91 Mich. 382 | Mich. | 1892
The petition in this case sets forth that the relator is a Michigan corporation, organized under “‘An act to authorize the formation of corporations for
“ The office for the transaction of the business of the said corporation shall be in the township of Hamtramck, in the county of Wayne, and State of Michigan.”
That it owns four vessels engaged in the transportation •of iron ore, chiefly to the ports of Lake Erie, but that occasionally cargoes of iron ore have been carried to the ports of Detroit and Wyandotte; that in February, 1892, it entered into a contract at Cleveland, Ohio, with parties residing there, for the employment of its vessels in transporting ores during the ' entire season of 1892 between ports of Lake Superior and Lake Erie; that it hires and maintains a general office for business in said township of Hamtramck, which place bears the sign of petitioner, and that all of its stockholders’ and directors’ meetings are held at said office; that it has no general office for the transaction of business, or other office whatsoever, in the city of Detroit, and that no sign of petitioner is exhibited anywhere in said city; that the business of securing cargoes for the current year will be transacted by its .agents in the Lake Erie ports; that •cargoes for prior years have been secured in the same way; that its agents are - paid commissions for their services; that the moneys earned are, as a rule, collected at .the several places where they become due; that it has no property in the city of Detroit; that its books of .account are kept at the general offices of the Michigan Car Company, in the city of Detroit; that petitioner is ■charged a nominal sum per year on account of the •expense of said book-keeping; that its earnings are paid
The respondent admits the due incorporation of relator, and the statement as to the location of its office in its articles of association. It alleges that the original and the first amended articles of association of relator declared the general office for the transaction of its business to be located in the city of Detroit; that the-amendment changing such office to Hamtramck was not made in good faith, and is not true in point of fact; that its general office for the transaction of its business has always been, and still is, in the city of Detroit; that prior to 1891 relator pretended to have an office on Jefferson avenue, in the township of Hamtramck, at the-residence and place of business of one Vorhees, a few rods from the margin of the Detroit river; that said Vorhees kept a place commonly known as a “roadhouse,” frequented by gentlemen who go out riding, and desire to stop at a place where their horses may be properly taken care of; that said Vorhees is a trainer and driver of trotting horses; that on one end of the stoop of the house of said Vorhees the relator had a small tin sign, with its corporate name marked thereon; that relator never did any business there as a corporation; that
On account of the necessity of an immediate disposition of the question for the interests of the public, we are disposed to waive the objection that the writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy, and dispose of the case upon its merits.
The act under which relator is organized provides that its articles of association shall state—
“The city or town and county in this State where their general office for business is located.”
Section 4 of the tax law of 1891 provides:
“All corporate property, except where some other provision is made by law, shall be assessed to the corporation as to a natural person in the name of the corporation. The place where its principal office in this State is situated shall be deemed its residence.”
The relator claims that the location of its office is a question of' law, and that the articles of association are conclusive on this point, and that as a matter of fact it
In Transportation Co. v. Scheu the tax law of New York provided that—
“All the personal estate of 'every incorporated company liable to taxation on its capital shall be assessed in the tow;n or ward where the principal office or place for transacting the financial concerns of the company shall be."
The act under which the plaintiff in that case was organized provided that a certificate should be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which the principal office for the management of the business of the company should be situated, and that it should state “the name of the city or town and county in which the principal office for managing the affairs of such company is to be situated," and should also keep its stock-books at the place designated in the certificate. The articles of association in that case fixed the office of the corporation at the village of Tonawanda; where the stock-book of the company was kept, and the directors held regular monthly meetings, and one clerk was employed and kept at the office, while an office was maintained in Buffalo, at which the president, secretary, and treasurer of the company chiefly did their business. It will readily be seen that the facts in that case and the statute are different from those in the present case.
In Starch Factory v. Dolloway the plaintiff was a manufacturing corporation, with its manufacturing establishment located, and its business carried on, in the city of Oswego. The books were kept at the treasurer’s office at Auburn, and 'its general financial affairs were transacted there. The certificate was required to state—
*388 “ The names of the town and county in which the operations of the company are to be carried on.”
The tax law provided:
“ All the personal estate of every incorporated company liable to assessment on its capital shall be assessed in the town or ward where the principal office or place for transacting the financial concerns of the company shall be; but, if such company have no principal office or place for transacting its financial concerns, then in the town or' ward where the operations of such company shall be carried on.”
It was also said in this case that the certificate under which the plaintiff was organized—
“Was intended to serve the same purpose as the declaration usually contained in special acts of incorporation, in which it was stated that tfie business was to be carried on in a particular town or city. The location established by the certificate could not be changed at the pleasure of the directors or trustees any more than the corporate name, the period of existence, or the objects for which the company was formed, or the amount of its capital stock.”
The plaintiff was taxed in Oswego, and the assessment there was sustained, notwithstanding that its principal office for the transaction of its financial concerns was in Auburn. A distinction is drawn in that case between manufacturing corporations and transportation companies, whose business could not generally be carried on in a single local jurisdiction. These cases are distinguishable in their facts, as well as in the statute governing them, from the present case.
It must be conceded that Steam-Boat Co. v. Buffalo goes to the full extent of the claim of the relator in this case.
In the case of Pelton v. Transportation Co. the statute of Ohio differs from ours, in that it does not require the articles of association to state that the principal office of
It is undoubtedly true that one may select or change his residence with a view to taxation. The citizen has a right to reside in the country and do business in the city. This, however, must be an actual residence. One •cannot maintain a nominal residence in the country while his actual residence is in the city, and thus avoid taxation in the city. A corporation possesses the same right in this respect that the individual does. A corporation must have a local habitation. It cannot fix a nominal domicile in the country while its actual domicile for business is in the city. If the relator’s position is •correct, it could as well locate its office for business at •a farm-house in some town in the interior of the State as in Hamtramck. It has no business in Hamtramck, and, in the very nature of things, can have none. None of its property is situated there.- The term “for business,” used in the statute, cannot be limited to so narrow a construction as to say that it means simply the annual meeting of the stockholders or meetings of directors. It must be held that the Legislature used the term in its ordinary significance, and intended it to refer to the business in which the corporation was engaged.
This is a Michigan corporation. Its local existence must be held to be in some place in the State where its business is.carried on.
In so far as the authorities above cited hold that the statement in the articles of association is conclusive against the -state for the purposes of taxation, we cannot follow them. The result would be to permit a corporation to have a merely nominal residence in one place,
For the purposes of this case the answer must be taken as true, and from that it appears that the only office for business which the relator has in this State is in the city of Detroit. The statement in its articles of association will undoubtedly estop relator to say that that is not its residence for certain purposes, such as filing chattel mortgages and services of process; but where it is apparent that the sole purpose is to avoid taxation, and that no office for business, within the meauing of the law, is kept at the place mentioned in its articles, the municipality where its" real office for business is kept may assess and tax its personal property.
The writ must be denied.