20 N.M. 572 | N.M. | 1915
OPINION OF THE COURT.
— This is an appeal from a decree confirming a sale under a mortgage foreclosure. Upon the coming in of the referee’s report of sale, the appellants filed objections to the-confirmation of the sale, setting up various objections, some of which are available and some are not.
“If such publication -shall be notice of the pendency of a suit, in a district court, the last insertion shall be at least twenty days before the date on or before which the defendant is notified to appear. In all other cases the last insertion shall be at least three days before the date fixed in such notice for the taking of the action concerning which the publication is made.”
It therefore clearly appears from the terms of the statute, itself, that 28 full days need not elapse between the first insertion of the notice and the day of sale, because, if a sale under a mortgage foreclosure may be made 3 days after the fourth and last insertion of the notice, necessarily 28 days cannot have elapsed since the first publication. We therefore hold that this section of the statute is complied with if 4 successive weekly notices of such sale are. published, and said sale takes place not less than 3 days after the last insertion of the notice in the newspaper.
“The amount for which said property will be sold, exclusive of the costs of making said sale with interest as provided by said decree, is, to-wit: Decree of foreclosure (principal) $1,567.-25: interest as provided in said decree, $103.44; costs in district and Supreme Courts, $27.10'— total, $1,697.7?”
The argument is made by counsel that this is not a statement of the amount of principal and interest to the date of sale as required by the section, but is merely a statement of the amount for which the propeity will be sold. We do not consider the 'argument as of any importance. It clearly appears from the notice that the amount of principal and interest to the date of sale is stated therein, and no one could have been misled by the slight informality of the notice.
Counsel for appellants suggest that appellee had no right to bid in the property at the sale, there being no express authority in the decree to do so. But the point is not relied upon for a reversal, as, indeed, it probably could not be.
It is argued by appellants that the decree is defective and invalid, but they are precluded from raising any such question in this proceeding; it having on a former appeal been determined that the decree should be affirmed.
There is no error in the record, and for the reasons stated the judgment of the lower court will be affirmed, and it is so ordered.