OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is co-defendants Limar-is Cruz-Velez, Sergio Rubio-Paredes and Emilio Arill-Garcia’s motion in limine (Docket No. 162). For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART the co-defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2016, co-defendants police officer Limaris Cruz-Velez (“Cruz-Velez”), prosecutor Sergio Rubio-Paredes (“Rubio-Paredes”), supervising district attorney Emiho Arill-Garcia (“Arill-Garcia”) filed a motion in limine seeking two evidentiary rulings prior to the scheduled jury trial: (1) that the court not allow plaintiff Robert Anel Diaz-Morales (hereinafter “Plaintiff’ or “Diaz-Morales”) to use the content of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s (PRSC) sentence of acquittal, namely, Pueblo v. Robert Anel Diaz Morales, CC-2006-532 (PRSC May 9, 2012), for purposes of establishing that the defendants lacked probable cause to prosecute him or that government witness Jose Luis Delgado (“Delgado”) was mendacious; (2) that the court preclude the Plaintiff from using the complaints contained in Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) administrative files against co-defendant Cruz-Velez because it is inadmissible character evidence. See Docket No. 162.
During a hearing held on June 14, 2016, Plaintiff opposed the defendants’ motion. In short, it argued that the PRSC sentence of acquittal established that Delgado’s testimony deserved no credibility, a fact that this court should take notice of here. The Plaintiff also claimed that, as stated in its portion of the joint proposed Pre-Trial Order, he only foresees using Cruz-Velez’s PRPD employee file for impeachment purposes, see Docket No. 149 at pages 99-100, and defendants cannot be allowed to curtail his right to potentially impeach Cruz-Velez by means of a motion in limine.
During the hearing, the court reserved its holding on the motion. See Docket No. 196.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Notice
In our Opinion and Order of March 21, 2016, the undersigned took judicial notice of the PRSC’s acquittal of plaintiff Diaz-
In his oral argument in opposition, the Plaintiff relied on Olsen v. Correiro,
In the case at hand, taking judicial notice that the Plaintiff was eventually acquitted is relevant and central to his claim of malicious prosecution. This is so because one of the elements of such a claim is establishing that the criminal proceedings in question terminated in the plaintiffs favor. See Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor,
First, the Moore court feared that allowing the use of the prior judicial opinion posed the significant risk that the jury would give undue weight to the judicial findings contained therein. Citing the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court stated that “ ‘[a] lay jury is quite likely to give special weight to judicial findings merely because they are judicial findings,’ ” Moore,
Second, the Moore court noted the confusion that may ensue from the different legal standard a juror must apply to the evidence in a criminal case versus the matter at hand. Whereas the evidence in a criminal case needs to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction, a jury here must examine the evidence available to them in light of the probable cause standard. The Moore court adequately noted that “[t]he impressions of the evidence contained in the [prior judicial] Opinion, however, might have colored the jurors’ evaluation and led them to conclude improperly that the evidence was insufficient to show probable cause because the same evidence was insufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal.” Id. at 144. The court thus concluded that even a “cautionary instruction would not overcome the unfair prejudice of admitting the prior judicial opinion because of both the nature of the evidence and its judicial source.” Id. at 145.
“Rule 403 ‘requires the trial court to exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by ‘the danger of unfair prejudice.’ ” United States v. Peake,
Persuaded by our sister court in Moore given the similar factual circumstances under which its decision was reached, we hereby GRANT the co-defendants’ motion in limine and take judicial notice of the PRSC’s sentence for the limited purpose of establishing that the criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff eventually resulted in his acquittal. However, the court finds it would be improperly prejudicial to provide a copy to or read it before the jury for the same reasons stated in Moore.
B. Cruz-Velez’s employee record with the PRPD
The defendants also seek to preclude the Plaintiff from using Cruz-Velez’s file as an employee of the PRPD during the jury trial. They contend that it constitutes impermissible character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See Docket No. 162 at pages 6-9. In response, the Plaintiff argued it may only use it for impeachment purposes, not to establish evidence of her character or a particular character trait.
Rule 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Nevertheless, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
While evidence may be deemed inadmissible on that basis, the court must be mindful of Rule 404’s interplay with Rule 608, which allows, on cross-examination only, inquiry into specific instances of conduct if “probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” United States v. Cudlitz,
As part of the test to determine if evidence of prior bad acts should be admitted during the trial of a case, “the trial court must perform a Rule 403 balancing test to determine whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v. Paniagua-Ramos,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the co-defendants’ motion in limine (Docket No. 162) is GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,