Diaz-Martinez v. Warden of Florida Soft Side South (Alligator Alcatraz)

Aug 5, 2026

2:26-cv-01102

ORDER

Petitioner Alejandro Diaz-Martinez is a Cuban citizen with a final removal order. He was recently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He argues that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment as interpreted in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and that he has not been afforded procedural due process since his supervision was revoked. (Doc. 1.) The Government opposes the petition (Doc. 6), and Diaz-Martinez replied (Doc. 7.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. Legal Framework

The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

II. Discussion

The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6).

But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 679. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Applied here, Diaz-Martinez cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. He has been in immigration custody since February 12, 2026. Because he has been detained for less than six months, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025). Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any substantive due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”).

Diaz-Martinez also presses a procedural due process claim. (Doc. 1 at 23.) But it’s not entirely clear which process he failed to receive, and it isn’t clear that Diaz-Martinez is entitled to a freestanding due process analysis at this time. When the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional perils of indefinite immigration detention in Zadvydas v. Davis, it did not instruct lower courts to start weighing the process afforded to the detainee. It set a timer. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). So until that timer goes off, Zadvydas itself supplies the constitutional metric. Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the Zadvydas standard is due process: a § 1231 detainee who fails the Zadvydas test fails to prove a due process violation.” Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 760 (4th Cir. 2024). Because Diaz-Martinez’s detention has not met the six-month threshold, he is not yet entitled to anything more.

Finally, Diaz-Martinez argues the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act when it revoked his supervised release. The difficulty here is twofold. First, Diaz-Martinez has brought this claim in a habeas petition, which is the wrong vehicle for the job. The writ of habeas corpus exists to challenge the fact or duration of physical confinement. It is not a catch-all funnel for standard administrative grievances. Trying to shoehorn a freestanding APA challenge into a habeas petition simply does not work. See Fleurimond v. Noem, No. CV-26-00037-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 507542, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2026). A habeas petition comes with a streamlined procedure, fast-tracked rules, and a nominal filing fee. An APA challenge, by contrast, is a standard civil action with a heftier filing fee and following the ordinary, more deliberate pace of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Litigants cannot sidestep those standard requirements by simply slapping a habeas label on an administrative complaint. See Alvarez v. Noem, No. 5:26-CV-0013-JKP, 2026 WL 93972, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2026); Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing legal distinction between habeas cases and civil actions brought under APA, which have different filing fees and exhaustion provisions).

Second, the APA itself leaves no room for this claim. The APA operates as a fallback option, providing a right of judicial review only when “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. But Diaz-Martinez has an adequate remedy—the very habeas petition he filed to get through the courthouse doors. See Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Because the writ of habeas corpus provides a fully adequate avenue to test the legality of his custody—which is the only thing Diaz-Martinez is challenging here—the APA simply leaves no room for this redundant claim. See Fleurimond, 2026 WL 507542, at *3; Rivera v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-01289 KWR-KBM, 2026 WL 381309, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026).

Diaz-Martinez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 5, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge