Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc.Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Ricardo M. Urbina
GRANTING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Katease Devaughn, brings suit against the defendant, Inphonic, Inc. (“Inphonic”), alleging that the defendant fired her in violation of
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The defendant is an online provider of wireless services with its principal place of business in the District of Columbia. Am. Compl. ¶ 2; Def.’s Mot. to Transfer (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1 & Ex. 1 (“Haithcock Aff.”). The defendant also has an office in Largo, Maryland. Def.’s Mot.
During her employment with the defendant, the plaintiff worked exclusively at the Largo office and her personnel records remain in Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10. The plaintiff’s supervisor at the time of her termination, J.D. Darby, resides in Maryland. Id. ¶ 11. The plaintiff’s supervisor prior to Darby, James Reed, currently resides in Virginia. Haithcock Aff. ¶ 12.
In June, 2005, the plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the Prince George’s County Human Relations Commission in which she listed the defendant’s address as 9301 Peppercorn Place, Largo, Maryland. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer (“Def.’s Reply”) at Ex. 1 at 2. The plaintiff does not allege that she filed any similar claim in the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights.
B. Procedural History
In May 2005, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia in which she asserted that the defendant violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and the District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15. On June 22, 2005, the plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute those causes of action with claims that the defendant violated
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and Transfer to Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity,
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
In an action where venue is proper,
Accordingly, the defendant must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the
B. The Court Grants the Defendant’s Motion to Transfer
The defendant argues that the plaintiff could have brought this suit in Maryland because a “substantial part” of the plaintiff’s claims arose in Maryland. Def.’s Mot. at 3. In support of its argument, the defendant notes that the plaintiff is a Maryland citizen, that her personnel records are located in Maryland, and that she was hired and fired in Maryland. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff worked exclusively in the defendant’s Maryland office. Id. The plaintiff, on the other
1. The Plaintiff Could Have Brought the Action in the District of Maryland
For the court to transfer an action to another venue, the defendant must show that the plaintiff originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622. In cases involving federal questions, a plaintiff may properly bring an action in a judicial district where a defendant resides.
The parties agree that the defendant conducts business in its Largo, Maryland office though its principal place of business is in the District of Columbia. Am. Compl. ¶ 2; Def.’s Mot. at 1. Since the defendant is a resident of both Maryland and the District of Columbia, the courts in both forums have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant.
Having established that the plaintiff originally could have brought this case in Maryland, the court’s next inquiry centers on whether the defendant has demonstrated that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice support transfer to the District of Maryland.
a. Private-Interest Factors
As discussed supra, the private-interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendant; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses, but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16 (citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, Heller Fin., 713 F. Supp. at 1129, 15 FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3848). In support of its motion, the defendant argues that the private-interest factors justify transfer to Maryland. Def.’s Mot. at 3. The plaintiff, in turn, argues that the court should defer to her choice to file suit in the District of Columbia. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. While courts normally defer to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, Schmidt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 33, courts afford “substantially less deference” to that choice where the plaintiff is not a resident of that forum or where the claims lack substantial connections to that forum. DeLoach v. Philip Morris Cos., 132 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 2000). Here, the plaintiff is a resident of Maryland and her employment by the defendant, from which the claims in this case arise, occurred in Maryland. Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Def.’s Mot. at 1. The plaintiff does not allege that the
In contrast to the tenuous connection this case has with the plaintiff’s choice of forum, Maryland has many material connections with the present action and therefore, is entitled to some weight. Wilderness Soc. v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2000). The plaintiff and the defendant are both Maryland residents, Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Def.’s Mot. at 1, the plaintiff’s personnel records are located in Maryland, Id. ¶ 10, and the plaintiff worked exclusively in Maryland before she was fired, Id. ¶ 6. The plaintiff’s claims, furthermore, arose out of her employment with the defendant at the Largo, Maryland office. Haithcock Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6-9.
As residents of Maryland, Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Def.’s Mot. at 1, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant should be inconvenienced by transferring this case to Maryland. Moreover, the witnesses to this action are likely to be employees at the Largo office and should not be inconvenienced by having to testify in Maryland. Indeed, the plaintiff’s most recent manager at Inphonic resides in Maryland. Haithcock Aff. ¶ 11. In any event, the plaintiff has not asserted that any witnesses will be unavailable for trial if the action is transferred to Maryland.1
In addition to the availability of witnesses, the plaintiff’s personnel records are located in Maryland. Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, the accessibility to sources of proof weighs in favor of transfer to Maryland. Schmidt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 35; Kafack, 934 F. Supp. at 8 (finding that transfer was proper where a majority of the witnesses and records were located in Maryland). Because both
b. Public-Interest Factors
Having concluded that the private-interest factors favor transfer of this action, the court’s next inquiry centers on the public-interest factors. The public-interest factors include: (1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16. When applied to the facts in this case, the public-interest factors also weigh in favor of transfer to Maryland.
As to the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws, the federal court for the District of Maryland is presumed to be as competent as this court in deciding issues of federal law. Liban, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (stating that the federal court in the district of Maryland is competent to decide federal issues) (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Because the plaintiff brings claims under
The second public-interest factor also supports the defendant’s motion to transfer because this court has no reason to believe that the docket of the District of Maryland court is any more congested than the docket of this court. Schmidt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 35. The plaintiff, moreover, has not argued that transfer would delay resolution of her case. Additionally, the case has not progressed so far that delay would result if another court must familiarize itself with the disputed
Finally, the local interest factor also weighs in favor of transfer to Maryland. The plaintiff’s claims involve Maryland residents, Am. Compl. ¶ 1, Def.’s Mot. at 1, and alleges discriminatory practices that occurred at the defendant’s office in Largo, Maryland. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6-9. See Liban, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (finding that transfer was proper where a majority of the alleged discriminatory events occurred in Maryland and where those events were directed at a Maryland resident). Indeed, the only interest the District of Columbia has in this matter is in regulating a local corporation. The state of Maryland, on the other hand, has an interest in protecting its citizens from discriminatory behavior and in regulating employers within its borders. Id. The public-interest factors, like the private-interest factors, accordingly support transfer of this case to Maryland.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant’s motion to transfer. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 13th day of December 2005.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge