PATRICK DI SANTO v. UNITED STATES
2024-1694
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
March 11, 2025
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:23-cv-02099-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
VIJAYA SURAMPUDI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
Before LOURIE, DYK, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Di Santo appeals pro se from a judgment of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court“) dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
I
On December 8, 2023, Mr. Di Santo filed a pro se complaint in the Claims Court. Mr. Di Santo‘s complaint named as defendants the United States, his former spouse, and her attorney.1 Mr. Di Santo challenged the entry of a default judgment against him in proceedings before the Supreme Court of the State of New York for the County of Ulster. Those proceedings apparently somehow related to earlier divorce and custody battles with his former spouse and her attorney. Mr. Di Santo further explained that, in his view, his former spouse and her attorney have engaged in a decades-long pattern of filing “frivolous and harassing lawsuits against him, which have resulted in the loss of his custody over his two children and the dissolution of his estate. S. App‘x 6.2
Mr. Di Santo alleged that the default judgment should be set aside in part because at the time of the default, he was “confined to G3 West psych pod in the Bradenton[,] Florida detainment center under the judicial care of Judge Hunter Carrol.” S. App‘x 9. He claimed that, despite his efforts to have the default set aside by the New York state courts, those courts impermissibly “denied [him] equal accommodations” for his traumatic brain injury, and in doing
The government moved to dismiss Mr. Di Santo‘s complaint, arguing that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over his claims. The Claims Court agreed with the government, granted the motion, and dismissed Mr. Di Santo‘s complaint.
Mr. Di Santo appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
II
We review dismissals by the Claims Court for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The plaintiff must establish the court‘s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Unrepresented plaintiffs are not held to as stringent a pleading standard as represented parties. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). However, this principle does not relieve an unrepresented plaintiff of the obligation to establish jurisdiction. See Kelley v. Sec‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The Claims Court possesses jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
Although Mr. Di Santo named the United States as a defendant in his complaint, it is apparent that his claims
We have considered Mr. Di Santo‘s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.3
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
