144 Ga. 743 | Ga. | 1916
So far as material to a decision of this ease, the will of James E. DeYaughn contained the following provisions: “Item 2. I give to my beloved wife, Mary Porter DeYaughn, the house and lot on which I now live, to have and to hold for and during the remainder of her life, and at her death said house and lot to go or revert to my estate; the foregoing provision is intended in lieu of dower.” And in the third item of the will the testator bequeathed to his wife, Mary Porter DeYaughn, and to his five children, “all the remainder of my realty and personalty and other property of every kind and description, share and share alike,” and provided for certain specific legacies to his wife and one of his children. Under the terms of the will the widow of
We are of the opinion that the court properly held that the executor of Mrs. Mary Porter DeYaughn was entitled to recover. The second item of the will clearly devised to her a life-estate in the house and lot therein described. The reversionary interest in said property constituted a part of the remainder or residue of the testator’s estate, unless we should hold that as to this reversionary interest James E. DeYaughn died intestate; and there is no reason that we can conceive for so holding. After the expiration of the life-estate which was carved out of the property referred to in the second item of the will, the reversion became a part of the remainder of the property disposed of in the third term of the will. We do not overlook the provision of our law that the intention of the testator controls; but the intention should be sought in the language employed, and the language employed here is neither vague nor ambiguous. In order to reach a different conclusion from that, announced above, as we have already said, it would be necessary to hold- that, as to the reversionary interest in the property devised in the second item of the will, there was an intestacy; and such a holding would be purely