34 N.H. 478 | N.H. | 1857
Jonathan M. Dexter, according to the agreed case, died seized of the land, in May, 1848, and by his will directed his executors to sell it at such times as they might deem expedient. The will made no other disposition of the land. The will does not give the executors any estate in the land, but only a bare authority to. sell. A devise to executors to sell passes the interest in the land, but a devise that the executors shall sell, or that the land shall be sold by them, gives them but a power. Littleton, sec. 169; 4 Kent’s Com. 320; Howel v. Barnes, Cro. Car. 382; Jackson v. Schauber, 7 Cowen 187.
The land then descended to the plaintiffs, heirs at law of the devisor, upon his death, and the executors, not having exercised their power to sell, the legal title remains in the plaintiffs.
By the common law, an heir or devisee cannot maintain trespass until he has entered and taken actual possession. But if he entered after the trespass was committed, he might maintain his action for a trespass committed before his entry, and after the death of his ancestor, or devisor. In such case his entry gave him in law a possession by relation from the death of the devisor, or ancestor. Com. Dig., Trespass, (B, 3 :) 1 Chitty’s Pl. 177.
Supposing an entry to be necessary to maintain this action, the bringing of the suit is a sufficient ratification of Parker’s act of entering in behalf of the plaintiffs, and the entry vested in the plaintiffs, by relation, a legal possession, sufficient to maintain this action.
Even if the doctrines of the common law were applied to the case, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. But in this State the party who has an estate in land and a right of entry, is, as a general rule, supposed to have entered and become actually seized and possessed according to his title, for the purposes of his remedy by writ of entry or action of trespass. This rule is not allowed to change the substantial liability and right of the parties; where an entry is necessary to take advantage of a condition or forfeiture, it must be actually made. In that case the estate of the plaintiff commences with his entry. Until he enters, he has made no election to insist on the forfeiture or breach of condition. But where a party has an estate, and not a mere right by entry to obtain an estate, by immemorial usage in this State, he may, without regard to the derivation of his title, count in' a writ of equity on his own seizin, and a disseizin done to himself, although he never had actual possession of the land. The law in such case for the purposes of the remedy sup
The plaintiffs áre entitled to recover, and the amount must be ascertained by reference to an arbitrator or commissioner, as is provided in the case.