HAYES v. STATE
298 Ga. App. 419, 680 S.E.2d 508
Court of Appeals of Georgia
March 2, 2017
unidentified level of drugs in Weaver‘s body “was insufficient to establish contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 419, 424 (2) (680 SE2d 508) (2009) (finding that evidence that defendant appeared in court smelling of alcohol and with alcohol in his system was insufficient to establish contempt beyond a reasonable doubt). See also Moody v. State, 131 Ga. App. 355, 357-358 (1) (206 SE2d 79) (1974) (defendant, who was brought to сourt by law enforcement officers and not on her own volition, was not subject to contempt merely for appearing there in a drunken condition).
The January 26 hearing was continued, not because of Weaver‘s condition, but because the judge chose to incarcerate her even though she had in no way intеrfered with the proceedings. Unlike in Hayes, supra, where the possibility of impairment “led the trial court to vacate Hayes’ earlier plea,” Hayes, 298 Ga. App. at 423 (2), nothing compelled the trial court to continue the hearing. Indeed, when she did not appear at the continued hearing, the court simply proceeded in her absence and аdopted the case plan agreed to by the parties at the start of the original hearing.
Because there is no evidence that Weaver interfered with the court, the judgment of contempt should be reversed.
DECIDED MARCH 2, 2017.
Conowal Welch Womack, Thomas D. Womack, for appellants.
Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Dennis R. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, Shalen S. Nelson, Calandra A. Harps, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Richard W. Highsmith, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF COLUMBUS v. FOUR JS FAMILY, LLLP.
A16A1741
798 SE2d 15
Court of Appeals of Georgia
March 2, 2017
ELLINGTON, Presiding Judge.
The Development Authority of Columbus (“DAC“) appeals from the trial court‘s orders granting Four JS Family, LLLP‘s, motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the closing of the sale by DAC of certain downtown Columbus commercial property and denying DAC‘s motion to dismiss Four JS‘s petitiоn for injunction and temporary restraining order. DAC claims that the trial court‘s orders are based on an erroneous finding that the Development Authorities
This dispute arises out of DAC‘s agreement to sell a 1.75 acre tract of commercial property (the “Property“) in downtown Columbus to Vision Hospitality Group, Inc. The record shows that the Property, which is currently used as a parking lot, is located across the street from the Columbus Ironworks Convention and Trade Center and also adjoins the Marriott Downtown Columbus Hotel, which is owned by plaintiff Four JS. DAC acquired the Property from the City in 2009. The City, from as early as 2001, and later, DAC, sought to have a hotel built and operated on the Property to support the Trade Center. In early 2016, Vision and DAC entered into an Agreement of Sale and Purchase (the “Sale Agreement“) providing for, among other things, the sale of the Property to Vision for $50,000 and committing Vision, upon satisfaction of certain conditions, to construct a 125-room hotel and a parking garage thereon.
Four JS filed a petition for injunction and temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin DAC and Vision from proceeding in furtherance of the Sale Agreement. Four JS claimed that DAC had violated
The trial court issued an order temporarily enjoining the closing of the Sale Agreement and set a hearing for determination of whether the temporary restraining order should be converted to a preliminary injunction. DAC moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At the subsequent hearing, the trial court first heard argument on the motion to dismiss, and it then held an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the closing of the Sale Agreement until further order of the court and, in a separate order, denied DAC‘s motion to dismiss. DAC appeals from these orders.
1.
We first consider whether, as DAC contends, the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the pеtition pursuant to
“[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 775 (755 SE2d 796) (2014). In other words, “[i]f, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. On appeal, we “review de novo a trial court‘s determination that a pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with any doubts resolved in the plaintiff‘s favor.” (Citation and punctuation omittеd.) Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, 324 Ga. App. 750 (751 SE2d 545) (2013).
In its petition, Four JS asserts that, while development authorities are authorized to sell or otherwise dispose of real property under the Act,
similarly-worded
In resolving this question, “we look to the literal language оf the statute, the rules of statutory construction and rules of reason and logic, the most important of which is to construe the statute so as to give effect to the legislature‘s intent.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Nix, 220 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) (469 SE2d 497) (1996). See
The purposes of the Act “are tо develop and promote trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities for the public good and the general welfare and to promote the general welfare of the state.”
Four JS contеnds that the sale of the Property by the Authority at less than fair market value would nevertheless fail to comply with
Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (7.1) of this Code section, to dispose of any real property for fair market value, regardless of prior development of such property as а project, whenever the board of directors of the authority may deem such disposition to be in the best interests of the authority if the board of directors of the authority prior to such disposition shall determine that such real property no longer can be used advantageously as a project for the development of trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, to dispose of any real property for fair market value or any amount below fair market value as determined by the board of directors of the authority, regardless оf prior development of such property as a project, whenever the board of directors of the authority may deem
such disposition to be in the best interests of the authority if the board of directors of the authority prior to such disposition shall determine that such real property no longer can be used advantageously as a project for the development of trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities and if title to such real property is to be transferred to the state.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The plain language of the Act refutes Four JS‘s argument that
To put the foregoing in more general terms, the Act sets forth a statutory scheme which differentiates between real property used (or to be used) as a project and real property which an аuthority‘s board determines cannot be used as a project. A sale by an authority of the latter would not come within the Act‘s purpose of developing and promoting trade, commerce, industry, and employment opportunities but is expressly allowed under conditions which require sales of such property to be made at fair market value to parties other than the State. Thus, Four JS is not entitled to relief on the ground that DAC‘s agreement to sell the Property at less than fair market value “for a project,” as the petition alleges, constituted a violation of
2. As the triаl court erred in denying DAC‘s motion to dismiss the petition, it also erred in granting Four JS‘s request for a
Judgment reversed. Branch and Mercier, JJ., concur.
DECIDED MARCH 2, 2017.
Buchanan & Land, Jеrry A. Buchanan, Benjamin A. Land, Shannon F. Land, for appellant.
Waldrep Mullin & Callahan, Joseph L. Waldrep, C. Morris Mullin, for appellee.
Kelly J. Long Pridgen, G. Joseph Scheuer, amici curiae.
SWINT et al. v. MAE et al.
A16A1759
798 SE2d 23
Court of Appeals of Georgia
March 2, 2017
BETHEL, Judge.
Fritz and Melissa Swint (“Plaintiffs“) brought a medical malpractice action against multiple medical providers1 including Tonya Mae, M.D. (“Dr. Mae“), and Pamela Roy, R.N. (“Nurse Roy“) (collectively, the “Defendants“), alleging the dоctors and nurse breached the standard of care owed to Mr. Swint in failing to correctly position and/or reposition him prior to and during surgery, which resulted in permanent injury to his right arm. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of causation. After arguments, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to Defendants,2 and this appeal followed.
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by holding that there was no evidence in the record that Defendants proximately caused any injury to Mr. Swint, by mischaracterizing Plaintiffs’ causation expert‘s testimony, and by misapplying the standard for medical causation. We disagree and affirm for reasons еxplained below.
“To prevail at summary judgment under