Dickerson v. StateDickerson v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Pivarnik
Defendant-Appellant Lonnie Dickerson was convicted of burglary, a class B felony; burglary, a class A felоny; and attempted murder, a class A felony. The convictions were the result of the consolidated trial оf two causes before a jury in the Vigo Superior Court, Division I. The trial court sentenced Appellant to tеn (10) years plus a ten (10) year enhancement for the class B burglary, thirty (80) years plus a ten (10) year enhancement for the attempted murder, and thirty (30) years plus a ten year enhancement for the class A burglary. All sentencеs were to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of one hundred (100) years.
Appellant‘s direct appeal raises the following issues:
1. whether the convictions were based on sufficient evidence; and 2. whether certain evidence was properly admitted.
Appellant admits that on the evening of December 5, 1983, he was inside the two homes which were burglarized. He also admits committing the class B burglary. However, he denies causing any harm to Clarissa May Kohberger, which hаrm resulted in the attempted murder charge and aggravating the second burglary to a class A felony.
I
Appellant‘s first allegation of error is that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence. Appellant merеly raises this issue at the start of his brief but presents no argument whatsoever. Thus, the issue is waived. Murray v. State (1985), Ind. 479 N.E.2d 1283, 1286, rem. denied (1985); Wagner v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 476, 486. However, in view of the seriousness of these crimes we *348 feel compelled to note that the record cleаrly shows: Dickerson admitted he burglarized two houses, but denied the beating and attempted murder of Clarissa Mae Kоhber-ger. He claims someone else had already broken into her house and that she was lying on her bed mоaning when he entered. The evidence most favorable to the State, however, supports the judgment of convietion. The jury was entitled to disbelieve that someone burglarized and beat Ms. Kohberger prior to Diсkerson‘s entry into her house. The signs of forced entry were a slashed sereen and a window which had been рried open. Both a tire tool and a knife were shown to have been in Dickerson‘s possession. Also, whеn Dickerson entered the house, Ms. Kohberger‘s purse still contained $600.00 which he stole. Most significantly, a witness testifiеd that the day after the crimes Dickerson gave her some of the stolen property and at that time hе had blood on his clothes (a fact corroborated by a police officer) and that his hands werе scuffed. He told the witness he had been in a fight. Ms. Kohber-ger, 86 years old, had been brutally and repeatedly beаten in the face with her assailant‘s fists and was then left helpless and alone. One of her eyes had to be rеmoved, and at the time of the trial, she had not regained her ability to move or communicate. The jury was еntitled to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Dickerson was the assailant and certainly cоuld properly have concluded that he took a substantial step towards the crime of murder.
II
Appеllant next alleges certain evidence was improperly admitted at trial. He first contends State Exhibit No. 88, а knife, was improperly admitted because it was never connected with him and was not admitted by way of a sufficient chain of custody. Furthermore, Appellant seems to be questioning the relevancy of the knife since the victim was not stabbed. Any issue concerning relevancy is waived however, because at trial Appеllant objected solely on the basis of an insufficient chain of custody. Bowens v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 1289, 1291. Regardless, the knife was relevant since it connected the two burglaries with which Appellant was charged, and also showed hоw entry was gained to Kohberger‘s home.
As far as arguing the sufficiency of the chain of custody, Appellant mеrely raises the issue without giving any supporting argument or citation. Thus, this issue is also waived. Reed v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1248, 1253, reh. denied (1985);
Appellant next questions the admission of State‘s Exhibits Nos. 22, 40, 42, and 44. These wеre photographs of a closeup of the victim‘s bed, the left side of the victim‘s head, the right side of her head, and the back of her head respectively. Appellant maintains these photographs werе cumulative, and served only to inflame the jury‘s emotions. An inspection of the photographs at issue reveals each to be a different angle of either the victim‘s head or body. Not only did each reflect a different angle, but each was relevant to the *349 State‘s case in chief, The photographs at issue were properly admitted.
The trial court is in all things affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, SHEPARD and DICKSON, JJ., concur.