157 S.W.2d 825 | Tenn. | 1942
Mary Dickens, deceased, owned a life estate in 1.37 acres of land in Shelby County and conveyed this acreage to defendants for school purposes. Mary Dickens died on December 31, 1939, and complainants, who aver themselves to be her sole heirs at law, filed their ejectment bill herein, on February 6, 1941, to recover possession of the land, together with rentals.
The following allegations appear in the bill:
"Your orators would show that a nice school building has been erected on this site and is known as the Overton Crossing Shelby County School for Negroes. Your orators would show that as a school building it is being used for said school purposes. This said school building and land together are worth several thousand dollars."
The court construed the bill to aver that Mary Dickens conveyed to defendants her life estate in this land, and not the fee. Counsel for complainants now asserts in his petition to rehear that the language of the bill, in this respect, was "a little ambiguous," and he now says that what he meant was that a life estate was all that she had to convey. He quotes adversary counsel to the effect that the deed purported to convey the land in fee simple to defendants. Accepting this as true, then defendants were in possession of the land at the death of Mary Dickens under recorded color of title to the land in fee simple. In this situation, defendants did not at the death of Mary Dickens take the land under the power of eminent domain. On the contrary, defendants held possession under their deed from Mary Dickens. It follows, then, that sections 3131 and 3132 of the Code, the first of which provides for the recovery of the value *307
of land taken under the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the second of which provides that suit must be instituted within twelve months from such taking, have no application.Southern Ry. Co. v. Jennings,
Defendants, as is averred in the bill, are in possession of the land in question for school purposes, having erected a schoolhouse thereon. Defendants, thus occupying the land for purposes of internal improvements, cannot be ousted in ejectment.
In Campbell v. Lewisburg Northern Railroad, supra, 160 Tenn., at page 491, 26 S.W.2d page 145, the court said: "The complainants in this case cannot recover possession of the land, nor can they free it from an inconsistent adverse possession.Saunders v. Memphis R.S. Railroad,
The case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Jennings, supra, relied on by complainant was a suit instituted in a law court to recover damages for the appropriation of the land in question. The case of Chambers v. Chattanooga Union Railroad,
Campbell v. Lewisburg Northern Railroad, supra, was a suit in equity wherein complainants sought to have their rights established in the land in controversy, claimed in fee by the railroad, and for partition. In the alternative, complainants asked for a decree for such damages as they might be entitled to. They were allowed *309 to recover the value of the land at the death of the life tenant, but were not entitled to anything for the value of the improvements placed thereon by the railroad.
In the instant case, we have a pure ejectment bill, which as held in Sanders v. Memphis R.S. Railroad,
As held in the original opinion of the court, the chancery court was without jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and the decree of the chancellor dismissing the same was without error.
Petition to rehear must be denied. *310