Pеtitioner Jaezef Adward Diab (“Petitioner”) seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision to affirm the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his petition for relief from removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture *38 (“CAT”). 1 Finding Petitioner has neither established past persecution based оn a protected category, nor a well-founded fear of future persecution, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an Egyptian national and a Coptic Christian. Coptic Christians are a religious minority in Egypt and historically have been the victims of discrimination by local Egyptian officials as well as Muslim extremists. The Egyptian nationаl government, however, has taken affirmative steps to limit such religious discrimination over the past few years.
Petitioner resided in Egypt until 1988, at which time he moved to Greece ostensibly to escape religious persecution. He arrived in the United States on January 12, 1997, and filed a petition for asylum on March 28,1998.
In suppоrt of his application for asylum, Petitioner testified before an Asylum Officer (“AO”) that, while he resided in Egypt, he was often confronted by Muslims who asked (and attempted to bribe) him to convert to Islam. Petitioner claimed that, in 1973 and 1975, while he was attending school, he was physically attacked on account of his religion by men that he believed to be Muslim. Petitioner further testified that, while in the army in 1982, a group of soldiers beat him when he refused to convert to Islam.
Petitioner further testified that one year after moving to Greece, a Muslim extremist named Hussein stabbed him thirty-three times in his home. Petitioner claimed that he spent two weeks in a Greek hospitаl as a result of his injuries and that Hussein was sentenced to ten years in prison for his crime. In his application, Petitioner noted that Hussein’s sentence was nearly complete, and that Petitioner had fled to the United States because he feared that either Hussein or one of his associates would attempt tо harm him upon Hussein’s release.
Petitioner also testified that he returned to Egypt in 1993 for twenty-three days to renew his passport, which was cheaper to renew in Egypt, and returned again in 1995, staying for twenty-five days in order to renew his visa for his stay in Greece. In December of 1996, Petitioner returned yet again, this time for a ten day visit with his mother.
The AO determined that Petitioner was not credible because his testimony was internally inconsistent, inconsistent with his written application, and vague. Specifically, the AO found that Petitioner’s testimony of the incidents in Egypt did not contain the substantive detail that a credible witness would be able to provide, and that Petitioner did not mention any of the specific assaults in Egypt in his application — he only described the attack in Greece. The AO was also concerned that material aspects of the account of the attack in Greece contained in Petitioner’s application were missing from his testimony. The AO’s report, which recommended that Petitioner’s application for asylum be denied, was sent to the IJ for use at the removal proceedings.
During the removal proceedings, Petitioner submitted various news articles and country condition reports detailing the abuse of Coptic Christians by Muslim extremists in Egypt. Petitioner also sub *39 mittеd an article, in Greek, that purportedly describes the knife attack. 2 When Petitioner testified before the IJ, he again asserted that he was afraid to return to Egypt because of Islamic fundamentalists generally, as well as of Hussein and his associates in particular. 3 The IJ, like the AO, found Petitioner not credible. Primarily, thе IJ doubted Petitioner’s expressed fear of returning to Egypt, given that he had returned in 1993, 1995, and 1996 for extended periods of time. In addition, the IJ found that Petitioner had not provided sufficient corroborating evidence. Petitioner submitted no hospital records or evidence corroborative of the specific allеgations he made about his persecution in Egypt or the attack in Greece. The IJ denied Petitioner relief from removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) and 1158(a), withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and protection under CAT. The BIA issued an order summarily affirming the IJ’s decision, and Petitioner filed this timely petition for judicial review.
II. DISCUSSION
While this case involves judicial review of a decision by the BIA, when the BIA summarily affirms an IJ’s opinion, we review the IJ’s analysis.
See El Moraghy v. Ashcroft,
In order to qualify for asylum, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that he is a “refugee” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1);
Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft,
A. Past Persecution
To establish past persecution, Petitioner must demonstrate either through credible testimony, or a combination of testimony and corroborative evidence, that he was persecuted on the basis of his religion.
See
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a)and (b)(1);
El Moraghy,
In addition, the IJ reasonably found that the evidence Petitioner provided did not adequately bolster his credibility.
See Aguilar-Solis,
B. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
We now turn to whether Petitioner has proven a well-founded fear of future persecution. As mentioned above, this require
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ment has both an objective and subjective component.
See Mukamusoni,
1. Objective Fear
Beginning with the objective component, Petitioner must prove that “a reasonable person ... would fear persecution on account of’ his religion.
Nelson,
Although the IJ found Petitioner generally not credible, Petitioner provided supporting evidence in the form of multiple news articles concerning the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt, as well as a 1997 terrorist attack by Muslim fundamentalists in Egypt. 6 Petitioner also supplied country condition reports on Egypt for the years 1995, 1996, 2000, and 2001. The 2000 and 2001 reports state that Muslim extremists continue to persecute religious minorities, specifically Coptic Christians, despite the national government’s efforts to ensure free exercise of religion. The 2000 report also identifies four assaults by Muslim extremists on Coptic Christians, and notes that a trial had commenced that year for the premeditated murder of a Coptic priest by a Muslim extremist. The 1996 report explicitly states that “[tjerrorist violence against Christians was a problem,” and that “[tjerrorist groups seeking to overthrоw the Government and establish an Islamic state continued their attacks on police, Coptic Christians, and tourists.” MB, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Egypt (1997) (emphasis added).
Despite what appears to be helpful background evidence, the IJ devotes one sentence in his opinion summarizing these reports, as well as thе various news articles submitted by Petitioner, concluding that they only “indicate that Moslem fundamentalists are seeking to overthrow the government of Egypt and establish a[n] Islamic fundamentalist government in Egypt.” The IJ also found it significant that none of the articles or country condition reports refer to Petitioner or any of his fаmily by name. But, the correct use of country condition reports is to provide “a
general
description of conditions faced by Coptic Christians in Egypt.”
El Moraghy,
Here, there is simply an “absence of reasoned discussion” by the IJ of whether the country condition reports and articles sufficiently support Pеtitioner’s claim that a “reasonable person” in Petitioner’s shoes as a Coptic Christian living Egypt would fear returning to Egypt. See id. Therefore, we cannot determine if the IJ properly considered this evidence. But because, as we discuss below, Petitioner has failed to establish a subjective fear of perseсution, we need not consider whether the IJ’s cursory review of this documentary evidence was in error. 7 Cf. id. at 205 *42 (remanding in light of misuse of country condition reports and the absence of key findings in IJ’s discussion of both past persecution and fear of future persecution).
2. Subjective Fear
To prove a well-founded fear of future perseсution, Petitioner also must demonstrate a subjective fear of persecution.
Velasquez,
We begin, yet again, with the fact that the IJ reasonably found Petitioner’s testimony not credible. The IJ noted Petitioner’s inability to explain why he returned to Egypt on three occasions despite his apparent fear of “imminent death” if he were to return there now. While returning to onе’s native country does not automatically refute the possibility of having a genuine fear,
see, e.g., Mukamusoni,
The petition for judicial review is DENIED.
Notes
. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231. While Petitioner appeals the BIA's ruling concerning his CAT claim, he makes no mention of this claim except within his statement of issues, and therefore we will not consider it upon appeal.
See Strahan v. Coxe,
. The article’s apparent translation, written in рen on notebook paper and not in complete sentences, does not name Petitioner; it refers to the victim of the attack as "County Joseph Di from Cairo.” The translation also asserts that the victim was stabbed nineteen times, not thirty-three. Respondent questions both the authenticity of the translation аnd whether the article actually refers to Petitioner or his story.
. Petitioner claims, but provides no evidence, that his attacker was a member of the Muslim fundamentalist group, Gamat Al Islamiyah.
. In addition to concurring with the AO's determination that Petitioner’s testimony was internally inconsistent and vague, the IJ determined that Petitioner сould not sufficiently justify his trips back to Egypt, discussed infra p. 12-13.
. It is significant that Petitioner’s attack occurred in Greece. Unlike some of the cases we review where documentation is difficult to obtain, such as in the genocide-ravaged country of Rwanda, Greece is a modem country, and therefore Petitioner reasonably may be expected to provide such documentation, or at a minimum, an explanation for the absence of such documentation.
. In November of 1997, a group of Muslim extremists opened fire on Egyptians and tourists at the temple of Hachepsut in Luxor, Egypt. Sixty people were killed, and twenty were wounded. The attack was believed to be aimed at disrupting the tourist industry.
. We urge that in the future, an IJ should be more comprehensive in discussing his analy
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sis of potentially relevant documentary evidence so that a reviewing court can evaluate whether such evidence was properly considered.
See El Moraghy,
. Having found that Pеtitioner has failed to prevail on his asylum claim, we also must affirm the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal. The burden of proof required for Petitioner to succeed in a withholding of removal claim is that there is a "clear probability” of persecution, which is higher than the "well-founded fear” standard implicated by an asylum claim.
See Mediouni v. INS,