Diaz v. DiazDiaz v. Diaz
Here, the evidence established, among other things, that the father engaged in a course of conduct which intentionally interfered with the relationship between the children and the mother. Such action is “so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to per se raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as custodial parent” (Matter of Chebuske v Burnhard-Vogt, 284 AD2d 456, 458 [2001]). Thus, the Family Court‘s determination that there had been a change of circumstances since the parties had agreed in October 2007 that the father should have physical custody of the children, and that it was in the children‘s best interests to award sole custody to the mother, had a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Miller v Osik, 94 AD3d 1124 [2012]; Matter of Jones v Leppert, 75 AD3d 552, 553 [2010]; Matter of Lichtenfeld v Lichtenfeld, 41 AD3d 849, 850 [2007]; Matter of Carl J.B. v Dorothy T., 186 AD2d 736 [1992]). Moreover, the Family Court‘s determination was consistent with the position of the attorney for the children, which is entitled to some weight (see Matter of Caravella v Toale, 78 AD3d 828 [2010]; Matter of Kozlowski v Mangialino, 36 AD3d 916, 917 [2007]).
Angiolillo, J.P., Dickerson, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.