KENNETH R. DEYO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v VICKI E. DEYO, Defendant-Appellee.
SC: 126795
Michigan Supreme Court
December 15, 2005
COA: 245210; Livingston CC: 01-030982-DM
Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice; Michael F. Cavanagh, Elizabeth A. Weaver, Marilyn Kelly, Maura D. Corrigan, Robert P. Young, Jr., Stephen J. Markman, Justices
On November 10, 2005 the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the May 25, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal is again considered and, pursuant to
We do not retain jurisdiction.
CORRIGAN, J., dissents and states as follows:
I would deny leave to appeal.
In 1994, plaintiff‘s father, Orville Quinney, became ill, and the parties began caring for him. In 1996, plaintiff‘s father moved into a new house with the parties, and plaintiff quit his job to care for his father full time. Plaintiff was the conservator of his father‘s estate and apparently used those assets to substitute for his outside employment. Plaintiff‘s father died in 1997 and left a large inheritance1 to plaintiff alone. The inheritance consisted primarily of securities, a bank account, and real estate in South Lyon, Howell, Warren, Roseville, and Milford.
The trial court agreed with plaintiff that some of the real estate and securities inherited by plaintiff had not been commingled with the marital estate and were part of plaintiff‘s separate estate. However, the court included this separate property in the marital estate for distribution purposes because the court believed that defendant‘s “assistance in caring for [plaintiff‘s] father as well as her continuation in the strained marriage for so many years created a situation whereby she did contribute to the inherited estate.” The court awarded defendant the entire marital estate of $714,6342 and half of a piece of plaintiff‘s inherited South Lyon property (the Eleven-Mile Road farm) worth $798,400.3
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split unpublished opinion per curiam. The majority concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the entire inherited estate should be included in the marital estate because defendant contributed to the acquisition of the inherited estate by assisting with the care of plaintiff‘s father.
I favor denying leave to appeal, first, because this case presents absolutely no issues of jurisprudential significance. The outcome of this case turns on its particular facts. The law regarding the division of inherited property in divorce proceedings has been thoroughly addressed by this Court. The only reason to interfere in the lower courts’ rulings is to engage in error correction. Because I do not believe that the Court of Appeals decision is “clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice,”
Here, the parties used the inherited assets to make purchases to improve the marital estate. When plaintiff‘s father became ill, the parties used the father‘s money to purchase a new home, where the three of them lived together. After the father died, plaintiff recorded a deed transferring that house to defendant and him. The parties used inherited funds to buy another house next door, which they rented out. The parties also used inherited funds to remodel the marital home, to pay joint credit card debts, and to purchase fertilizer, a power washer, a truck, and lawn maintenance equipment for plaintiff‘s planned new business, as well as a car for their daughter. Plaintiff‘s use of the inherited assets in this manner shows that he treated certain of the inherited assets as marital property.
Second, the trial court correctly concluded that the inheritance should be included as part of the marital estate because defendant helped care for plaintiff‘s sick father. A spouse‘s separate assets may be included in the marital estate if the award is “insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance” of the other party,
[I]n Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 294; 527 NW2d 792 (1995), this Court held that the defendant‘s inherited stock in a family-owned company was available for invasion because the plaintiff‘s handling of child-rearing and domestic duties had freed the defendant to concentrate on building up that company. The Hanaway Court found that the
defendant‘s stock had “appreciated because of defendant‘s efforts, facilitated by plaintiff‘s activities at home.” Id. at 294.
Similarly here, defendant‘s efforts to care for plaintiff‘s father preserved the father‘s fortune by saving the costs associated with a nursing home. Additionally, the money saved by caring for plaintiff‘s father at home presumably accrued interest, allowing the estate to appreciate in value. Thus, when plaintiff‘s father died, the inheritance was larger because of defendant‘s efforts. Defendant thus “contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation” of the inherited property under
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., join the statement of CORRIGAN, J.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
December 15, 2005
Clerk