97 Mich. 1 | Mich. | 1893
Plaintiff, a dealer in horses, on April 14, 1891, wired defendant from New York, asking the price of a certain horse called “ Golden. Rod,” then owned by defendant, at Jackson, this State. To this communication defendant-replied by wire on the 16th, saying; “ $500 lowest for soft bay horse Golden Rod.” Upon receipt of this message, and on the same day, plaintiff again wired
The main controversy in the case is, was the injury to
The court was not in error in this, interpretation of the contract. The plaintiff’s proposition was to take the horse at the price named, if he was perfectly sound. Defendant accepted the terms of the proposition, but added: “If you take him, it must be closed and the horse taken away without delay.” It is said that there is no substantial variance between the terms of plaintiff’s offer and defendant’s acceptance; but there is a material difference. The acceptance left the question open to be determined by the plaintiff* whether he would take the horse at once, and under it he was bound to decide .whether he would comply with defendant’s demand. The proposition of -defendant was tantamount to saying: “I will take the $500 you offer on condition only that you take the horse immediately. If you do not conclude to do so, I do not accept your terms.” It is not true that under such circumstances the minds of the. parties had met so that the contract was completed. Neither can it be said that the posting of the letter by plaintiff to Hatch completed it. Until the 'plaintiff had in turn notified the defendant that he would take the horse as defendant proposed, it was not completed; and this was not done until Hatch called upon the defendant, a week later. In any .-view of the case, the contract cannot be said to have been completed until that
Where an offer is by letter, the usual mode of acceptance is by sending a letter announcing a consent to accept. There are other modes of acceptance, which are equally conclusive upon the parties; but in the present case no letter was written to defendant accepting his-proposition. Mr. Hatch, the agent of plaintiff, was directed to go to defendant, pay the money, and take the horse. He did not go until a week after, and at that time defendant might have said: " You have come too late. My proposition was an immediate delivery. The plaintiff cannot have the horse. He has not accepted my offer to take him without delay." If this position had been taken by the defendant, and he had refused to deliver the horse, no one would have claimed that plaintiff could recover him in an action. To make a completed contract, the minds of the parties must meet; and, where a proposition is in writing, the acceptance must be absolute, and identical with the terms of the proposal. The authorities cited by defendant’s counsel do not meet the case presented by this record.
Judgment affirmed.
Counsel cited: Benj. Sales (4th Amer. ed.), p. 55, and note; Crook v. Cowan, 64 N. C. 743; Lungstrass v. Insurance Co., 48 Mo. 201; Cooper v. Altimus, 62 Penn. St. 486; Patton v. Hassinger, 69 Id. 311, 314; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103; Milling Co. v. Brown, 128 Mass. 171.