(аfter summing up the facts to the jury). This cause has been argued, as if there was something peсuliar in an action for a libel, and as if it rested on harsh and extraordinary principles, not to be encouraged in an enlightened age. I know of nothing that justifies such a notion. The case of libels stands upon the same general grounds as other rights of action for wrongs. The. general rule of law is, that whoever does an injury to another is liable in damages to thе extent of that injury. It matters not, whether the injury is to the property, or the person, or the rights, оr the reputation, of another. The law has declared all these entitled to its prоtection; and whoever wantonly assails them must answer in damages for the consequences. Civil society could not exist upon any other terms. Injuries to the reputation, by gross slanders and degrading libels, are oftentimes more extensive in mischief, and more fatal to the public peace and to private happiness, than any which can affect mеre -corporeal property. Indeed the dearest property, which a man has, is often his good name and character; and as to a woman, without the possеssion of a fair fame, and pure, unsullied chastity, she is deemed a ruined outcast, unworthy of сonfidence, and sunk in irretrievable degradation.
Nor is there any difficulty in defining or ascertaining what the law deems a libel. Notwithstanding the suggestions thrown out in the defence, it is as plain and wеll settled as any doctrine of the law. Any publication, the tendency of which is to degradе and injure another person, or to bring him into contempt, ridicule, or hatred; or which accuses him or her of a crime punishable by law, or of an act odious and disgraceful in society, is a libel. If it is false, be who knowingly writes, publishes, or circulates it, is responsible, in a civil аction, for damages to the party injured. No man has a right to state of another that, which is false and injurious to him. A fortiori no man has a right to give it a wider and more mischievous range by publishing it in a newspaper. The liberty of speech, or of the press, has nothing to do with this subjeсt. They are not endangered by the punishment of libellous publications. The liberty of speech and the liberty of the press do not authorize malicious and injurious defamation. Therе can be no-
The real questions then for the jury are, in the first place, whether the publication is a l{bel; and of this it seems to me there can be no doubt, unless we choose to shut our minds against the obvious meaning of thе language. If it is a libel, then the next consideration is, whether the wife was the party alluded to, and whether the import of the language is truly set forth in the innuendoes in the declaration. Thе next inquiry is, whether the publication was made, by the defendant, with a knowledge that it was libellous. If sо, the law presumes it to be malicious; for there is no pretence to say, that there was any justification from the occasion of publication, and an act is deemеd malicious, not only when it arises from personal spite, but when it is a wanton and intentional injury. Malice is wilfulness. See Duncan v. Thwaites, Barn. & C. 556, 584, 585; Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & C. 247.
Verdict for plaintiffs, $800.