Dick v. Attorney GeneralDick v. Attorney General
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Rosellini
Lead Opinion
This case arises under the Consumer Protection Act,
The respondent refused to comply with this demand and the petitioner, acting under the authority of
The respondent appeared in superior court and objected to the petition on several grounds, one of which was that the notice did not allow sufficient time to prepare a defense. Other grounds were that the notice did not sufficiently apprise the respondent of the nature of the complaint against him; that it did not comply with the requirement of
The trial court rejected all of these contentions and ordered the production of the records. The respondent petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari which was granted (Dick v. Attorney General, 9 Wn. App. 586, 513 P.2d 568 (1973)). The Court of Appeals dealt with only one of the respondent’s contentions. It held that, because the respondent’s practice was licensed by the director of licenses under
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
The respondent apparently concedes that his drugless healing practice comes within the definition of trade or commerce as used in this statute. It has been and is his position, however, that his practice is exempted under
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited or regulated under laws administered by the insurance commissioner of this state, the Washington utilities and transportation commission, the federal power commission or any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States: . . .
It is acknowledged by the petitioner that the practice of drugless healing is regulated under
The holder of a license must record it in the county where he resides (
The petitioner first maintains that the director of licenses is not a “regulatory body or officer” within the meaning of
The FTC, however, is not a regulatory body within the meaning ofRCW 19.86.170. The term “other regulatory body” must be construed in light of the preceding terms and the intent of the entire act. The ejusdem generis rule is that specific words or terms modify and restrict the interpretation of general words or terms where both are used in sequence. [Citing cases.] The specific agencies or bodies mentioned in the statute all regulate areas where permission or registration is necessary to engage in an activity. Once the requisite permission is obtained, the activity is subject to monitoring and regulation. The FTC, however, is not such an agency. It has no control over entry into its area of concern. It merely monitors the business practices of those who freely enter its domain. In this respect its position is analogous to that of the United States Attorney General in his capacity of enforcing the anti-trust laws. In State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wn.2d 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964), we concluded that he was not a “regulatory officer” within the meaning ofRCW 19.86.170. We held that “surveillance and enforcement activities undertaken by the federal authorities pursuant to consent decrees” do not make a business “a regulated industry within the meaning of the state act.”
Thus it will be seen that we have, applying the rule of ejusdem generis, held that where an activity is licensed and subject to regulation, that is, where an officer or agency has control over entry into an area of concern, the exemption section applies.
We have stated that the Consumer Protection Act should be liberally construed to effect its purpose, in accordance with the direction contained in
The Court of Appeals held that because the respondent’s practice was regulated generally under the provisions of
[W]e have reason to believe that there is an unauthorized practice in medicine, and that he is prescribing medication without authorization, and that, there are [sic] other unfair and unaccepted practicing by the individual concerned.
The unauthorized practice of medicine is prohibited under
When the respondent showed that his practice was regulated generally under a statute administered by a regulatory officer within the meaning of the act, it became incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the actions or transactions under investigation were not covered by those regulations. Since he did not provide the information necessary to make a determination upon the point, he cannot claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in dismissing the action.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Hale, C.J., and Finley, Hunter, Hamilton, Stafford, Wright, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) — I concur. I assume the Attorney General will have an opportunity to file an amended demand consistent with the language of this opinion.