177 S.W. 955 | Tex. | 1915
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
From the opinion and the briefs and argument of parties, we make the following statement of facts as they were presented to the jury on behalf of the plaintiff, Duncan.
The Court of Civil Appeals said that the evidence was conflicting and, it being conflicting, we must adopt that statement which is most favorable to Duncan, in whose favor the jury found on the issues presented. We
The facts were submitted to the jury, and the jury found in favor of Duncan. Therefore, we must act upon this case on the assumption that the facts were as Duncan claimed and as the jury found, and must apply the law to them as if there were no controversy, because the questions of fact being settled, this court can not affect the credibility of the witnesses or anything of that character.
We restate the proposition which is before us and which contains the only issue that is presented to us in this case, thus: Diamond, an insurance broker, undertook to keep the property of Duncan insured, and having it insured in a company that failed, and of which failure he had knowledge, did not give notice to Duncan of such failure or take steps to procure substitute insurance.
We find on our application docket an entry to the effect that Diamond was not liable for the $200. We have examined the matter carefully, and find no ground for difference in liability for the $1500 and his liability for the $200. The duty to reinsure each was the same, and upon failure, the liability must be the same. In fact, the failure, of the insurance company is of no importance in this case, for if it had continued to be solvent and the policies had expired, the failure to reinsure would have imposed the same liability upon Diamond as attaches under the facts before us.
If Diamond had pleaded his right to a credit for the amount that it would have cost Duncan to reinsure the property, he might have been entitled to have that sum deducted, but the question is not before us properly. It was not presented in the trial court; in fact, it appears first in the application for writ of error.
We find nothing to justify this court in reversing the judgment of the District Court. It is ordered that the judgments of the District Court and the Court of Civil Appeals be and they are affirmed.
Rehearing
OH MOTIOH FOE EEHEABIHG.
delivered the opinion of the court.
It was erroneously stated in the opinion of the late Chief Justice rendered upon the original hearing of the case, that the smaller of the two policies of insurance involved,—the one for $200, had expired before the fire occurred. This policy did not expire, according to its terms, until about three months after the destruction of the property by fire. Hnder the findings of the jury, however, -this circumstance does not in our opinion relieve the plaintiff in error of liability for the loss sustained by Duncan because of the worthlessness of the policy.
We should possibly advert to one other matter. It is again urged by the plaintiff in error in his motion that the judgment in Duncan’s favor for the loss sustained by him on account of Diamond’s failure to comply with his agreement to renew the former’s policies, as found by the jury, ought now to be reversed because of the charge on the measure of dam
We are still inclined to the view that this was defensive matter and ought to have been pleaded. Right-of-Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, etc., Co., 106 Texas, 94, 157 S. W., 737, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.), 268. It should not be overlooked that the policies were in fact issued by Diamond as the insurance agent, and the cause of action arose upon his agreement, substantially, to maintain the insurance on the property in that amount, the worthlessness of the policies within his knowledge, and his failure to notify Duncan that they had become worthless. If Duncan had not paid for them, Diamond was, of course, entitled to offset the amount of the premiums; but we think it was incumbent upon him to make the plea. ■
If the proof was admissible in mitigation of the damages on the general issue, without the necessity of a pleading, it is clear that the burden was upon Diamond to make it. He was an insurance agent. Duncan was not. The cost of the insurance or the amount of the premiums was a fact peculiarly within his knowledge. Certainly he was in better position to know what the amount was than Duncan. It is elementary law that the burden of proof is on him who best knows the facts, or in whose knowledge the fact peculiarly lies. I Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 79; Byan v. Railway Co., 65 Texas, 13, 57 Am. Bep., 589. In his brief in the Court of Civil Appeals Diamond contended that there was no sufficient proof to sIioav what the amount of the premiums was, and that therefore the alleged error could not be cured by remittitur. Since the burden was upon him to make the proof, and, according to his contention,-there was no proof on the question, the charge of the court was not erroneous in failing to submit it. The requested instruction for a peremptory verdict proceeded upon the theory that Duncan had failed to make out his case in having omitted to make this proof; and for the same reason the trial court correctly refused it.
This case Avas tried in January, 1910. The judgment in Duncan’s favor was affirmed in the Court of Civil Appeals on June 3, 1911. A writ of error was granted by this court October 5, 1911. The case was decided here, affirming both judgments, January 27, 1915. At best, the amount of the premiums was trivial in comparison with the amount properly in controversy. We overrule the contention of the plaintiff in error on the question for the reasons Ave have stated. But if the question
With the correction noted in the original opinion the motion for re- j hearing is overruled. . j
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING OPINION ON MOTION EOR REHEARING.
delivered the following dissenting opinion:
Plaintiff in error complains that the charge to the jury assumed, as a matter of law, that Diamond was under the affirmative duty of notifying Duncan of the insolvency of Traders Insurance Co., or of procuring for Duncan new and solvent insurance. I find no merit in that contention, inasmuch as “renew” in the charge was apparently used by the trial court and understood by the jury as including keeping up the insurance, in a solvent company. And it seems to have been so treated by the Court of Civil Appeals.
However, the charge of the court on the measure of damages was clearly erroneous in permitting recovery of the full amount of insurance which, under the jury’s finding, Diamond should have had kept in force for Duncan. From that sum should have been deducted the amount of the premiums which such substitute insurance would have cost Duncan. His recoverable. damages, if any, should be merely compensatory.
The amount of such premiums was not established by the evidence; consequently, the amount which Duncan was entitled to recover was not established; wherefore plaintiff failed to make out his case. Logically, then, defendant’s requested special charge Ho. 1, directing a verdict for defendant, should have been given. This point was duly presented in the motion for new trial, and in the assignments of error filed in the trial court, and in appellant’s' brief in the Court of Civil Appeals, at p. 54, et seq., under “Second Assignment of Error” (Ho. 5; in Tr.), and four distinct propositions thereunder, and was also duly presented to this court. The establishment of the proper measure of damages being an essential and affirmative part of Duncan’s case, there rested upon Diamond no duty of pleading or proving what the cost of the premium for such substitute insurance would have been. I do not consider the cost thereof a matter so peculiarly within the knowledge of Diamond as to constitute an exception to the general rule, nor as bringing this case within the rule which this court announced in Right-of-Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mf’g Co., 106 Texas, 94, 157 S. W., 736, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.), 268, in which this court said:
“If, however, the person who produced the oil acted in good faith, he would be entitled to have deducted the cost of bringing it to the surface and to the market. The contention of plaintiff in error is in effect that the owner must concede the good faith of the trespasser and prove that which is known only to his adversary, the cost of producing the oil.” (Italics mine.)
Here, it seems to me, it would have been easy for the plaintiff to have proved what the substitute insurance would have cost Duncan.
My present strong conviction is that the rule announced in the cited case ought not -to be applied to the facts of this case—although I confess that, since this motion was filed, I have been unable to find opportunity for going thoroughly into that question. I think that, at least, the motion for a rehearing should be granted.