4 Mason C.C. 302 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island | 1826
The statute of descents of Rhode Island (page 222), enacts, “that when any person, having title to any real estate of inheritance, shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend and pass in equal portions to his or her kindred,” in the manner pointed out by the act. One of the clauses, applicable to the facts of the present case, is, “if there be no grandfather,
If the case stood singly upon this clause of the statute, the argument would be irresistible, for the first cousins are nearer of kin than the second. But the prior clause in the statute provides for the right of representation of all descendants. If Waite Dexter, or Waite Brown, had survived the intestate, they would doubtless have been entitled to share in the estate. By this clause the descendants, by representation, are to inherit, as their ancestor would, if the ancestor had survived the intestate. It is argued, that this clause is not applicable to special cases, like the present, but only to cases falling within the general scheme of descents traced out by the act. But there is nothing in the act itself, which leads to such a conclusion. The mere priority of the clauses in the act establishes nothing; for each is an independent canon, and must be construed to apply to all cases, to which it may, in its general sense, be applied. The clause itself is universal and absolute in its terms. It includes all cases. What ground is there for the court to narrow down its universality? Under the old law of descents, no right of representation was allowed, except as far as brothers’ and sisters’ children. The act of 1822 abolished this limitation, and allowed this right of representation ad infinitum. The clause, as to ancestral estates, is perfectly sensible and correct without any limitation. Its object plainly is to ascertain, who are of the whole blood; and when this is ascertained, the scheme of descents is the same as in common cases. In other words, the next of kin are to be ascertained by the general regulations of the act; and these provide for an indefinite representation by descendants of the person, who, if living, would have been the next of kin.
The judgment of the court is, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover only one eighteenth part of the estate. Judgment accordingly.