The plaintiff, Charles A. Dickey, was injured in an accident on December 2, 1964, when Matthew Meier, an agent and employee of Katherine Meier, backed a pickup truck into another vehicle pinning the plaintiff between the vehicles. The issues on appeal involve the nature and effect of “a special and restrictеd release” releasing and discharging Matthew Meier from liability for the *421 personal injuries to the plaintiff but specifically reserving any and all claims which the plaintiff might havе against Katherine Meier. The district court found that the release by operation of law discharged the liability of both Katherine and Matthew Meier and dismissed the action.
Following the accident of December 2, 1964, both Matthew Meier and Katherine Meier died. The plaintiff filed claims against both the estates and the claims, were disаllowed by the county court. Appeals were then perfected to the district court. While the cases were pending in the district court, the plaintiff, upon payment of $6,250, executed a “special and restricted release and indemnifying agreement” to Matthew Meier, deceased, which released and forever discharged Matthew Meier, deceased, his heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns, “and all other persons, firms or corporations, who are оr who may be liable for any claims of any kind or character, demands, rights or causes of action of whatsoever kind or nature, foreseen and unforeseen, developed and undeveloped, especially because of bodily and personal injury to said Charles A. Dickey * * * reserving, however, all claims, demands and causes of action * * * against said Katherine Meier, deceased.” The release also agreed to indemnify and hold harmless Matthew Meier, deceased, and his rеpresentatives and assigns “against loss from any further claims, demands or actions that may hereafter, at any time, be made or brought against them or either of them for thе purpose of enforcing any further claim for damages, reimbursement, contributions, or otherwise * * * in consequence of said accident, it being understood that this includes particularly, any claims of Katherine Meier, deceased, her personal representatives, heirs * * A separate paragraph repeats the statement that the release is a special and restricted release releasing only Matthew Meier, deceased, his personal representativеs and heirs and reserving any and all claims against Katherine Meier, *422 deceased, her personal representatives and heirs.
The action against the estate of Matthew Meier was thereafter dismissed with prejudice. In the aсtion against the estate of Katherine Meier with which we are concerned, the foregoing release and settlement with Matthew Meier were established. The рleadings and answers to requests for admissions also establish that the only basis of liability against the estate of Katherine Meier rests on the doctrine of respondeаt superior. There is no allegation or evidence of any independent negligence of Katherine Meier, the employer-principal, and the sole negligence was that of Matthew Meier, the employee-agent, who has been released and discharged.
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the рleadings and responses to requests for admissions. The motion was sustained by the trial court, and the action dismissed.
The plaintiff contends that under the circumstances herе Matthew Meier and Katherine Meier were joint tort-feasors, and that in such a situation release and discharge of one joint tort-feasor on settlement and рayment of damages is not a defense to an action against another unless it was agreed between the parties to the settlement that such payment was in full satisfaction of all damages suffered. Authority for the latter portion of plaintiff’s contention rests on Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co., 89 Neb, 393,
The critical factor, however, is that Matthew Meier and Katherine Meier were not joint tort-feasors under the facts hеre. Plaintiff relies on the case of S.M.S. Trucking Co. v. Midland Vet, Inc.,
Courts generally have not made this distinction or have followed rules applicable to true joint tort-feasors even though recognizing the distinction. See Annotation, Release of (or covenant not to sue) master or principal as affecting liability of servant or agent for tort, or vice versa, 92 A. L. R. 2d 533, at page 536 et seq.
Where the doctrinе of respondeat superior has been involved, many cases make no distinction between releases and covenants not to sue. There are also сases which can be cited in support of a great variety of interpretations as to the effect of a release by an employer or an employee on the liability of the other where *424 the cause of action is in tort and the liability is founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Consideration of the many and divergent legal principles and the practical problems in multiplicity of litigation and in determining whether satisfaction was full or only partial, all lead us to the view adopted by most courts which have considered the issue. See Annotation, 20 A. L. R. 2d 1044. We hold that in a tort action based exclusively on the alleged negligence оf an employee or agent, a valid release of that employee-agent releases the employer or prinicpal from liability, even though the release specifically reserves all claims against the employer-principal. See, Max v. Spaeth,
The action of the district court was correct and is affirmed.
Affirmed.