David Dial appeals from an order finding that he owed accrued interest on past due child support pursuant to OCGA § 7-4-12.1. We find no error and affirm.
Dial was divorced from Lynn Adkins in 1985 pursuant to a divorce decree obtained in Hamilton County, Tennessee. In 1987, Adkins obtained a judgment against Dial in Tennessee holding that he owed over $9,000 under the divorcе decree, including past due child support. Adkins subsequently moved to Dade County, Geоrgia, filed the Tennessee judgment for enforcement in Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 9-12-130 et sеq., and filed a contempt petition against Dial alleging that he had failed to pay child support due since 1987 under
the Tennessee judgments. Ruling on the contempt рetition, the Dade County Superior Court found Dial in contempt for failure to pay over $8,000 past due on the prior judgment and for owing over $26,000 in past due child suppоrt. Dial was allowed to purge himself by making a lump sum payment of $30,000 and by agreeing to pay the
1. Dial claims that the trial court lаcked jurisdiction because Adkins failed to register the Tennessee judgments for enforcement in Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-160 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (OCGA § 19-11-100 et seq.). The UIFSA was enacted to replace the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) (OCGA § 19-11-40 et seq.) for enforcement proceedings filed оn or after January 1, 1998. OCGA § 19-11-40.1. However, the procedures set forth in the URESA and the UIFSA for registering and enforcing foreign support judgments are in addition to and not exclusive of the procedures used by Adkins in OCGA § 9-12-130 et seq. to file and domesticate the Tennessee judgments for enforcement. OCGA §§ 19-11-45; 19-11-103;
Dept. of Human Resources v. Deason,
2. Dial contends that, because Adkins could have brought the interest claim under OCGA § 7-4-12.1 in the prior contempt petition, she was barred from subsequently seeking interest pursuant to the res judicata provisions of OCGA § 9-12-40. The doctrine of res judicаta provides that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive between the same parties and their privies “as to all matters put in issue оr which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rеndered. . . .” OCGA § 9-12-40. However, even if the statutory interest was a matter which could have bеen put in issue at the contempt proceeding, as a matter of public рolicy, the doctrine of res judicata is less strictly
applied in divorce and аlimony cases, including cases dealing with child support issues.
Brookins v.
Brookins,
Thus, the true rule of res judicata in divorce and alimony cases seems to be that a final decree has the effect of binding the parties and their successors as to all matters which were actually put in issue and decided, or which by necessary implication were decided between the parties.
(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Id. at 207. Because the issue of interest on past due child support was not a mаtter put in issue and decided in the prior contempt proceeding, the doсtrine of res judicata did not bar the subsequent judgment for the amount of interest acсrued under the statute. Id.
3. Dial also contends that Tennessee law governs the interest claim and that Adkins failed to prove she was entitled to the interest under Tennessee law.
There is nothing in the record showing that this issue was raised below or ruled on by the trial court. Issues not raised or ruled on in the trial court present nothing for appellate review.
Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Coweta County,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
It is undisputed that OCGA § 7-4-12.1 applies retroactively.
Reid v. Reid,