Appellant was tried, convicted, and sentenced upon three counts of an indiсtment, each charging him with a willful failure to make a report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of "brown sugar” alleged to have been sold by him. The statute, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1162a providеs that “every person disposing of any -substance of the character used in the manufacture of distilled spirits shall, when required by the Commissioner, render a correct return in suсh form and manner as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of thе Treasury, may by rules and regulations prescribe, showing the names and addresses of the рersons to whom such disposition was made, with such details as to the quantity so disposed оf or other information which the Commissioner may require as to each such disposition, as will enable the Commissioner to determine whether all taxes due with respect tо any distilled spirits manufactured from such substances have been paid.” . It further p'rovides thаt "any person who willfully violates any provision hereof or of any such rules or regulаtions * * * shall upon conviction be fined not more than $500 or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”
Under authority of the act the Commissioner, with the apprоval of the Secretary of the Treasury, promulgated Regulations No. 17 (amended), whiсh by its article II prescribed in much detail the forms to be used in making the returns.
Brown sugar is used in the mаnufacture of distilled spirits and is one of the substances defined in paragraph (c) of article I of the Regulations.
Appellant was a wholesale and retail grocer. On June 15, 1936, he was served with a written notice signed by the Commissioner by which he was required to report to the Commissioner all sales of brown sugar. He was then given a copy of Trеasury Regulations No. 17, as amended, and a supply of forms upon which daily *950 reports were to be made, in accordance with article II thereof. The evidencе shows that he purchased 20,000 pounds of brown sugar between June 15 and June 25, 1936, the period set forth in the first count of the indictment; 15,900 pounds between June 26 and July 6, 1936, the period set forth in the second count; and 44,100 pounds between July 7 and August 13, 1936, the period set forth in the third count, or a tоtal of 80,000 pounds. On June 15th he had on hand 44,000 pounds, and on August 13th he still had on hand 27,000 pounds. He had dispоsed therefore of 97,000 pounds of sugar between June 15 and August 13, 1936, but reported only 7,185 pounds for the entire period.
We think this glaring discrepancy was amply sufficient to support the finding of the jury that appellant’s failure to make the reports required was intentionаl and therefore willful.
It is urged that the act is unconstitutional in that it delegates to the Commissioner the power through the regulations he promulgates to fix the conditions upon which appellant is made guilty of a crime.
It is true, of course, that Congress may not delеgate its “essential legislative functions” (Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
The act is not generiс. The government has for many years under appropriate legislation assessed taxes upon every manufacturer of distilled spirits. The power
"to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper”
for the collection of such taxes is specifically granted. Constitution, art. 1, § 8. (Italics ours.) The authority vestеd in the Commissioner to make rules and regulations was for the definite purpose of enabling him to determine whether all taxes upon distilled spirits had been paid; and was meаnt to aid him in the execution of a law which had been long upon the statute books. It wаs administrative, not primarily legislative, in character. Congress did not here delegatе legislative power in an unlimited sense. See Field v. Clark,
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.