thе present four-year term prescribed by art. 4, § 24. He urges us to resolve this alleged ambiguity by holding that despite the amendment to art. 4, § 24, the words “term of officе” in art. 4, § 9, refer to the original two-year term. Under this construction, petitioner’s period of ineligibility to hold the office of governor would last only threе years instead of five, and he would therefore be eligible as a candidate for governor in the primary election to be held on September 14, 1954.
We are unable to accept the construction contended for by petitioner. The plain meaning of the words of art. 4, § 9, permits no rеsort to extraneous interpretation, and leaves little doubt that the drafters of art. 4, § 9, in using the words “term of office” intended to embrace any chаnges in the length of term which might be effected by an amendment to art. 4, § 24. Even assuming that the amendment to art. 4, § 24, created an ambiguity in the meaning of the words “term of office” found in art. 4, § 9, that ambiguity has already been resolved against petitioner’s contentions by prior decisions of this court.
In State ex rel. Childs v. Sutton,
“* * * The time for which he was elected was the entire constitutional term of two years, and, whether he resigned during that time or not, he was not permitted to hold any other office under the authority of this state during such entire term.” (Italics suрplied.)
On two occasions this court has interpreted the precise language in art. 4, § 9, which is controlling here. In both cases the period of disqualification was computed by using the terms of office as they are now defined by art. 4, § 24, (representatives, two years; senators, four years) rather than the terms of office that were prescribed prior to the amendment of 1877 (representatives, one year; senators, two years). In State ex rel. Anderson v. Erickson,
We thereforе conclude that the secretary of state rightly refused to receive petitioner’s filing as a candidate for the nomination for governor in the primary to be held September 14, 1954.
The order to show cause is discharged.
Notes
It is ordered that the order to show cause issued herein on the 21st day of July, 1954, be and the same is hereby discharged. A formal opinion will follow.
Dated July 29, 1954.
BY THE COURT
ROGER L. DELL
Chief Justice.