Diaz Flores v. AshcroftDiaz Flores v. Ashcroft
Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, Hillel Smith, Washington, DC, Kenneth L. Pasquarell, Acting District Director, San Antonio, TX, Terri Jane Scadron, Washington, DC, Caryl G. Thompson, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.
John Ashcroft, Washington, DC, pro se.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner Juan de Dios Diaz Flores (“Diaz Flores“) appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA“) denial of his application for asylum and order of removal to Diaz Flores‘s home country of Honduras.
In February 2000 Juan de Dios Diaz Flores (“Diaz-Flores“) fled Honduras and traveled to the United States seeking asylum. In March 2000 he was detained by immigration officers as he attempted to enter the United States. At that time he sought political asylum and his petition was set for hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ“). After the hearing, the IJ held that the petitioner had not satisfied his burden of proving past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution as required to receive asylum.
At his evidentiary hearing Diaz Flores testified that he and his family received frequent death threats from 1990 to 2000 for petitioner‘s participation in a hospital workers union and a dissenting political party. Several of Diaz Flores‘s colleagues in the political party were killed between 1997 and 2000, and petitioner finally made the decision to flee Honduras when a close colleague was killed in early 2000.
Although the IJ found Diaz Flores‘s testimony credible, some of that testimony is undermined by facts petitioner presented to the IJ. First, Diaz Flores remained in Honduras for ten years after he first received death threats, and despite receiving numerous threats he only notified the authorities of the threats and intimidation on two occasions. Second, Diaz Flores‘s family has remained in Honduras since petitioner left in February 2000; they have received no death threats and have not been harmed.
Although the IJ concluded that petitioner‘s testimony was generally credible, he was concerned about petitioner‘s unexplained failure to produce evidence from friends, family and other union officials to corroborate the threats to him or the harm to colleagues. Because of petitioner‘s unexplained failure to produce this evidence, the IJ concluded that petitioner failed to carry his burden of proof to establish that he had suffered persecution in the past or had a well founded fear of persecution.
We owe deference to the findings of the IJ and BIA, reviewing their factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. In reviewing for substantial evidence we must uphold the BIA‘s or IJ‘s factual findings “unless the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find otherwise.” Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the BIA‘s decision denying asylum is supported by substantial evidence.2
AFFIRMED.
David V. Bernal, Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, Washington, DC, Kenneth L. Pasquarell, Acting District Director, San Antonio, TX, Regina Byrd, Washington, DC, Caryl G. Thompson, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.
John Ashcroft, Washington, DC, pro se.
PER CURIAM:*
Kol Mapku, also known as Kole Marku, petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA“) decision affirming the Immigration Judge‘s (“IJ“) denial of his motion to reopen deportation proceedings. Mapku argues that: (1) the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ‘s decision, (2) equitable tolling should apply to his case, and (3) that his due process rights were violated when the BIA adopted the reasoning of the IJ and affirmed the IJ‘s decision.
Mapku has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the denial of his motion to reopen. See Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 2000). As the operation of a statute of limitations is not at issue in this case, Mapku‘s equitable tolling argument is without merit. See United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, Mapku‘s due process argument is unavailing. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.