Diaz v. DiazDiaz v. Diaz
Although this Court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults in matrimonial actions, it was still incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default in opposing the plaintiff‘s motion, inter alia, for an upward modification of child support, and the existence of a meritorious defense to that motion (see Young Chen v Ruihua Li, 67 AD3d 905, 906 [2009]; Ogazi v Ogazi, 46 AD3d 646 [2007]; Faltings v Faltings, 35 AD3d 350 [2006]; Melish v Melish, 267 AD2d 218 [1999]; French v French, 260 AD2d 430, 431 [1999]). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Young Chen v Ruihua Li, 67 AD3d at 906; Cordova v Cordova, 63 AD3d 982 [2009]; Cooper v Cooper, 55 AD3d 866 [2008]).
Contrary to the defendant‘s contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in concluding that he failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable excuse for defaulting in opposing the plaintiff‘s motion after he had been granted numerous adjournments to submit opposition papers and retain new counsel (see French v French, 260 AD2d at 431).
Since the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default, we need not determine whether he had a meritorious defense to the plaintiff‘s motion (see Young Chen v Ruihua Li, 67 AD3d at 905; Ogazi v Ogazi, 46 AD3d at 249; Matter of Lutz v Goldstone, 31 AD3d 449, 450 [2006]).
Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Angiolillo, Eng and Sgroi, JJ., concur.