272 S.W. 31 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1925
Reversing.
Whether or not appellee is entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act on account of the death of her husband, H.H. Sparks, depends on whether at the time of his death he was an employee of the appellant herein or doing work for it as an independent contractor. The Workmen's Compensation Board found that he was an employee and awarded compensation, *74 which award was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court.
There is no dispute concerning the facts, and therefore the question on the facts is one of law, and the finding of the board under such circumstances is a finding of law which may be reviewed by this court. Bates Rogers Construction Co. v. Allen,
*76"The fact that the person for whom work is being done, or the owner of the property, directs what shall be done, and the kind or quality of material to be used, and exercises a general superintendency over the work to see that it is done properly and according to contract, will not create the relation of master and servant between him and the contractor engaged to do the work or the laborers under the contractor. Or, as said by some of the authorities, if the owner or person having the work done engages a contractor, 'who represents the will of his employer or owner only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished,' or if the contractor 'furnishes his own assistants, and executes the work, either entirely according to his own ideas, or in accordance with the plans previously given to him by the person for whom the work is being done, without being subject to the orders of the latter in respect to the details of the work,' the person engaged to do the work will be regarded as an independent contractor."
In Borderland Coal Co. v. Burchett,
"The rule is, if the contractor furnishes his own assistance, and executes the work either entirely according to his own interests or according to plans previously given him by the person for whom the work is to be done, without being subject to the orders of the latter in respect to the details of the work, the person so engaged will be regarded as an independent contractor, and the laborers he employs will be his servants, and not the servants of the owner of the property.
"This rule is not changed by the fact that, by agreement, the person for whom the work is being done advances to the contractor pay for his employees, and actually pays them, charging the amount paid to the contractor as against the specified contract price."
See also White v. Olive Hill Fire Brick Co.,
Applying the principles above laid down, it is perfectly plain that appellee's decedent was an independent contractor. He was not subject to discharge without cause by appellant. He had the right to employ his own assistants, to pay them what he pleased, and to direct how and when they should work. He was not required to work any specific number of hours a day or any particular day. The details of his work were left to his discretion and the manner of his payment was not inconsistent with the relationship of independent contractor. He was employed to do a specific piece of work for guaranteed compensation according to plans and specifications furnished him, but how he should do the work, and the assistants he should employ, and when he should do the work, was all left to his discretion. As he was an independent contractor, appellee is not entitled to compensation, and the award of the board affirmed by the circuit court is erroneous. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, with instructions to enter an order directing the board to dismiss appellee's application.
Judgment reversed. *77