236 Mass. 588 | Mass. | 1921
This is an appeal from a decree of the Superior Court confirming a finding of the Industrial Accident Board to the effect that the death of John Devine, an employee under the workmen’s compensation act, was not due nor related to a personal-injury which arose out of or in the course of his employment, and dismissing the claim of his widow for compensation. The deceased employee is alleged to have received on May 14, 1917, the injury from which his death resulted. At that time it was provided by the act that in case of disagreement between the parties concerning compensation, a committee on arbitration should be formed tq decide the matters in dispute. That committee was to be composed of a representative appointed by each of the respective-parties and its chairman was to be a member of the board designated, for that purpose/ St. 1911, c. 751, Part III, §§ 6 and 7,-
1. The dependent now contends that this hearing and decision should have been by a committée on arbitration in accordance with the statute in force at the time of the alleged injury, and that the single member had no jurisdiction, although St. 1917, c. 297, was in force at the time the hearing occurred.
This point was raised for the first time by motion to recommit made in the Superior Court after adverse decisions by the single member and by the full board on appeal. It is assumed, but without so deciding, that the point thus raised, if sound, would affect the jurisdiction of the court and hence may be taken advantage of in this proceeding at any time before final decree. Corcoran v. Higgins, 194 Mass. 291. Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 227 Mass. 46, 50.
This contention of the dependent cannot be supported. St. 1917, c. 297, relates wholly to procedure and affects no substantial rights of the employer, employee or insurer. The general purpose of the workmen’s compensation act was to substitute in cases to which it is applicable, for common law or statutory rights of action and grounds of liability, a system of money payments, based upon the loss of wages, by way of relief for workers or dependents of workers who receive injury in the course of and arising out of their employment. As stated in the “Report of the Commission on Compensation for Industrial Accidents” submitted in 1912, which framed the act adopted by the Legislature (without change except in Part V, § 3, whereby all liability insurance companies were granted the same privileges as the Massachusetts Employees’ Insurance Association in the matter of insuring), at page 46, — “The Massachusetts law may be briefly characterized as an elective compensation insurance law giving
That the amendment of the act made by St. 1917, c. 297, is procedural, not affecting rights of substance, is plain not only from examination of its terms in connection with their context in the act, but from the fact that the sections to which it relates are under Part III of the act, which is entitled “Procedure.” It is clear from this circumstance that it was the legislative intention thereby to deal with procedure alone. Bartoni’s Case, 225 Mass. 349, 354.
The case at bar in this particular is within the authority of many decisions. Rogers v. Nichols, 186 Mass. 440. Selectmen of Amesbury v. Citizens Electric Street Railway, 199 Mass. 394. Howard v. Fall River Iron Worhs Co. 203 Mass. 273,276. Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. 220 Mass. 1, 3. Simmons v. Hanover, 23 Pick. 188. Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506. Ay-Yu-Tse-Mil-Kin v. Smith, 194 U. S. 401. Campbell v. Iron-Silver Mining Co. 27 C. C. A. 646; 83 Fed. Rep. 643. See in this connection Wilson v. Head, 184 Mass. 515; Yeomans v. Heath, 185 Mass. 189.
It was held in Commonwealth v. Phelps, 210 Mass. 78, after reviewing many decisions,, that a statute enacted after the com
It seems plain to us that no constitutional right of the employee or of his dependent was in the slightest impaired by the enactment and enforcement of St. 1917, c. 297.
2. No discussion is required to demonstrate that the agreement of the insurer, to the effect that the employee received an injury on May 14, 1917, for which compensation was paid, had no reference whatever to the contention of the insurer that the cause of the employee’s death was something wholly unconnected with that injury. The decision of the board was not contrary to any agreed fact.
3. The case was fully heard by the single member and his decision was that there was no causal connection between the death of the employee and the injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. When the cause came on to be heard before the board on review, the dependent moved for further hearing on the merits supporting that motion with affidavits as to additional evidence. This motion was denied and the decision of the single member was affirmed. Motion was made by the dependent in the Superior Court that the cause be recommitted to the board for a new hearing with additional evidence on the merits. That motion for a general rehearing was denied. In this there was no reversible error. It is provided by the act, Part III, § 10, as amended, that “No party shall as a matter of right be entitled to a second hearing upon any question of fact.” The implication of this sentence is that commonly there shall be no rehearing. There is no doubt of the power of the court to send a case back for further hearing when justice seems to require it. Nelson’s Case, 217 Mass. 467. Doherty’s Case, 222 Mass. 98. Both the Industrial Accident Board and a judge of the Superior Court have decided that in the present ease there ought to be no rehearing. There is nothing on this record to show that there has been any abuse of discretion, and we are not able to say that it was not wisely exercised. Fierro’s Case, 223 Mass. 378. Bean’s Case, 227 Mass. 558. Corski’s Case, 227 Mass. 456.
4. The finding of the Industrial Accident Board manifestly
Decree affirmed.