DELLA DIAL, A. C. JOHNSON, NANCY NORFLEET, CONSTANCE TAYLOR, ABRAHAM WASHINGTON, GEORGIA M. WOODS, LAURA B. WASHINGTON, v. HEALTHSPRING OF ALABAMA, INC., MARCUS TROTTER,
No. 07-15529
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
August 26, 2008
D. C. Docket No. 07-00412-CV-2-KD-C; [PUBLISH]
versus
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question whether a complaint about conduct regulated by the Medicare Act filed in a state court may be removed to a federal court. Seven individual beneficiaries of the federal Medicare program filed a complaint against Healthspring of Alabama, Inc., the administrator of a Medicare Advantage health-insurance plan. Healthspring removed the case to a federal court and asserted that the complaint is “founded on a claim or right arising under the . . . laws of the United States,”
I. BACKGROUND
Della Dial, A.C. Johnson, Nancy Porter Norfleet, Constance Taylor, Abraham Washington, Laura B. Washington, and Georgia M. Woods are beneficiaries of Medicare, a social-security program that provides federally-subsidized health insurance and is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The benefits available under Medicare are prescribed by law and divided into four “parts.” Part A provides hospital, skilled nursing, home health, and hospice care benefits. Part B provides physician and other outpatient services. Part D provides outpatient prescription drug benefits. The traditional Medicare structure allows beneficiaries access to Parts A, B, and D as separate benefits. Part C provides beneficiaries with an option to instead obtain the benefits available under Parts A and B as well as some additional benefits through a health insurance plan, known as a “Medicare Advantage Plan,” administered by a private company. See generally Matthews v. Leavitt, 452 F.3d 145, 147 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006).
Dial and the other six persons had been beneficiaries under Parts A and B of Medicare until 2005, when they enrolled in a Medicare Advantage Plan
The beneficiaries filed a complaint against Healthspring in the Circuit Court of Perry County, Alabama. The complaint asserts twelve counts, which are phrased as claims under Alabama law. The complaint also states that “[t]he Plaintiffs make no claims pursuant to any Federal Law, nor do the Plaintiffs make any claims which would give rise to Federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claims arise solely from state law.”
Healthspring removed the action to the federal district court under the general federal-question removal statute,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the denial of a motion to remand. Florence v. Crescent Res., L.L.C., 484 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Healthspring removed this action under the general federal-question removal
Ordinarily, “[t]o determine whether [a] claim arises under federal law, we examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and ignore potential defenses.” Anderson, 539 U.S. at 6, 123 S. Ct. at 2062. The complaint expressly alleges only state-law claims, but Healthspring argues that the complaint contains claims that fall within an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule that applies “when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption.” Id. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 2063. Complete preemption occurs when a federal statute both preempts state substantive law and “provides the exclusive cause of action for the claim asserted.” Id. at 8, 123 S. Ct. at 2063. Healthspring argues that the Medicare Act expressly preempts state substantive
The wrinkle in this appeal is that the only source of federal law that Healthspring invokes in support of removal is the Medicare Act, which “strips federal courts of primary federal-question subject matter jurisdiction” over claims that arise under that Act. Cochran, 391 F.3d at 779 (citing
Because the plaintiffs’ action is not a “civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,” the action is not removable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The denial of the plaintiffs’ motion to remand is REVERSED. We REMAND to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the state court from which it was removed.
REVERSED and REMANDED.