Michael A. DEWEY, Appellant, v. Helen K. DEWEY (Roberts), Appellee.
No. S-5572.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Nov. 25, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1995.
886 P.2d 623
Fred W. Triem, Petersburg, for appellant.
Charles A. Winegarden, Kodiak, for appellee.
Before MOORE, C.J., RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ., and BRYNER, J., pro tem.*
OPINION
MOORE, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Dewey (Michael) was divorced from Helen Dewey (Helen), now Helen Roberts, in 1985. Michael agreed to pay child support for both their son, born during the marriage, and Michael‘s stepdaughter, born to Helen before the marriage. In 1992, Michael filed a motion for relief from judgment, in which he sought to terminate the support obligation for his stepdaughter. This case requires us to determine whether Michael is obligated under the original agreement to support his stepchild, and, if so, whether Michael has made a sufficient showing to terminate his obligation. We hold that Michael remains obligated under the agreement.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case concerns the obligations of Michael Dewey to support Tisha Melovidov.1
Michael and Helen subsequently petitioned for dissolution of their marriage, and a decree of dissolution was granted in February 1985. The parties were not represented by attorneys when they obtained their dissolution. Since 1985, the parties have not seen each other, nor has Michael seen either his son Robert or his stepdaughter Tisha. Helen Dewey has since remarried and is now known as Helen Roberts. She currently resides in Kodiak, while Michael lives in Missouri.
Because of the accrual of a large arrearage in child support, Michael‘s wages have been garnished, and his federal tax refunds have been seized. Michael filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
III. DISCUSSION
A. Validity of Stepparent‘s Agreement to Support Stepchild 2
“At common law, a stepparent-stepchild relationship imposes no obligations and confers no benefits on either the stepparent or the child.” Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417, 422 (Alaska 1985). While some states impose a duty on the stepparent to support the stepchild as long as the stepparent is married to that child‘s natural parent,3 no such duty exists in Alaska. Id. at 422 n. 10. Thus, while married to Helen, Michael had no duty to support Tisha. Furthermore, even in those states where the stepparent does have a support obligation while married to the natural parent, such obligation terminates upon the divorce of the stepparent from the natural parent. See, e.g.,
However, there are certain exceptions which may cause a court to impose a continuing support obligation on the stepparent. One exception occurs where the stepparent has made an express written or oral agreement to support the stepchild, where such agreement is enforceable under state law. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980). There are other possible exceptions based on equitable principles, such as promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel or equitable adoption.
In this case, Michael explicitly agreed to support Tisha in the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. This agreement is enforceable under Alaska law, and therefore an exception to the general rule that no post-divorce support requirement exists here. While there is no Alaska case directly on point, we have held that parties are bound by settlement stipulations in the same manner as they would be bound by contract. Godfrey v. Hemenway, 617 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1980); Kimball v. First Nat‘l Bank, 455 P.2d 894, 898 (Alaska 1969). “The courts look with favor on stipulations designed to simplify, shorten or settle litigation....” Godfrey, 617 P.2d at 8. Absent a showing of a cognizable contract defense, such as fraud, we
At least one other jurisdiction has explicitly recognized that a stepparent can create a contractual right to support a stepchild. In Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a stepparent was liable for support for a stepchild under a separation agreement incorporated into the divorce decree, but because the stepfather had no underlying legal duty of support, he was unconstitutionally jailed for contempt in an attempt to enforce the agreement. The separation agreement explicitly provided that the stepfather would pay $30 per week support for the stepchild until majority. Id. 412 A.2d at 397. The stepfather fell behind in payments and was imprisoned for contempt of the court decree. Id. 412 A.2d at 397-98. The Maryland Constitution prohibited imprisonment for non-payment of a “debt.” Id. 412 A.2d at 398. The court held that a decree providing for support of dependent children would not constitute “debt” for this purpose. Id. 412 A.2d at 401. However, because the legal duty to support did not ordinarily encompass stepchildren, the stepfather‘s obligation in this case was merely “contractual,” and it created nothing more than a debt for which the constitution afforded him immunity from imprisonment. Id. 412 A.2d at 402. The court noted that the trial court had a wide array of other enforcement tools available. Id. 412 A.2d at 404. The court thus recognized an enforceable contractual obligation based on an agreement by the stepparent similar to Michael‘s agreement. We agree that a stepparent can assume a contractual obligation to support his stepchild.
Helen also asserts that Michael is liable for Tisha‘s support on promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel grounds. Because Michael was bound by an express written agreement to support Tisha, we need not address these arguments.
B. Modification of Stepparent‘s Child Support Obligation
1. Civil Rule 60(b)
Michael moved for relief from judgment pursuant to
[T]he court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
...
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, ... or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the date of notice of the judgment....
Michael argued below for relief from judgment under
[M]odification is only cautiously to be granted; ... some change is not enough; ... the dangers which the decree was meant to foreclose must almost have disappeared; ... hardship and oppression, extreme and unexpected, are significant; and ... the movant‘s task is to provide close to an unanswerable case. To repeat: caution, substantial change, unforeseenness, oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements.
Id. at 813.
Michael alleges several changed circumstances. First, his affidavit states that “[s]ince the time of the dissolution, my income has changed drastically and I have not been able to afford to pay child support for both Tisha and Robert.” While a drastic change in income may qualify as a substantial change in circumstances, Michael provides no supporting evidence of such a change. He states in his reply brief that when he was transferred from Alaska he lost his 25% tax-free COLA and his “generous” Alaska living allowance. He also states that he has remarried and has two children born of this second marriage. However, he does not make any specific showings of the extent to which his income has decreased in relation to his expenses. He simply did not provide the trial court with sufficient evidence of changed economic conditions to warrant modifying his support obligation.7
Michael also points to Helen‘s remarriage to Mr. Roberts as a substantial change in circumstances. He argues that “[s]ince 1988, she has had another source of support for Tisha.” Again, Michael fails to provide any specific evidence demonstrating how much Helen‘s situation has improved, if at all, and how much Tisha‘s need for child support has decreased.8 Furthermore, under the general rule in Alaska regarding stepparents, as provided in Burgess, Mr. Roberts would be under no obligation to support Tisha.9
Michael further points to his inability to claim Tisha as a dependent for tax purposes
Relief under
In Lowe v. Lowe, 817 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1991), this court identified four factors, in the context of a property division, which constitute “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6):
- the fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement has been destroyed;
- the parties’ property division was poorly thought out;
- the property division was reached without the benefit of counsel; and
- [the asset in controversy] was the parties’ principal asset.
Id. at 458-59 (citing Schofield v. Schofield, 777 P.2d 197, 202 (Alaska 1989)). This court granted relief under 60(b)(6) in Lowe because the dissolution petition provided that the husband would have primary custody of the children, when in fact the wife had primary custody after the dissolution.
There is no such destruction of an underlying assumption of the dissolution petition in this case. The parties contemplated that Helen would have custody and Michael would have visitation rights and pay child support. Nowhere in his briefs does Michael argue that the fundamental assumptions have changed. He argued below that the Schofield factors apply in this case because, had the parties consulted with counsel, he would not have agreed to support Tisha. Even if this were true, it would not evidence the destruction of a fundamental assumption. As Wright & Miller state: “The broad power granted by clause (6) is not for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made. A party remains under a duty to take legal steps to
It is true that the parties were not represented by counsel. If, as Michael alleges, he would not have agreed to support Tisha if he had known he was under no legal obligation to do so, then this factor is relevant. However, Michael did not convince the superior court that he was in fact mistaken as to his legal obligation. Furthermore, even if he were mistaken, the failure to hire counsel by itself would not cause us to grant relief under 60(b)(6). See Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) (father‘s pro se status in trial court did not warrant relief from child support obligation under
A further reason for denying relief here is that the court must “consider[] whether relief under clause (6) will further justice without affecting substantial rights of the parties.” Wright & Miller, § 2864, at 213. Here, terminating Michael‘s support obligation would substantially affect Tisha‘s rights. Michael has not shown that, when his interests are balanced against the interests of the child, it is not inequitable for him to continue paying child support.
Finally, motions under either 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6) must be made within a “reasonable time.” Here, there is no indication that Michael moved for relief from judgment within a reasonable time. Michael simply gives no reason for his seven year delay in filing a
In a similar factual situation, the Indiana Court of Appeals reached a similar holding regarding postjudgment relief. Toller v. Toller, 176 Ind.App. 322, 375 N.E.2d 263 (1978). In Toller, the stepfather made no express agreement to support his stepchild, but he was present at a hearing before the order requiring him to support his stepchild was entered. Id. 375 N.E.2d at 264. The stepfather failed to object to the court order. Over two years after the date of the dissolution, he filed a 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The court found that the stepfather did not file this motion within a “reasonable time” under the circumstances, and therefore affirmed the denial of the motion. Id. 375 N.E.2d at 265. Cf. Gill v. Gill, 211 N.W.2d 374 (N.D.1973) (indicating that Rule 60(b) relief may be appropriate where a support order against a stepfather is obtained by fraud or deceit).
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying Michael‘s motion for relief under
2. Alaska Statute 25.24.170
As discussed with respect to Rule 60(b), Michael has failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in this case. He has not made a specific showing of how much his income has decreased in relation to his expenses, nor has he shown how much, if any, Tisha‘s need for his support has decreased. Cf. Curley, 588 P.2d at 292-93 (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to reduce the amount of support from $200 to $100 per month per child, where the husband‘s income declined from $1,815 to $1,400 per month.).
Another shortcoming in Michael‘s evidence is that he fails to show why the alleged change in financial circumstances justifies modification of his support obligation to Tisha but not to Robert.13 The fact that Michael seeks relief from only his support for Tisha indicates that his motion is based more on a desire for relief from his allegedly contractual obligation than on any material change in circumstances. Because he has not met his burden of proving a material change in circumstances, Michael is not entitled to modification of the child support award under
IV. CONCLUSION
Michael entered into an enforceable contractual obligation to support Tisha, which was incorporated into the divorce decree. His possible mistake as to his legal obligation at the time does not warrant modification under the circumstances of this case. He has not provided sufficient evidence of a substantial and material change in circumstances to justify modifying the child support obligation under
BRYNER, Justice, pro tem., dissenting.
In my view, Michael Dewey made a sufficient showing below to preclude summary denial of his Motion for Relief from Judgment.
In denying Michael‘s motion summarily, the superior court expressed the view that the entry of the dissolution decree effectively precluded Michael from challenging the support obligation. The court stated, in relevant part, that, “with the entry of the order of support, [Michael] lost the right to unilaterally sever” his in loco parentis relationship with Tisha. This conclusion is incorrect as a matter of law: “The mere agreement by an adult to pay money to or for a minor does not, without more, create an in loco parentis relationship....” Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396, 403 n. 8 (1980).
As a separate basis for denying relief, the superior court further found, as a factual matter, that Michael had failed to establish the nature of the mistake that formed the basis for his motion for relief from judgment. My review of the record convinces me that the superior court was clearly erroneous in finding Michael‘s allegation of mistake inadequate. In his affidavit, Michael asserted that, “[a]t the time of the dissolution, I mistakenly agreed to pay child support for Tisha Melovidov and for Robert Dewey even though Tisha Melovidov is not my child. I did so without legal advice; I did not get an attorney to counsel me.” Reading this statement in a reasonable and common sense manner, I think the core allegation set forth therein is abundantly clear: Michael asserts that, at the time of the dissolution, he mistakenly believed that he was legally obligated to make support payments for Tisha, even though she was not his child and he had never adopted her.1
Helen‘s assertion falls short of the mark. Michael‘s offer to pay more for Tisha‘s support than Helen demanded certainly establishes that Michael made no mistake about the amount of support he agreed to pay. Yet Michael is not asserting a mistake as to the amount he agreed to pay; he is claiming a mistake as to his legal obligation to pay any money at all. Michael‘s commendable willingness to pay a generous amount of child support has no logical bearing on, and wholly fails to negate, Michael‘s core claim of mistake: that the source of his generosity lay in his mistaken understanding of his legal duty toward Tisha.
Indeed, Helen‘s asserted willingness to accept monthly child support in the amount of fifty dollars for Tisha provides strong corroboration for Michael‘s claim of mistake and a strong indication that this mistake was not unilateral — that Michael and Helen shared the view that Michael was legally bound to pay at least some amount for Tisha‘s support. Helen presumably would not have proposed even a minimal payment of fifty dollars per month unless she believed that Michael had a legal duty to support Tisha.
Notably, by asserting in her response to Michael‘s motion for relief from judgment that the in loco parentis doctrine obligated Michael to provide for Tisha‘s continued support upon dissolution of the parties’ marriage, Helen reveals her continuing belief that Michael was legally obligated to provide ongoing support for Tisha by virtue of his marriage to Helen, and not merely as a result of his willingness to undertake a contractual support obligation. This legal view is correctly rejected by the majority opinion in this case. And it is precisely the type of mistaken legal belief that, according to Michael, prompted his own decision to agree to pay child support for Tisha.
Scrutiny of the original dissolution paperwork, attached as an exhibit to Michael‘s motion for relief from judgment, lends further credence to Michael‘s assertion of mistake. In the original Petition for Dissolution of Marriage form that was filed by the parties in this case and certified as true by both Michael and Helen, both Tisha and Robert Dewey are listed as “children born of the marriage or adopted.” The Child Support Order form, which appears to have been filled in and submitted by the parties, lists Michael as the father of Tisha, not as Tisha‘s custodian. The Child Support Order purports to require payment of child support based on Michael‘s status as father, not based on the existence of an underlying agreement or contract to pay support for a child that was neither fathered nor adopted by Michael. Likewise, the Decree of Dissolution itself describes child support as an obligation of “the father.”
In short, the record, taken as a whole, strongly suggests that the parties in this case entered into an uncounseled child support agreement in the mistaken belief that Michael‘s legal status was essentially indistinguishable from that of a natural parent: that the law imposed upon Michael the same duties and obligations upon dissolution that would have been imposed on him had he been Tisha‘s biological or adoptive father. The record further suggests that in approving the dissolution and ordering support, the superior court acted upon the mistaken
summary disposition of Michael‘s motion was appropriate, the superior court should have read Michael‘s pleadings in a common sense manner and resolved any ambiguity in Michael‘s favor. At the very least, the court should have called on Michael to submit a supplemental affidavit more particularly describing the mistake that led him to enter into the support agreement.
Accepting as true those allegations that remain uncontroverted in Michael‘s motion for relief from judgment, the record supports the conclusion that “the fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement has been destroyed,” Lowe v. Lowe, 817 P.2d 453, 458 (Alaska 1991), and that relief in at least limited form,2 would be appropriate under
I have no quarrel with the majority‘s holding that a knowing and voluntary agreement between divorcing parents for child support payments is enforceable on contractual grounds, regardless of the obligor parent‘s preexisting legal duty to pay support. A purely contractual duty to pay support, however, could arise only upon the showing of a valid contract — one reflecting the informed agreement of both parties. In my view, a contract based on mutual mistake as to the obligor parent‘s preexisting legal duty to pay support could not be deemed a valid contract. In affirming the superior court‘s denial of relief, the majority of the court simply assumes that a valid contract was formed in this case. In the face of Michael‘s claim of mistake, Helen‘s failure to expressly deny the mistake, and the strong suggestion in the original dissolution paperwork that both parties misunderstood the legal duties applicable in their situation, the majority‘s willingness to assume the existence of a valid contract seems unrealistic and unjustified.
Accordingly, I dissent from the court‘s decision affirming the superior court‘s order denying relief.